The foreign policy of the people's republic of China: A balance‐sheet

1994 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 20-43
Author(s):  
Robert A. Scalapino
2014 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-34 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shizhong Yang ◽  
Ruining Yang ◽  
Z. Jun Lin

This paper exhibits the historical evolution of the balance sheet in the People's Republic of China. In particular, we examine three major changes in the balance sheet (which reports the financial position of an economic or business entity) since the founding of the new China in 1949 and the political, social and economic changes during this period. The content, structure and presentation of the balance sheet (or alternative forms of the statement in use) are illustrated. The political and economic factors driving its evolution are analyzed to assist readers in understanding the rapid changes in Chinese accounting over the last six decades. The implications of the Chinese experience for international accounting convergence are also briefly outlined.


1978 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-49
Author(s):  
William Minter

Mozambique “switched from a pro-Chinese to a pro-Soviet stance during the Angolan civil war,” writes a commentator in the influential U.S. quarterly Foreign Policy of Fall 1977. “Mozambique said to Cool on Soviets, Turn West,” headlines a Washington Post dispatch of December 15, 1977. The Economist’s Foreign Report claims in its advertising to have been the first to describe the ideological infighting within FRELIMO and the swing to Russia. The commentators seemed to have missed Mozambique’s 1977 trade fair in September, at which the People’s Republic of China won first prize for an exhibit corresponding to Mozambique’s needs, but if they had been there one might well have seen headlines proclaiming Mozambique’s shift back to China.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (04-1) ◽  
pp. 122-133
Author(s):  
Ilya Kolesnikov ◽  
Konstantin Kasparyan ◽  
Elena Malyshkina ◽  
Jordan Gjorchev

The article is devoted to the comprehension of changes in foreign policy of Communist China during Mao Zedong's rule - in late 1940s - mid 1970s. The authors investigate the causes and consequences of fundamental changes in the Chinese foreign policy doctrine, taking into account the whole range of objective and subjective factors that led to the deterioration of the Soviet-Chinese relations and the beginning of rapprochement between China and the USA.


Author(s):  
Anatoliy V. Goncharenko ◽  
Lybov G. Polyakova

The article researches the US foreign policy towards the PRC during Gerald Ford presidency in 1974-1977. It describes the reasons, course and consequences of the intensification of the US foreign policy strategy in the Chinese direction during the investigated period. There was explored the practical realization of the “Pacific Doctrine”by Washington. The role of various groups in the American establishment in the question of the formation of the Chinese White House policy has been analyzed. The specific foreign policy actions of the administration of the US president Gerald Fordon the PRC in 1974-1977 are analyzed. The chief results of the foreign policy of the administration of the President of the United States Gerald Ford (1974-1977) concerning the PRC, which resulted from the real political steps taken by the leaders of both countries, was the establishment of systematic and reliable channels of bilateral ties, expansion of economic, scientific and cultural contacts, the beginning of a systematic exchange of views on the most important issues of international relations. In the second half of the 70’s of the twentieth century this dialogue ensured the continuity of China’s policy in Washington, which was based on the concept of a “balance of power”, while China played a complementary role in the foreign policy strategy of the White House. These factors formed the “Pacific Doctrine” of G. Ford, which gave Beijing the status of an American partner in maintaining a balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region and consolidated a positive assessment of the place and role of the People’s Republic of China in Asian politics in the United States of America. The return of American political thought to the ideas of the combination policy occurred in the formation of US-Soviet strategic parity and awareness of the ruling circles in the United States, due to the defeat in Vietnam, the limited resources of force influence on the international situation. Started in the United States the study of China’s behavior in the international arena and its power parameters made it possible then to draw a preliminary conclusion that the People’s Republic of China can fill the place of the missing link in the “triangle” of the global scheme – a place of counterweight to the USSR; this required the removal of a US-Chinese confrontation. However, the socio-political and ideological contradictions that were pushed to the foreground on the initial stage of the Chinese policy of the administration of G. Ford and the process of normalization of bilateral relations, again made themselves felt at a later stage. Their injection was promoted by the logic of the development of bilateral US-China relations, as well as by a number of internal objective and subjective reasons, as in the People’s Republic of China (a sharp increase in the struggle for power connected with the illness and death of Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong), and in the United States (Gerald Ford made certain curtseys towards the American right-wing conservative forces and began to intensify approaches to Beijing and Moscow, and also the presidential campaign of 1976). Keywords: the USA, PRC, China, foreign policy, American-Chinese relations, “Pacific Doctrine”, Gerald Ford, Henry Kissinger , Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping.


1992 ◽  
Vol 129 ◽  
pp. 103-122 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhai Qiang

The Geneva Conference of 1954 represented an important event in the development of China's foreign policy. For the first time, Beijing's diplomacy became the focus of attention in an international meeting. Despite American opposition and delaying tactics, the conference was a diplomatic triumph for China. It greatly enhanced Beijing's international status. China's leaders clearly perceived their role in global rather than in regional terms. Their pride and confidence were best expressed by the Renmin ribao (People's Daily) editorial of 22 July 1954:For the first time as one of the Big Powers, the People's Republic of China joined the other major powers in negotiations on vital international problems and made a contribution of its own that won the acclaim of wide sections of world opinion. The international status of the People's Republic of China as one of the big world powers has gained universal recognition. Its international prestige has been greatly enhanced. The Chinese people take the greatest joy and pride in the efforts and achievements of their delegation at Geneva.Alone among the great powers, Beijing identified itself as a member of the Afro-Asian camp of newly independent nations. The Chinese leadership perceived China as the champion of the Afro-Asian cause against the oppression and exploitation of the west. It was within this context that China had played the major part in fashioning a new set of principles for world politics-the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.” This emphasis on Afro-Asian solidarity would culminate in the Bandung Conference of 1955.Zhou Enlai played an important role in the Geneva Conference. He excelled in playing British and French realism off against the rigidity and inflexibility of American Cold War policies. His diplomacy epitomized the “United Front” strategy which has been a distinct feature of the PRC's foreign policy: to unite with all possible forces to isolate China's most dangerous enemy. Zhou's performance at Geneva suggests that he was a shrewd practitioner of diplomacy of the possible.


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