Phenomenological philosophy as the basis for a human scientific psychology.

2014 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 233-248 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amedeo Giorgi
1998 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amedeo Giorgi

AbstractA description of the founding of the Journal of Phenomenological Psychology and some of its vicissitudes during its first 25 years are described. Some of the difficulties the journal experienced are correlated with the minority status of phenomenological psychology in the world of psychology at large. Several factors are hypothesized to be the basis of Phenomenology's little impact on mainstream psychology: intrinsic difficulties in comprehending phenomenological philosophy, the fact that phenomenological psychology has not yet sufficiently diflerentiated itself from phenomenological philosophy; and mainstream psychology's clear non-openness to approaches that seem different to its established values.


2002 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 141-177 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lisa Cosgrove ◽  
Larry Davidson

AbstractThe last in a series of examinations, this paper articulates Husserl's mature position on the nature of a phenomenologically informed human science. Falling between the naïve positivity of a naturalistic approach to psychology and the transcendental view of consciousness at the base of phenomenological philosophy, we argue that a human scientific psychology—while not itself transcendental in nature needs to re-arise upon the transcendental ground as an empirical—but no longer transcendentally naïve—discipline through Husserl's notion of the "return to positivity." This notion of the return allows us to avoid "transcendental psychologism," differentiating psychological from transcendental subjectivity but from a transcendental, rather than naïve perspective. In this way, the return to positivity reclaims psychology as a worldly, but no longer naïve, discipline. To facilitate an understanding of the different perspectives in question, and the process of leaving the naturalistic perspective in order to return to it once armed with a transcendental understanding and its associated tools, we continue to develop the illustrative example of anorexia provided in the first part of this series. In conclusion, we discuss the implications of this framework for transcendental reforms both of clinical practice and of psychological research.


1990 ◽  
Vol 18 ◽  
pp. 66-72
Author(s):  
George A. Miller

1996 ◽  
Vol 41 (9) ◽  
pp. 872-875
Author(s):  
Wayne H. Holtzman

2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-66
Author(s):  
Monika Szuba

The essay discusses selected poems from Thomas Hardy's vast body of poetry, focusing on representations of the self and the world. Employing Maurice Merleau-Ponty's concepts such as the body-subject, wild being, flesh, and reversibility, the essay offers an analysis of Hardy's poems in the light of phenomenological philosophy. It argues that far from demonstrating ‘cosmic indifference’, Hardy's poetry offers a sympathetic vision of interrelations governing the universe. The attunement with voices of the Earth foregrounded in the poems enables the self's entanglement in the flesh of the world, a chiasmatic intertwining of beings inserted between the leaves of the world. The relation of the self with the world is established through the act of perception, mainly visual and aural, when the body becomes intertwined with the world, thus resulting in a powerful welding. Such moments of vision are brief and elusive, which enhances a sense of transitoriness, and, yet, they are also timeless as the self becomes immersed in the experience. As time is a recurrent theme in Hardy's poetry, this essay discusses it in the context of dwelling, the provisionality of which is demonstrated in the prevalent sense of temporality, marked by seasons and birdsong, which underline the rhythms of the world.


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