Psychologism and Phenomenological Psychology Revisited, Part II: The Return to Positivity

2002 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 141-177 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lisa Cosgrove ◽  
Larry Davidson
Keyword(s):  
Clinical Practice ◽  
Psychological Research ◽  
Human Science ◽  
Transcendental Subjectivity ◽  
Scientific Psychology ◽  
Phenomenological Psychology ◽  
Phenomenological Philosophy ◽  
Naturalistic Approach

AbstractThe last in a series of examinations, this paper articulates Husserl's mature position on the nature of a phenomenologically informed human science. Falling between the naïve positivity of a naturalistic approach to psychology and the transcendental view of consciousness at the base of phenomenological philosophy, we argue that a human scientific psychology—while not itself transcendental in nature needs to re-arise upon the transcendental ground as an empirical—but no longer transcendentally naïve—discipline through Husserl's notion of the "return to positivity." This notion of the return allows us to avoid "transcendental psychologism," differentiating psychological from transcendental subjectivity but from a transcendental, rather than naïve perspective. In this way, the return to positivity reclaims psychology as a worldly, but no longer naïve, discipline. To facilitate an understanding of the different perspectives in question, and the process of leaving the naturalistic perspective in order to return to it once armed with a transcendental understanding and its associated tools, we continue to develop the illustrative example of anorexia provided in the first part of this series. In conclusion, we discuss the implications of this framework for transcendental reforms both of clinical practice and of psychological research.

Th e origins of The journal of Phenomenological Psychology and Some Difficulties in Introducing Phenomenology Into Scientific Psychology

1998 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amedeo Giorgi
Keyword(s):  
Minority Status ◽  
Scientific Psychology ◽  
Phenomenological Psychology ◽  
Phenomenological Philosophy ◽  
The World ◽  
Mainstream Psychology

AbstractA description of the founding of the Journal of Phenomenological Psychology and some of its vicissitudes during its first 25 years are described. Some of the difficulties the journal experienced are correlated with the minority status of phenomenological psychology in the world of psychology at large. Several factors are hypothesized to be the basis of Phenomenology's little impact on mainstream psychology: intrinsic difficulties in comprehending phenomenological philosophy, the fact that phenomenological psychology has not yet sufficiently diflerentiated itself from phenomenological philosophy; and mainstream psychology's clear non-openness to approaches that seem different to its established values.

Phenomenological Psychological Research as Science

2012 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 36-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Applebaum
Keyword(s):  
Qualitative Research ◽  
Natural Science ◽  
Scientific Inquiry ◽  
Psychological Research ◽  
Human Science ◽  
Empirical Science ◽  
Scientific Psychology ◽  
Psychological Method ◽  
Perspective Drawing ◽  
Interpretive Approach

Abstract Part of teaching the descriptive phenomenological psychological method is to assist students in grasping their previously unrecognized assumptions regarding the meaning of “science.” This paper is intended to address a variety of assumptions that are encountered when introducing students to the descriptive phenomenological psychological method pioneered by Giorgi. These assumptions are: 1) That the meaning of “science” is exhausted by empirical science, and therefore qualitative research, even if termed “human science,” is more akin to literature or art than methodical, scientific inquiry; 2) That as a primarily aesthetic, poetic enterprise human scientific psychology need not attempt to achieve a degree of rigor and epistemological clarity analogous (while not equivalent) to that pursued by natural scientists; 3) That “objectivity” is a concept belonging to natural science, and therefore human science ought not to strive for objectivity because this would require “objectivizing” the human being; 4) That qualitative research must always adopt an “interpretive” approach, description being seen as merely a mode of interpretation. These assumptions are responded to from a perspective drawing primarily upon Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, but also upon Eagleton’s analysis of aestheticism.

The Early history of Phenomenological Psychological Research in America

1995 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 46-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas F. Cloonan
Keyword(s):  
Natural Science ◽  
Psychological Research ◽  
Human Science ◽  
Early History ◽  
Phenomenological Psychology ◽  
Academic Context ◽  
Psychological Method ◽  
Science Approach ◽  
History Of ◽  
And Behavior

AbstractThis article on the early history of phenomenological psychological research in the academic context in America focuses on the four approaches of the following respective psychologists: 1) Donald Snygg, Arthur W. Combs, and Anne C. Richards and Fred Richards; 2) Robert B. MacLeod; 3) Adrian L. van Kaam; and 4) Amedeo P. Giorgi. It begins by first addressing the "context" for this early history namely, the European origin of philosophical phenomenology and the connection of it with the psychology of its times in Europe, and then the American background for the development of a sensibility for phenomenology and an eventual connection of phenomenology with psychology. Each of the four positions was examined in terms of basic approach to the study of human experience and behavior. That is, examination was directed toward whether the respective position was under the aegis of psychology as a human science or as a natural science. Also examined were the research postures and the methodologies of the four positions in terms of their respective degrees of reflecting either the human science or the natural science approach, and in terms of their approximation to a phenomenological psychology. It was found that syncretism characterized the approaches of the first three positions, and that there was either an absence of phenomenological psychological method in the psychologies of those positions or, in the case of MacLeod, an undeveloped and non-worked-out method. Only the work of Amedeo Giorgi presented 1) a human science approach that was radical and not compromised by natural science syncretions, and 2) an articulated phenomenological psychological method based on Husserl's concept of intentionality and on mediation of Merleau-Ponty's philosophical phenomenological method.

scholarly journals Phenomenological psychology and qualitative research

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Magnus Englander ◽  
James Morley
Keyword(s):  
Data Analysis ◽  
Psychological Research ◽  
Analysis Method ◽  
Sample Analysis ◽  
Scientific Psychology ◽  
Phenomenological Psychology ◽  
Analysis Process ◽  
Hands On ◽  
History Of ◽  
Detailed Outline

AbstractThis article presents the tradition of phenomenologically founded psychological research that was originally initiated by Amedeo Giorgi. This data analysis method is inseparable from the broader project of establishing an autonomous phenomenologically based human scientific psychology. After recounting the history of the method from the 1960’s to the present, we explain the rationale for why we view data collection as a process that should be adaptable to the unique mode of appearance of each particular phenomenon being researched. The substance of the article is then devoted to a detailed outline of the method’s whole-part-whole procedure of data analysis. We then offer a sample analysis of a brief description of an ordinary daydream. This is an anxiety daydream in response to the recent Covid-19 pandemic. We present this daydream analysis in full to show the concrete hands-on 5 step process through which the researcher explicated the participants’ expressions from the particular to the general. From this brief sample analysis, the researcher offers a first-person reflection on the data analysis process to offer the reader an introduction to the diacritical nature of phenomenological psychological elucidation.

scholarly journals Rhythms of intuition. Methodological reflections in phenomenological psychology

2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 110-131
Author(s):  
Benedikte Kudahl ◽  
Tone Roald
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenological Research ◽  
Psychological Research ◽  
Phenomenological Psychology ◽  
Research Procedure

This paper discusses how different concepts of rhythm apply to phenomenological psychological research. We suggest that viewing phenomenological research in psychology as rhythmic not just enables us to notice how the research procedure implies certain shifts within in a series of temporally structured movements of repetition and change; it also enables us to deepen our understanding of the manner in which the researcher engages with the studied phenomenon through intuition. In other words, we argue that rhythm is fundamental to the method of how we understand “the things themselves.”

scholarly journals Christian Anti-Psychology and the Scientific Method

1987 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 10-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
James D. Foster ◽  
Mark F. Ledbetter
Keyword(s):  
Human Behavior ◽  
Scientific Method ◽  
Psychological Research ◽  
Scientific Psychology

Christians are becoming increasingly vocal in their criticism of scientific psychology. In their criticisms Christian anti-psychologists have devalued knowledge gained through research and suggested both that the scientific method is inappropriate for studying human behavior and that the deception inherent in psychological research is immoral. This article examines these concerns and argues that the more subjective alternatives suggested by the critics of psychology suffer from many of the same limitations as scientific psychology and that taking such an approach would amount to substituting uncontrolled error for controlled error and uncontrolled deception for controlled deception.

A New Narrative for Psychology

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Schiff
Keyword(s):  
Meaning Making ◽  
Theoretical Perspective ◽  
Psychological Research ◽  
Subjective Experiences ◽  
Scientific Psychology ◽  
Narrative Psychology ◽  
Psychological Understanding ◽  
Effective Strategies ◽  
History Of ◽  
Narrative Functions

A New Narrative for Psychology is a far-reaching book that seeks to reorient how scholars and laypersons study and think about persons and the goals of psychological understanding. The book provides a challenging critique of contemporary variable-centered, statistical methods, revealing what these approaches to psychological research leave unexplored; it presents readers with a cutting-edge, narrative, approach for getting at the thorny problem of meaning making in human lives. For readers unfamiliar with narrative psychology, this is an excellent first text, which considers the history of narrative psychology and its place in contemporary psychology. The book goes well beyond the basics, however. A New Narrative for Psychology offers a fresh and innovative theoretical perspective on narrative as an active interpretive process that is implicated in most aspects of everyday life, and the ways in which narrative functions to make present and real subjective and inter-subjective experiences. Theory is grounded in vivid illustrations of what can be learned from the intensive study of how persons, in time and space, narrate their experiences, selves, social relationships, and the world. A New Narrative for Psychology reintroduces narrative psychology as a credible, trustworthy, and useful perspective for considering the hows and whys of human meaning making and argues for the necessity of narrative as a central, and complementary, perspective in scientific psychology. It is an invitation to a conversation about the critical questions of psychology, the most effective strategies for approaching them, and the future of discipline.

Alfred Schutz on Phenomenological Psychology and Transcendental Phenomenology

2017 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 214-239 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexis Emanuel Gros
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Transcendental Phenomenology ◽  
Alfred Schutz ◽  
Phenomenological Psychology ◽  
Phenomenological Philosophy ◽  
Human And Social Sciences ◽  
Alfred Schütz ◽  
Do So

AbstractAlfred Schutz is, without a doubt, one of the phenomenologists that contributed the most to the reflection on how to apply insights from phenomenological philosophy to the, empirical and theoretical, human and social sciences. However, his work tends to be neglected by many of the current advocates of phenomenology within these disciplines. In the present paper, I intend to remedy this situation. In order to do so, I will systematically revisit his mundane and social-scientifically oriented account of phenomenology, which, as I shall show, emerges from a theoretical confrontation with the Husserlian distinction between transcendental phenomenology and phenomenological psychology.

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