In Search of a Route to World Power: General de Gaulle, the Soviet Union, and Israel in the Middle Eastern Crisis of 1967

2010 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gadi Heimann
Author(s):  
Jörg Baberowski

This chapter looks at Stalinism during the Great Patriotic War. It first discusses Joseph Stalin's changing approaches to terror following the end of his policy of exterminatory violence. This shift is well illustrated by two incidents, one in September 1939 when Nikita Khrushchev traveled with Marshal Timoshenko to the town of Vynnyky. This episode shows that the Stalinist terror was also an instrument of ethnic cleansing with which the Stalinist regime did its best. The other incident was in 1941, when Germany invaded the Soviet Union. The front-line soldiers of the Red Army were trapped in a cycle of violence from which there was no escape. This chapter considers how the Great Patriotic War allowed Stalinism to develop to its full potential. The Soviet Union had become a world power, and yet it could offer its subjects nothing but misery and slavery. Only the death of Stalin on March 5, 1953 put an end to Stalinism and with it, despotism.


Worldview ◽  
1972 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 32-38
Author(s):  
David S. McLellan ◽  
Ronald J. Stupak

When Dean Acheson was appointed Under Secretary of State in September, 1945, I. F. Stone wrote in The Nation: “He has been pro-De Gaulle, anti-Franco, strongly opposed to the admission of Argentina to the U.N., and friendly to the Soviet Union … of all the men now in the Departrrient, Acheson was by far the best choice for Under Secretary, and it is no small advantage to pick a man who already knows a good deal about the inner workings.” Stone went on to note that one of Acheson's strongest assets was “in his relations with Congress. He deserves a generous share of the credit for the passage of the Bretton Woods legislation, and he played no inconsiderable part in the Senate's approval of the Charter.” In order to placate Acheson's reactionary critics, Tom Connally reassured trie Senate that he would “never have voted for Mr. Acheson's confirmation [as Under Secretary] unless it had been implicitly understood that he would not have a predominant voice in foreign policy.”


2005 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 307-321
Author(s):  
Roland Marchal

From 1988, there has been a change in the pace of events in the Horn of Africa. The United States and the Soviet Union opted out of the logic of cold war which obtained up to then, leaving more room open to an intervention by neighbouring States (Israel, Irak, the Gulf States). The extension into the Horn of the Middle-Eastern rivalries is all the more real since the political powers are all in a precarious position, despite their use of an unmitigated coercion. Yet, the internal dynamics, which are complex, are still prevailing. It does not seem from their current evolution that there is any hope for real peace talks to end the conflicts.


Author(s):  
Peter Sluglett ◽  
Andrew Payne

This chapter examines the effects of the Cold War upon the states of the Middle East. Although the region was not so profoundly affected as other parts of the world in terms of loss of life or major revolutionary upheaval, it is clear that the lack of democracy and many decades of distorted political development in the Middle East are in great part a legacy of the region's involvement at the interstices of Soviet and American foreign policy. After a brief discussion of early manifestations of USSR–US rivalry in Greece, Turkey, and Iran at the beginning of the Cold War, the chapter uses Iraq as a case study of the changing nature of the relations between a Middle Eastern state and both superpowers from the 1940s until the collapse of the Soviet Union.


2014 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 441-459 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Mintz ◽  
Uk Heo

AbstractIn this paper we extend dyadic research on conflict processes in international relations, to the analysis of triadic relationship. Specifically, we argue that although conflict can be explained at the dyadic level of analysis, a triadic analysis can greatly enrich our understanding of the dynamics of conflict and cooperation. We present a theory of triadic relationship and test it with data on the effect of aid and trade of Middle Eastern dyads with major powers (the US, The Soviet Union/Russia, the UK and France) in the post-WWII era using negative binomial regression. The results show the importance of expanding research in International Relations from dyadic to triadic interactions. Robustness tests demonstrate the validity of our analysis.


1990 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-86

Gorbachev, like every Party general secretary before him, tried to maintain a centrist position, while the whole spectrum was moving toward reform. At some point, however, the centrist position became narrower and narrower while, as we saw in the last elections, the democratic process came to encompass about two-thirds of the population in the large cities. Reactionary forces, from monarchists to Stalinists, comprise about 10 percent. But lately Gorbachev seems to be reaching toward those reactionary forces for many things. The appointments to the Presidential Council, the shift in tone in the newspapers, all the stories about the republics' owing so much to the Soviet Union, the territorial demands—they are a small, but growing number of indicators portending a shift to a more conservative position. We do not know whether this shift is due to army pressure or to his fear of becoming an apprentice sorcerer who has created forces he can no longer control. I should add that the Communist ideology is losing ground every day, and there is danger of its being replaced with a chauvinist Russian ideology, a kind of national socialist ideology. If I had to choose between the Communists and the National Socialists, I would choose the Communists. At least they offer equal oppression for everybody instead of unequal oppression for selected peoples. These developments lead to the extremely dangerous idea of holding the empire at all costs. Gorbachev has the chance to become the Soviet Union's de Gaulle. For the time being, however, de Gaulle's mantle is still beyond his reach.


2012 ◽  
Vol 55 (4) ◽  
pp. 1073-1096 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. C. PEDEN

ABSTRACTThe Suez crisis is widely believed to have contributed significantly to Britain's decline as a world power. Eden's miscalculation of American reaction to the attack on Egypt was damaging to Britain's reputation and fatal to his career. However, his actions were contrary to received wisdom in Whitehall. The crisis merely confirmed Britain's dependence on the United States and had no lasting impact on Anglo-American relations. Britain's relationship with its informal and formal empire was already changing before 1956, and the turn from the commonwealth to Europe owed little to Suez. Examination of policy reviews in Whitehall before and after the Suez crisis shows that the Foreign Office, Commonwealth Relations Office, and Colonial Office were slow to accept the need for change in Britain's world role. Insofar as they did from 1959 it was because of Treasury arguments about the effect of high defence expenditure on the economy, and slow growth of the United Kingdom's population compared with the United States, the European Economic Community, and the Soviet Union.


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