Hindsight bias in metamemory: outcome knowledge influences the recollection of judgments of learning

Memory ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Malte F. Zimdahl ◽  
Monika Undorf
Author(s):  
Rüdiger F. Pohl ◽  
Edgar Erdfelder

Hindsight bias describes the tendency of persons—after the outcome of an event is known—to overestimate their foresight. For example, following a political election, persons tend to retrospectively adjust their predictions to the actual outcome. These judgment distortions are very robust and have been observed in a variety of domains and tasks. About 50 years of research on hindsight bias have meanwhile brought a wealth of findings and insights. Core research questions are (1) how to explain hindsight bias in terms of underlying processes, (2) whether there are individual differences in susceptibility, (3) how the bias possibly impedes decision-making in applied contexts, such as political decision-making, and (4) how possibly to overcome it. Theoretical approaches suggest that there are distinct components of hindsight bias, and that several, mainly cognitive, mechanisms are responsible for them. Using stochastic models of hindsight bias allows us to estimate the relative proportions of these mechanisms. Depending on the task, motivational factors may also exert their influence. In addition, the strength of hindsight bias appears to be related to some personality traits and also to age. For example, some authors found that hindsight bias tends to increase with the tendency toward favorable self-presentation and to decrease with intelligence. Moreover, lifespan studies have shown that children and older adults show larger hindsight bias than young adults. Hindsight bias has been found in political decision-making (as well as in other applied domains). Surprisingly, attempts to overcome hindsight bias have mainly failed, whereas only a few debiasing techniques show promising results. In sum, one important conclusion is to be continuously aware of the potentially distorting influence of outcome knowledge on the evaluation of our own (or other’s) prior knowledge state.


2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (5) ◽  
pp. 771-788 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julia Groß ◽  
Hartmut Blank ◽  
Ute J. Bayen

People tend to be biased by outcome knowledge when looking back on events. This phenomenon is known as hindsight bias. Clinical intuition and theoretical accounts of affect-regulatory functions of hindsight bias suggest a link between hindsight bias and depression, but empirical evidence is scarce. In two experiments, participants with varying levels of depressive symptoms imagined themselves in everyday scenarios that ended positively or negatively and completed hindsight and affect measures. Participants with higher levels of depression judged negative outcomes, but not positive outcomes, as more foreseeable and more inevitable in hindsight. For negative outcomes, they also misremembered prior expectations as more negative than they initially were. This memory hindsight bias was accompanied by disappointment, suggesting a relation to affect-regulatory malfunction. We propose that “depressive hindsight bias” indicates a negative schema of the past and that it sustains negative biases in depression.


2020 ◽  
Vol 228 (4) ◽  
pp. 278-290 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eylul Tekin ◽  
Henry L. Roediger

Abstract. Recent studies have shown that judgments of learning (JOLs) are reactive measures in paired-associate learning paradigms. However, evidence is scarce concerning whether JOLs are reactive in other paradigms. In old/new recognition experiments, we investigated the reactivity effects of JOLs in a levels-of-processing (LOP) paradigm. In Experiments 1 and 2, for each word, subjects saw a yes/no orienting question followed by the target word and a response. Then, they either did or did not make a JOL. The yes/no questions were about target words’ appearances, rhyming properties, or category memberships. In Experiment 3, for each word, subjects gave a pleasantness rating or counted the letter “e ”. Our results revealed that JOLs enhanced recognition across all orienting tasks in Experiments 1 and 2, and for the e-counting task in Experiment 3. This reactive effect was salient for shallow tasks, attenuating – but not eliminating – the LOP effect after making JOLs. We conclude that JOLs are reactive in LOP paradigms and subjects encode words more effectively when providing JOLs.


2020 ◽  
Vol 228 (4) ◽  
pp. 264-277 ◽  
Author(s):  
Evan E. Mitton ◽  
Chris M. Fiacconi

Abstract. To date there has been relatively little research within the domain of metamemory that examines how individuals monitor their performance during memory tests, and whether the outcome of such monitoring informs subsequent memory predictions for novel items. In the current study, we sought to determine whether spontaneous monitoring of test performance can in fact help individuals better appreciate their memory abilities, and in turn shape future judgments of learning (JOLs). Specifically, in two experiments we examined recognition memory for visual images across three study-test cycles, each of which contained novel images. We found that across cycles, participants’ JOLs did in fact increase, reflecting metacognitive sensitivity to near-perfect levels of recognition memory performance. This finding suggests that individuals can and do monitor their test performance in the absence of explicit feedback, and further underscores the important role that test experience can play in shaping metacognitive evaluations of learning and remembering.


2020 ◽  
Vol 228 (4) ◽  
pp. 254-263 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pedro S. Mendes ◽  
Karlos Luna ◽  
Pedro B. Albuquerque

Abstract. The present study tested if word frequency effects on judgments of learning (JOLs) are exclusively due to beliefs or if the direct experience with the items also plays a role. Across four experiments, participants read prompts about the frequency of the words (high/low), which could be congruent/incongruent with the words’ actual frequency. They made pre-study JOLs (except Experiment 1b), immediate JOLs, and completed a recall test. If experience drives the effect, JOLs should be based on actual word frequency rather than the prompts. Results showed higher pre-study JOLs for prompts of high frequency, but higher immediate JOLs for high-frequency words regardless of the prompt, suggesting an effect of direct experience with the words. In Experiments 2 and 3, we manipulated participants’ beliefs, finding a small effect of beliefs on JOLs. We conclude that, regarding word frequency, direct experience with the items seems more relevant than beliefs when making immediate JOLs.


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