Th e origins of The journal of Phenomenological Psychology and Some Difficulties in Introducing Phenomenology Into Scientific Psychology

1998 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amedeo Giorgi
Keyword(s):  
Minority Status ◽  
Scientific Psychology ◽  
Phenomenological Psychology ◽  
Phenomenological Philosophy ◽  
The World ◽  
Mainstream Psychology

AbstractA description of the founding of the Journal of Phenomenological Psychology and some of its vicissitudes during its first 25 years are described. Some of the difficulties the journal experienced are correlated with the minority status of phenomenological psychology in the world of psychology at large. Several factors are hypothesized to be the basis of Phenomenology's little impact on mainstream psychology: intrinsic difficulties in comprehending phenomenological philosophy, the fact that phenomenological psychology has not yet sufficiently diflerentiated itself from phenomenological philosophy; and mainstream psychology's clear non-openness to approaches that seem different to its established values.

Psychologism and Phenomenological Psychology Revisited, Part II: The Return to Positivity

2002 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 141-177 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lisa Cosgrove ◽  
Larry Davidson
Keyword(s):  
Clinical Practice ◽  
Psychological Research ◽  
Human Science ◽  
Transcendental Subjectivity ◽  
Scientific Psychology ◽  
Phenomenological Psychology ◽  
Phenomenological Philosophy ◽  
Naturalistic Approach

AbstractThe last in a series of examinations, this paper articulates Husserl's mature position on the nature of a phenomenologically informed human science. Falling between the naïve positivity of a naturalistic approach to psychology and the transcendental view of consciousness at the base of phenomenological philosophy, we argue that a human scientific psychology—while not itself transcendental in nature needs to re-arise upon the transcendental ground as an empirical—but no longer transcendentally naïve—discipline through Husserl's notion of the "return to positivity." This notion of the return allows us to avoid "transcendental psychologism," differentiating psychological from transcendental subjectivity but from a transcendental, rather than naïve perspective. In this way, the return to positivity reclaims psychology as a worldly, but no longer naïve, discipline. To facilitate an understanding of the different perspectives in question, and the process of leaving the naturalistic perspective in order to return to it once armed with a transcendental understanding and its associated tools, we continue to develop the illustrative example of anorexia provided in the first part of this series. In conclusion, we discuss the implications of this framework for transcendental reforms both of clinical practice and of psychological research.

The Phenomenological Psychology of J.H. van den Berg

2015 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 141-162
Author(s):  
Amedeo Giorgi
Keyword(s):  
Private Practice ◽  
Phenomenological Psychology ◽  
University Of Leiden ◽  
Phenomenological Philosophy ◽  
The World ◽  
The 1950S ◽  
The University

J.H. van den Berg was a member of the Utrecht school of phenomenology that flourished in Holland during the 1950s and early 1960s. He was a psychiatrist who had a private practice and he taught at the University of Leiden. Along with other members of the Utrecht school, not all of whom were psychiatrists, he was among the first to apply the insights drawn from existential-phenomenological philosophy to psychology and psychiatry. As with the philosophers, he emphasized that subjectivity was engaged with the world and its activities had to be described. He emphasized that insights into experience as lived, or the phenomenal level, was what was critical for psychologists to understand.

‘A pinch of unseen, unguarded dust’: The World and Self in Thomas Hardy's Poems

2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-66
Author(s):  
Monika Szuba
Keyword(s):  
The Body ◽  
The Self ◽  
Phenomenological Philosophy ◽  
The Earth ◽  
The World ◽  
The Universe ◽  
Recurrent Theme ◽  
Body Subject

The essay discusses selected poems from Thomas Hardy's vast body of poetry, focusing on representations of the self and the world. Employing Maurice Merleau-Ponty's concepts such as the body-subject, wild being, flesh, and reversibility, the essay offers an analysis of Hardy's poems in the light of phenomenological philosophy. It argues that far from demonstrating ‘cosmic indifference’, Hardy's poetry offers a sympathetic vision of interrelations governing the universe. The attunement with voices of the Earth foregrounded in the poems enables the self's entanglement in the flesh of the world, a chiasmatic intertwining of beings inserted between the leaves of the world. The relation of the self with the world is established through the act of perception, mainly visual and aural, when the body becomes intertwined with the world, thus resulting in a powerful welding. Such moments of vision are brief and elusive, which enhances a sense of transitoriness, and, yet, they are also timeless as the self becomes immersed in the experience. As time is a recurrent theme in Hardy's poetry, this essay discusses it in the context of dwelling, the provisionality of which is demonstrated in the prevalent sense of temporality, marked by seasons and birdsong, which underline the rhythms of the world.

Psyche as Postmodern Condition

Janus Head ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 61-91
Author(s):  
Rex Olson ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Archetypal Psychology ◽  
Scientific Psychology ◽  
The World

This article examines James Hillman’s notion of psyche in relation to metaphor as the foundation for his archetypal psychology. In pushing Jung to his imaginal limits, Hillman provides an archetypal corrective to the Cartesianism inherent in modern scientific psychology in order to understand all aspects of contemporary psychological life. He proposes an ontological view of metaphor that locates psyche beyond language and mind to places in the world, thus seeking to establish a postmodern archetypal psychology. In the end his notion of psyche is not radical enough in its critique to advance archetypal psychology into acknowledging its postmodern condition.

Sartre’s Transcendental Phenomenology

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Webber
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Phenomenology ◽  
Phenomenological Reduction ◽  
Transcendental Argument ◽  
Phenomenological Psychology ◽  
The World

The first phase of Sartre’s philosophical publications displays an apparent ambivalence toward Husserl’s transcendental turn. Sartre accepts both major aspects of that turn, the phenomenological reduction and the use of transcendental argumentation. Yet his rejection of the transcendental ego that Husserl derives from this transcendental turn overlooks an obvious transcendental argument in favor of it. His books on emotion and imagination, moreover, make only very brief comments about the transcendental constitution of the world of experience. In each case, these appear at the end of the book and can seem to contradict the book’s central analysis. The problem underlying these features of his works of phenomenological psychology is clarified and resolved, however, when Sartre articulates his own transcendental phenomenology and ontology in Being and Nothingness a decade after he first encountered the work of Husserl. This resolution raises a new problem that animates the next phase of his philosophy.

Phenomenological Psychopathology, Neuroscience, Psychiatric Disorders, and the Intentional Arc

2018 ◽  
pp. 1064-1077
Author(s):  
Grant Gillett ◽  
Patrick Seniuk
Keyword(s):  
Neural Circuits ◽  
Basic Structure ◽  
Evolutionary Perspective ◽  
Mental Life ◽  
Phenomenological Philosophy ◽  
Philosophy Of Perception ◽  
The World ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Phenomenological Psychopathology ◽  
The Way

This article combines an evolutionary perspective with phenomenological philosophy of Merleau-Ponty. Neuroscience addresses the way the brain connects individuals to domains of adaptation, while Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of perception explores the way sense situates humans the world. In particular, his concept “the intentional arc” captures the basic structure of embodied mental life through purposeful action. The processes of “sedimentation” and the neuroscience of ontogeny offer a perspective on the development of cortical and subcortical neural circuits that are in to-and-fro communication with the lived body. This dynamic sheds light on the genesis of a psychological life, structures of attunement, and capacity for adaptation to the world, which are all vulnerable to disruption in psychiatric disorder.

The Psychopathology of Psychopaths

2018 ◽  
pp. 881-895
Author(s):  
Jérôme Englebert
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenological Approach ◽  
Emotional Stimuli ◽  
Related Disorder ◽  
Phenomenological Philosophy ◽  
The World ◽  
Holistic Conception ◽  
Alter Ego ◽  
Psychological Advantage ◽  
Psychopathic Disorder ◽  
Phenomenological Psychopathology

This article presents a holistic conception of psychopathy inspired by phenomenological psychopathology and compares it with the mainstream nosographic diagnosis (Schneider, Cleckley, Hare, and Cooke). The article illustrates how a structural-phenomenological approach enhances the investigation of psychopathy. An epistemological discussion of the concept of emotions reveals that psychopaths are competent at managing emotional stimuli, which bestows a psychological advantage upon them. More specifically, a reflection enlightened by the contributions of phenomenological philosophy on empathy and sympathy clarifies the presentation of “psychopathic being-in-the-world.” Starting with the tension between clinical practice and criticism of the dominant diagnostic scales, this article considers the “essential characteristics” of the psychopathic disorder to be: reification of the alter ego without an ego-related disorder, emotional coldness as it provides adaptive benefits, and empathic skills without sympathy.

scholarly journals The Dialogue between Theology and Science as an Open-Ended Hermeneutics of the Human Condition

2020 ◽  
pp. 1338-1355
Author(s):  
Alexei V. Nesteruk
Keyword(s):  
Modern Philosophy ◽  
Human Condition ◽  
New Developments ◽  
Phenomenological Philosophy ◽  
The World ◽  
Theology And Science ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Science And Theology ◽  
Theology And Philosophy ◽  
The Human Condition

This paper represents a direct continuation and development of my stance on the sense of the dialogue between theology and science as it is seen through the eyes of phenomenological philosophy and its extension towards theology. I further interpret the paradoxical position of humanity in the world (being an object in the world and subject for the world) to be the cause in the split between science and theology. Since, according to modern philosophy, no reconciliation between two opposites in the hermeneutics of the subject is possible, the whole issue of the facticity of human subjectivity as the sensebestowing centre of being acquires theological dimensions, requiring new developments in both theology and philosophy. The intended overcoming of the unknowability of man by himself, tacitly attempted through the “reconciliation” of science and theology (guided by a purpose to ground man in some metaphysical substance), is not ontologically achievable, but demonstrates the working of formal purposefulness (in the sense of Kant). Then the dialogue between theology and science can be considered as a teleological activity without a purpose representing never-ending hermeneutics of the human condition

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