PRICING DECISIONS FOR A CLOSED-LOOP SUPPLY CHAIN IN A FUZZY ENVIRONMENT

2012 ◽  
Vol 29 (01) ◽  
pp. 1240003 ◽  
Author(s):  
JIE WEI ◽  
JING ZHAO ◽  
YONGJIAN LI

This paper studies pricing problem for a closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer in a fuzzy environment. The purpose of this paper is to explore how the manufacturer makes his decisions about wholesale price and transfer price and how the retailer makes her decisions about retail price and collecting price in the expected value standard. Each firm's optimal pricing strategies are established by using game theory under the centralized and decentralized decision cases, respectively. Managerial insights into the economic behavior of firms are also investigated, which can serve as the basis for empirical study in the future. Moreover, we analyze numerically the results and give some insights on the influence of some parameters.

2012 ◽  
Vol 452-453 ◽  
pp. 663-668 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hong Wei Jiang

With awareness of environmental protection strengthens and constraints of regulations and laws to environmental protection increasing, more and more enterprises focus on the closed-loop supply chain management. Considering difference between new product and remanufactured product, this paper constructs closed-loop supply chain system with manufacturers recycling used products directly from the consumers based on game theory. The optimal pricing decisions and the optimal profit of centralized and decentralized closed-loop supply chain are obtained. It is found that the efficiency of decentralized closed-loop supply chain decreases by 25%. At last, the coordination mechanism is designed to solve the profit conflict in the decentralized closed-loop supply chain by the two-part tariff contract.


2012 ◽  
Vol 220-223 ◽  
pp. 319-322
Author(s):  
Hong Wei Jiang

Based on game theory, this paper constructs closed-loop supply chain system with retailer recycling used products from the consumers incorporating difference between new product and remanufactured product. The optimal pricing decisions and the optimal profits of centralized coordinated and decentralized closed-loop supply chain are obtained. It is found that the efficiency of decentralized closed-loop supply chain decreases by 25%. Finally, the coordination mechanism is designed to solve the profit conflict in the decentralized closed-loop supply chain by the profit sharing contract.


2011 ◽  
Vol 204-210 ◽  
pp. 1710-1715
Author(s):  
Qiao Lun Gu ◽  
Tie Gang Gao

In this paper, we focus on the price decisions of the wholesale price, the retail price and the collecting price for the closed-loop supply chain with and without competition. We obtain the optimal decisions based on two models: Model I without competition and Model II with competition. By the analysis of a numerical example, we find that the competition between the manufacturers in model II will affect their prices decisions and their profits; in model II, the two manufacturers would like to halve the market while the retailer hope to increase the difference of their market shares, and the two manufacturers would not like to increase the substitute ratio of their products while the retailer can benefit from that. So, from the manufacturers’ point of view, they should avoid the competition risk by choosing the independent retailers.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (20) ◽  
pp. 11357
Author(s):  
Kai Liu ◽  
Chunfa Li ◽  
Runde Gu

With the continuous development of e-commerce, it has become normal for the manufacturer to sell products and to collect used products through e-commerce platforms (platform for short). We consider an electronic closed-loop supply chain (E-CLSC) where we composed a manufacturer with remanufacturing capability and a platform that can provide logistics services. The purpose of this paper is to address whether the manufacturer should directly collect used products from the consumer under the platform. Specifically, we have developed four game models, namely model N (no collection), model M (the manufacturer collects), model E (the platform collects), and model T (the third-party collects) and derived the optimal pricing decisions, logistics service level, and collection rate for E-CLSC members. We found that remanufacturing used products is conducive to increasing the profits of the manufacturer and the platform as well as to increasing the utility of the consumer. Under the same conditions, for the manufacturer, the platform, and the consumer, the optimal choice is that the manufacturer directly collects the used products from the consumer. If the manufacturer is unable to establish an effective collection channel, he should consider outsourcing to a contractor and should consider the platform to be under the same conditions. Numerical examples are also given to verify the proposed results.


2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jie Wei ◽  
Guoying Pang ◽  
Yongjun Liu ◽  
Qian Ma

Pricing decisions of a two-echelon supply chain with one manufacturer and duopolistic retailers in fuzzy environment are considered in this paper. The manufacturer produces a product and sells it to the two retailers, who in turn retail it to end customers. The fuzziness is associated with the customers’ demand and the manufacturing cost. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effect of two retailers’ different pricing strategies on the optimal pricing decisions of the manufacturer and the two retailers themselves in MS Game scenario. As a reference model, the centralized decision scenario is also considered. The closed-form optimal pricing decisions of the manufacturer and the two retailers are derived in the above decision scenarios. Some insights into how pricing decisions vary with decision scenarios and the two retailers’ pricing strategies in fuzzy environment are also investigated, which can serve as the basis for empirical study in the future.


2012 ◽  
Vol 236-237 ◽  
pp. 321-325
Author(s):  
Hong Wei Jiang

This paper constructs a closed-loop supply chain system with the manufacturer recycling waste products from the retailer based on game theory in heterogeneous market in which the price of the new product is different from that of the remanufactured product. The optimal pricing decisions of the supply chain without remanufacturing and the closed-loop supply chain with remanufacturing are obtained. Through theoretical analysis and numerical simulation, we obtain the optimum production and pricing strategies, and analyze the impact of the consumers’ acceptance for the remanufactured product on product pricing, which provides a basis for the closed-loop supply chain’s production decisions.


2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qingming Zou ◽  
Guangyu Ye

In a closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, this paper studies the pricing strategies and coordination mechanism of supply chain when the remanufacturing cost is random caused by the proportion of reusability parts in design stage and quality condition of recycling product. The results show that the wholesale price and retail price are negative correlation, while the recycling rate and total profit of supply chain system are positive correlation with the proportion of reusability component designed in new product and quality of recycling product. Moreover, there are conclusions that the wholesale price and retail price are lower while the recycling rate and total profit of supply chain system are higher with centralized decision. Then, in order to coordinate the closed-loop supply chain, this paper develops a revenue-sharing contract, in which the revenue share parameter is determined based on absolute deviation approach. The theoretical results are illustrated by a numerical example.


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