Trans-Religious Dancing Dialogues: Michel Henry on Dionysus and the Crucified

Perhaps owing to frictions between his Christological worldview and the dominant secularism of contemporary French thought as taken up in the U.S., and persistent worries about a seeming solipsism in his phenomenology, Michel Henry’s innovative contributions to aesthetics have received unfortunately little attention in English. The present investigation addresses both issues simultaneously with a new interpretation of his recently-translated 1996 interview, “Art and Phenomenology.” Inspired by this special issue’s theme, “French Thought in Dialogue,” it emphasizes four levels of dialogue in the interview, as follows: (1) the interview as such, with Jean-Marie Brohm; (2) its titular dialogue between art and phenomenology; (3) what I term a “trans-religious” dialogue between Christianity’s Jesus and Friedrich Nietzsche’s Dionysus; and (4) a related dialogue between painting (Henry’s favored genre) and dance that is “Dionysian” (in Nietzsche’s sense). It concludes with new phenomenological accounts of a literal and a figurative dance, namely the social Latin dance called bachata, and an improvised musical dialogue with the mockingbirds of my hometown. In sum, thanks to Henry’s engagement with various forms of dialogue, including with Brohm, the arts, paganism, and dance, one can find room in his transcendental subjectivity of Life for others, dancingly transcending even humanity.

Excerpt from Chapter One of Frank Engster’s Book: Das Geld als Maß, Mittel und Methode Das Rechnen mit der Identität der Zeit (Berlin: Neofelis Verlag UG, 2014)

The question of the book is how a radical critique of capitalism is possible when critique in the tradition of Kant and Hegel means that the criticized subject itself has to “give” the measure of its critique. The thesis is that, while in Kant this reflexivity is achieved by transcendental subjectivity and reason and in Hegel by self-consciousness, self-relation of the concept and the absolute reason of spirit, in Marx we find a materialist turn. The turn shows that capitalist society became reflexive by a kind of self-measurement, done by the functions of money, on the one hand, and the valorization of labour power and capital, on the other. Money, by its function as the measure of value and the means of its realization and mediation, measures in the commodities the productive relations of their production, thus determining from the past valorization of labour and capital the magnitudes necessary for their further productive valorization — and hence for a productive use of money itself. That is howl, in money’s capital form, the measured magnitudes become reflexive, while money itself becomes in its capitalist self-relation the form to measures the same valorization process which by this form becomes possible in the first place

Alguien lo sabe. Desvelo trascendental y dativo de manifestación en-off como voz narrativa

Tras reconocer el papel decisivo que juega en el pensamiento husserliano la intersubjetividad en su estructura trascendental, y, respecto a la Einfühlung y la Fremderfahrung, el importante papel que desempeña la Umfiktion (Circunficción), el presente artículo desarrolla la posibilidad experiencial y de senti-do que supone ese extraño personaje que es la Voz Narrativa heterodiegética. En concreto, la Voz Narrativa como Otro subsidiario en el caso de que los personajes duerman o hayan muerto. Esto permite pensar al Testigo como dativo de manifestación en off en soporte último del continuum de la fenomenalidad. Con ello, se trata de profundizar en la tesis husserliana acerca de la inmortalidad de la subjetividad trascendental y extraer algunas conclusiones metafísicas y éticas. El artículo se basa en un texto de Muñoz Molina (Alguien lo sabe) en el que comentaba un pasaje de Al faro, de V. Woolf.Recognizing the decisive role in Husserl's thought of the intersubjectivity in its transcendental structure, and, for the Einfühlung and Fremderfahrung, the important role of Umfiktion (Circunfiction), this article develops the experiential possibility and the possibility of meaning that assumes the Strange character who is the heterodiegetic Narrative Voice. Specifically, the narrative voice as subsidiary Other in the event that the characters sleep or have died. This suggests the Witness as dative of manifestation in off as last stand of the continuum of phenomenality. With this, it is deepening the Husserlian thesis about the immortality of transcendental subjectivity and draw some metaphysical and ethical conclusions. The article is based on a text by Muñoz Molina (Someone knows) that commented a passage from To the Lighthouse, by Virginia Woolf

Metaphysics and Realism

The article deals with the problem of the return of metaphysics within the framework of the ontological turn of philosophy and the situation of post-metaphysical thinking. The conditions for the possibility of modern metaphysical discourse in the projects of empirical metaphysics and historical ontology are revealed. Historical ontology as a meta-reflexion of philosophy over its own historical foundations is able to bridge the gap between the epistemological static nature of transcendental subjectivity and the ontological dynamism of the growth of scientific knowledge about reality by comprehending the conditions of interaction between science and metaphysics in conditions of post-metaphysical thinking and realistic reversal of ontology. Philosophical knowledge in the context of the ontological turn and the associated return of metaphysics becomes focused not so much on the sharp demarcation of science and metaphysics and postulating the incommensurability of their ontologies, but on identifying mutually enriching areas of research that could give a new impetus to their development.

Reassessing Lewin on the Promise of Husserl's Phenomenology of Time-Consciousness

In his seminal essay "Music Theory, Phenomenology, and Modes of Perception," David Lewin takes up (and works against) Husserl's phenomenology of inner time-consciousness as a means of developing his own perception-based musical analyses. My aim, in this article, is not only to show that what Lewin adopts as a theory of Husserlian time-consciousness is in direct conflict with the understanding produced by contemporary philosophers associated with the Husserl Archives, but also to argue that a better understanding of Husserlian time-consciousness enables us to imagine the ways in which phenomenological inquiry actually supports Lewin's objectives. First, I clarify the complicated history of Lewin's textual source, Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins, arguing that a failure to take account of the genesis of Husserl's text brings about a concomitant misinterpretation of its philosophical content. Second, I critique Lewin's reduction of retention and protention to present contents of perceptions, demonstrating that this results in an infinite regress (or "recursive" structure, in Lewin's terms), and I show that Husserl himself avoids this by investigating the temporal flow of the subject (i. e., as a structure of transcendental subjectivity). Finally, I argue that the Husserlian framework of timeconsciousness provides a productive way to concern ourselves with the creative acts of music making that Lewin so prizes.

Husserl's Project, Critique, and Idea of Reason

The present study seeks to accomplish three goals: to shed light on the problem of reason in Husserl’s co-inherited philosophical project, to elucidate his transcendental critique of reason, and to present Husserl's idea of reason in its distinctive features. A historical excursus first provides a frame to understand the necessity of a critique of reason, its proper subject-matter, and its function for the project of genuine philosophy. In particular, this historical reflection identifies the form that a critique must assume in order to fulfil its philosophical-scientific task. The focus is then directed at Husserl's methodological recalibration of the problem of reason. Husserl's ‘prinzipielle Kritik’ is elucidated in his transcendental reassessment of the headings ‘reason’ and ‘unreason,’ and is thought in connection to the concept of Selbstbesinnung. Lastly, Husserl’s idea of reason is reconstructed in relation to, and in disambiguation from, the concepts of self-evidence, logos, synthesis, fulfilment, positing, etc. Reason, as teleological rule and structural form of transcendental subjectivity, is clarified in its dependence on, and irreducibility to, the problems of constitution and in light of the question of its objective/subjective character.

We-Synthesis

The purpose of this paper is threefold: (1) To show the basic contours of transcendental subjectivity in the later work of Edmund Husserl, especially the Cartesian Meditations and the Crisis, and in the strictly phenomenological work of Michel Henry, especially Material Phenomenology; (2) to highlight Henry’s radical critique of Husserlian intersubjectivity and show that such critique, while valuable in its intention, is ultimately misguided because it neglects the important contribution Husserl’s complicated vocabulary of lifeworld makes to the study of intersubjectivity; and (3) to point toward a phenomenological conception of intersubjective practice we may call the realm of we-synthesis that prioritizes the first-person perspective rooted in empathy, which enables meaningful engagement with the second-person perspective. Working in conjunction with Husserl and Henry on the phenomenological conception of shared life enables the recuperation of the fragile line between subjectivity and intersubjectivity.