“You Don't Know Khrushchev Well”

The ouster of Nikita Khrushchev in October 1964 was a key moment in the history of elite politics in one of the most important authoritarian regimes of the twentieth century. Yet political scientists and historians have long seemed uninterested in Khrushchev's downfall, regarding it as the largely “inevitable” result of his supposedly unpopular policies. Archival sources that have recently come to light cast serious doubt on this assessment and demonstrate new ways of measuring contingency. By showing the countermeasures Khrushchev could have taken, the importance of timing, and the sense among the plotters that their move was highly risky, this article demonstrates that Khrushchev's defeat was far from preordained. The lesson of October 1964 is not that policy differences or failures lead inexorably to political defeat, but that elite politics in Marxist-Leninist regimes is inherently ambiguous, personal, and, most importantly, highly contingent.

a declaration on friendly relations

This chapter reconstructs, in a descriptive and aspirational mode, lawful friendship through an encounter between the literary figure of ‘the friend’ and an international law of friendly and unfriendly relations. It begins with a gesture of elegiac friendship before locating friendship in an international law of enemies, criminals, pirates and neutrals. It finishes by elaborating a politics of international legal friendship and makes a plea for a tentative, careful friendliness suggested by friendships found in Montaigne, Nietzsche and Derrida, and in three moments of friendship set in the Cold War: one literary (the depiction of friendship in John Adams’ opera, Nixon in China), one an unlikely performance of anti-imperial friendly relations (the friendship between Nehru and Tito, begun in Belgrade) and one epistolary (a letter sent by Nikita Khrushchev to Fidel Castro in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis). Each represents in its rudimentary way a ‘lawful friendship’, a declaration on friendly relations.

The sino-soviet border conflict in the middle of the XX century

The article is devoted to the analysis of the peculiarities of relations between the USSR and the PRC in the middle of the XX century. The authors analyze the circumstances of the deterioration of relations between the two countries since Nikita Khrushchev assumed leadership of the USSR and the condemnation of the cult of personality of Joseph Stalin. The nature of "cartographic aggression" and "great power chauvinism" is revealed. Besides, typological rhetoric, common and specific features in mutual accusations of the Soviet and Chinese sides are shown. The illegality of the territorial claims of the PRC, the betrayal of socialist ideals by its leadership, attempts to discredit the Soviet Union in the international arena, and the desire to undermine the world communist movement used to be the main theses in the research of the Soviet historians of the 1960s-1980s. It is concluded that the interpretation of Sino-Soviet relations in Soviet historiography was primarily propagandistic and closely related to the state interests of the Soviet Union.

The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict in the Middle of the XX Century

The article is devoted to the analysis of the peculiarities of relations between the USSR and the PRC in the middle of the XX century. In a short historical period, two countries with a similar ideology and political system shifted from relations of friendship and mutual assistance to military-political confrontation, which culminated in the armed conflict on Zhenbao (Damansky) Island in March 1969. A special interest of the Chinese side in good-neighbourly relations with the Soviet Union at the initial stage of the existence of the PRC (1949-1955) is described. The authors analyze the circumstances of the deterioration of relations between the two countries since Nikita Khrushchev assumed leadership of the USSR and the condemnation of the cult of personality of Joseph Stalin. Special attention is paid to the border issue in the relationship between the two countries. It presents the different views of the PRC and the Soviet Union on the tsarist treaties with China concluded in the second half of the XIX century. Moreover, the problem of ideological confrontation between the Soviet and Chinese leadership is considered; the publications of Soviet historians which assess the actions of the PRC leadership against the Soviet Union are analyzed. The nature of "cartographic aggression" and "great power chauvinism" is revealed. Besides, typological rhetoric, common and specific features in mutual accusations of the Soviet and Chinese sides are shown. The illegality of the territorial claims of the PRC, the betrayal of socialist ideals by its leadership, attempts to discredit the Soviet Union in the international arena, and the desire to undermine the world communist movement used to be the main theses in the research of the Soviet historians of the 1960s-1980s. It is concluded that the interpretation of Sino-Soviet relations in Soviet historiography was primarily propagandistic and closely related to the state interests of the Soviet Union.

Splitting Apart: How the Soviet-Albanian Relations Came to an End

Albania was the only Eastern European country to exit from the Warsaw Pact and consequently become diplomatically isolated by its member states by late 1961. Such an event was the result of the continuous accusations exchanged between the Albanian and the Soviet Leaders, primarily between Enver Hoxha and Nikita Khrushchev. In the midst of the turbulent Soviet-Albanian relations, China offered its alliance to Albania which only worsened the situation. This study aims to illustrate how the curve of the Albanian-Soviet partnership changed over time, starting from the Stalin era and finishing with the Khrushchev era. More precisely, this study explains how Khrushchev’s decision-making concerning other countries, especially Yugoslavia, pushed the Albanian leaders into changing attitude towards the Soviet Union and make alliances with Mao Zedong. Received: 2 May 2021 / Accepted: 15 June 2021 / Published: 8 July 2021

Between Kennedy and Khrushchev

During the 1960 election, the “Merry-Go-Round” ’s revelation of a suspicious loan from billionaire Howard Hughes helped to defeat Richard Nixon. Nevertheless, Drew Pearson remained an outsider in John Kennedy’s New Frontier, having accused Kennedy’s Pulitzer Prize–winning book, Profiles in Courage, of having been ghost-written, and painted Joseph P. Kennedy as being sympathetic to Nazi Germany before World War II. Being a generation older than Kennedy, Pearson found himself more comfortable with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev and scored a rare interview with him. Khrushchev insisted that he sought peace, which Pearson communicated to Kennedy and to his readers. Consequently, anti-communist groups assailed the column and picketed Pearson. At the same time, Pearson grew more appreciative of the civil rights movement. The column attacked the Ku Klux Klan and encouraged Kennedy to speak out more forcefully against racial segregation and inequality.

The Arsenal of the Mediterranean Revolution

This chapter elaborates the capture of the Yugoslav ship Srbija off the Algerian coast by the French navy on 7 August 1957, which was then escorted to the military port of Mers-el-Kebir. It notes the independence of Morocco and the crowning of Sultan Mohammed as King Mohammed V, who provided strong support to those fighting against French and Spanish colonialism. It also discusses police officers in Casablanca that confiscated war material from the shipment of the Czechoslovak party and secretly distributed it to the Algerian insurgents. The chapter reviews the Warsaw Pact summit that took place in Budapest from 1 to 4 January 1957, wherein the renewed communist unity under the leadership of Nikita Khrushchev was demonstrated. It pays attention to Marshal Tito's attendance at the summit, where he gave his public support to the renewed Cominform, hoping to redeem himself for the secret support he had been giving to Imre Nagy.

A Defeat in the Himalayas

This chapter recounts the end of the Cuban Crisis on 21 November 1962 as the US navy lifted the naval blockade when Nikita Khrushchev agreed to remove the missiles and nuclear warheads from the island. It talks about the secret agreement that the United States signed for the removal of the one hundre PGM-19 Jupiter ballistic missiles from their air bases in Gioia del Colle near Bari, Italy, and Çiğli near İzmir, Turkey. It also refers to Marshal Tito's initiative on the policy of Third World interventionism, which Khrushchev had accepted and imposed on his Stalinist comrades. The chapter investigates the nature of Tito's engagement in Moscow and of the real effects of the Yugoslav apparatus that acted as the Soviet Union's vanguard in the Third World. It discusses Tito's secret empire, which used long-proved cadres with impressive experience and constituted an elite political-diplomatic–intelligence network with global reach.

The Third World Capital in the Balkans

This chapter talks about the First Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-aligned Countries that took place in Belgrade in September 1961. It cites the Non-aligned Movement (NAM), which underlines an active and peaceful approach as something more than mere neutralism of the countries outside the global military and political blocs. It also mentions Michael Makarios III, the primate of the autocephalous Orthodox Church of Cyprus, who attended the conference. The chapter explains how the United States was forced to make aggressive moves to compensate for a non-existent weakness that was imposed on the American public by Nikita Khrushchev, who was aware he was lagging behind in the armament race. It discusses the mutual intimidation that threatened the peaceful coexistence between Moscow and the United States, which was good for Tito as the eternal mediator balancing between the big powers.

A New Mediterranean Offensive

This chapter refers to Marshal Tito's activation of a new subversive network by the time he received Nikita Khrushchev in Belgrade and his bases on the northern Mediterranean shore had been closed. It examines the Boléro–Paprika operation that was launched on 7 September 1950, in which émigré activists, guerrillas, and communists were forced out of Saint-Cyprien camp near Toulouse. It also looks at the career of communist Jesús Hernández, who said a lot about the influence Tito had maintained among Spanish cadres. The chapter recounts how the NKVD sent Hernández to Mexico in 1943 under the codename Pedro as head of the Soviet illegal residency after the military defeat in Spain. It cites Pavel Fitin's order to all Soviet operatives as head of the NKVD's Foreign Department to distance themselves from Hernández.