The Emergence of Phenomenological Psychology in the United States

This essay strives to bring together the institutional history of phenomenological psychology within the American academy from the middle of the 20th century to the current moment. Although phenomenological psychology has always been a dynamically international and interdisciplinary movement, the scope of this essay is limited to the different ways in which this new field expressed itself in certain psychology departments and educational institutions across the United States. After presenting this institutional history, and some (but certainly not all) individual contributors, a brief commentary is offered.

On the Epoché in Phenomenological Psychology: A Schutzian Response to Zahavi

Dan Zahavi has questioned whether the use of a transcendental phenomenological epoché is essential for phenomenological psychology. He criticizes the views of Amedeo Giorgi by asserting that Husserl did not view the transcendental reduction as needed for an entrance into phenomenological psychology and that, if one thinks so, phenomenological psychology would be in danger of being absorbed within transcendental phenomenology. Thirdly, rather than envisioning transcendental phenomenology as a purification for phenomenological psychology, Zahavi recommends a dialogue between transcendental phenomenologists and psychologists. However, the two disciplines are closer for Husserl who also conceives phenomenological psychology as a self-standing science, and Giorgi is not as rigid on the necessity of transcendental phenomenology for phenomenological psychology. Alfred Schutz, following Husserl’s “Nachwort,” develops his own distinctive phenomenological psychology that appreciates disciplinary convergences and respects boundaries, while also articulating a wider understanding of epoché as an anthropological fact operative beyond the limits of transcendental phenomenology.

Phenomenological psychology and qualitative research

This article presents the tradition of phenomenologically founded psychological research that was originally initiated by Amedeo Giorgi. This data analysis method is inseparable from the broader project of establishing an autonomous phenomenologically based human scientific psychology. After recounting the history of the method from the 1960’s to the present, we explain the rationale for why we view data collection as a process that should be adaptable to the unique mode of appearance of each particular phenomenon being researched. The substance of the article is then devoted to a detailed outline of the method’s whole-part-whole procedure of data analysis. We then offer a sample analysis of a brief description of an ordinary daydream. This is an anxiety daydream in response to the recent Covid-19 pandemic. We present this daydream analysis in full to show the concrete hands-on 5 step process through which the researcher explicated the participants’ expressions from the particular to the general. From this brief sample analysis, the researcher offers a first-person reflection on the data analysis process to offer the reader an introduction to the diacritical nature of phenomenological psychological elucidation.

Rhythms of intuition. Methodological reflections in phenomenological psychology

This paper discusses how different concepts of rhythm apply to phenomenological psychological research. We suggest that viewing phenomenological research in psychology as rhythmic not just enables us to notice how the research procedure implies certain shifts within in a series of temporally structured movements of repetition and change; it also enables us to deepen our understanding of the manner in which the researcher engages with the studied phenomenon through intuition. In other words, we argue that rhythm is fundamental to the method of how we understand “the things themselves.”

Phenomenological justification of psychoanalysis

The article is a preliminary sketch of the phenomenological description of the experience of psychoanalysis, in order to phenomenologically justify the fundamental psychoanalytic concepts and phenomena. The phase structure experience of the psychoanalysis is considered, namely: analyst’s anxiety, psychoanalytic reduction, psychoanalytic analysis and interpretation. In addition, the first part of the article is devoted to the main aspects of logical-phenomenological critique of psychoanalysis. First of all, the critique of the associative, mechanistic, speculative theory of psychoanalytic practice that its phenomenological inadequacy leads to a gap between psychoanalytic theory and practice. This fact is especially emphasized in the phenomenological psychology of Arthur Kronfeld and the Daseinanalysis of Ludwig Binswanger and Medard Boss. Hence, the article is an attempt to outline another way to bridge this gap, by phenomenological justification of the experience of psychoanalysis.

Creative Writing Among Chinese Teachers: An Overview of Phenomenological Psychology

This research is a descriptive study that wants to explore creative writing among Chinese teachers through the perspective of phenomenological psychology. The method used in this research is qualitative. The respondents of this study were 19 teachers who came from formal school teachers and LBB teachers. Data collection techniques were carried out by means of questionnaires, documentation, and interviews. Data analysis technique is done by identification, classification, and reduction. The researcher also carried out data validity so that the data was maintained scientifically. The results of the study show the following. First, most Chinese teachers do not write creatively because they are more concerned with the field of Mandarin. Second, from the aspect of the cause of the lack of creative writing in Chinese teachers who occupy the highest position is the environment because in the opinion of respondents, the environment is very influential because in their daily life they live in an environment.

A Critical Analysis of Blaustein’s Polemic Against Husserl’s Method

The aim of the article is to define and investigate an interpretative framework for the philosophy of Leopold Blaustein, a student of Twardowski in Lwów (Lvov, Lviv) and Husserl in Freiburg im Breisgau. The author defends the thesis that it is justified to refer to Blaustein’s philosophy not as phenomenology sensu stricto, but as a phenomenologically-oriented descriptive psychology related but not equivalent to the project expounded by Husserl in the first edition of Logische Untersuchungen as well as in his project of phenomenological psychology (as formulated in 1925). The article traces Blaustein’s critique of Husserl’s phenomenological methods, putting it in the historical context of the discussion with Ingarden. Next, the author juxtaposes Blaustein’s understanding of psychology with Husserl’s project of 1925, which makes it possible to identify not only the differences between the two projects, but also their similarities. The article also raises questions about the scope of descriptive-psychological analyses.