Hindsight bias, outcome knowledge and adaptive learning

Hindsight bias refers to the tendency to overestimate in hindsight what one has known in foresight. Recently, two experiments extended the research to include samples from different cultures ( Choi & Nisbett, 2000 ; Heine & Lehman, 1996 ). Asking their participants what they would have guessed before they knew the outcome (“hypothetical design”), Choi and Nisbett (2000 ) found that Koreans, in comparison to North Americans, exhibited more hindsight bias. Heine and Lehman (1996 ), however, reported that Japanese people in comparison to Canadians showed marginally less hindsight bias. In a second study, in which participants were asked to recall what they had estimated before they knew the outcome (“memory design”), the latter authors found no difference in hindsight bias between Japanese people and Canadians. We extended these studies with 225 Internet participants, in a hypothetical design, from four different continents (Asia, Australia, Europe, and North America). Hindsight bias was large and similar for all samples except for German and Dutch participants who showed no hindsight bias at all. While the latter effect may be based on peculiarities of the material and of the participants, the former underscores the worldwide stability of the phenomenon. In addition a follow-up surprise rating (paper and pencil) in China (35 participants) and Germany (20 participants) revealed that only less surprising items led to hindsight bias while more surprising ones did not. We suggest that the basic cognitive processes leading to hindsight bias are by-products of the evolutionary-evolved capacity of adaptive learning. On top of these basic processes, individual meta-cognitions (e.g., elicited by surprise) or motives (e.g., a self-serving motive) may further moderate the amount of bias, thus explaining the diverging results of Choi and Nisbett (2000 ), Heine and Lehman (1996 ), and our own study.

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Hindsight Bias in Political Decision Making

Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics ◽

10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1013 ◽

2019 ◽

Author(s):

Rüdiger F. Pohl ◽

Edgar Erdfelder

Keyword(s):

Decision Making ◽

Hindsight Bias ◽

Cognitive Mechanisms ◽

Political Decision ◽

Important Conclusion ◽

Self Presentation ◽

Theoretical Approaches ◽

Actual Outcome ◽

Outcome Knowledge ◽

Political Decision Making

Hindsight bias describes the tendency of persons—after the outcome of an event is known—to overestimate their foresight. For example, following a political election, persons tend to retrospectively adjust their predictions to the actual outcome. These judgment distortions are very robust and have been observed in a variety of domains and tasks. About 50 years of research on hindsight bias have meanwhile brought a wealth of findings and insights. Core research questions are (1) how to explain hindsight bias in terms of underlying processes, (2) whether there are individual differences in susceptibility, (3) how the bias possibly impedes decision-making in applied contexts, such as political decision-making, and (4) how possibly to overcome it. Theoretical approaches suggest that there are distinct components of hindsight bias, and that several, mainly cognitive, mechanisms are responsible for them. Using stochastic models of hindsight bias allows us to estimate the relative proportions of these mechanisms. Depending on the task, motivational factors may also exert their influence. In addition, the strength of hindsight bias appears to be related to some personality traits and also to age. For example, some authors found that hindsight bias tends to increase with the tendency toward favorable self-presentation and to decrease with intelligence. Moreover, lifespan studies have shown that children and older adults show larger hindsight bias than young adults. Hindsight bias has been found in political decision-making (as well as in other applied domains). Surprisingly, attempts to overcome hindsight bias have mainly failed, whereas only a few debiasing techniques show promising results. In sum, one important conclusion is to be continuously aware of the potentially distorting influence of outcome knowledge on the evaluation of our own (or other’s) prior knowledge state.

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Hindsight Bias in Depression

Clinical Psychological Science ◽

10.1177/2167702617712262 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 5 (5) ◽

pp. 771-788 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Julia Groß ◽

Hartmut Blank ◽

Ute J. Bayen

Keyword(s):

Depressive Symptoms ◽

Empirical Evidence ◽

Hindsight Bias ◽

Positive Outcomes ◽

Negative Outcomes ◽

Clinical Intuition ◽

The Past ◽

Outcome Knowledge ◽

Regulatory Functions ◽

Looking Back

People tend to be biased by outcome knowledge when looking back on events. This phenomenon is known as hindsight bias. Clinical intuition and theoretical accounts of affect-regulatory functions of hindsight bias suggest a link between hindsight bias and depression, but empirical evidence is scarce. In two experiments, participants with varying levels of depressive symptoms imagined themselves in everyday scenarios that ended positively or negatively and completed hindsight and affect measures. Participants with higher levels of depression judged negative outcomes, but not positive outcomes, as more foreseeable and more inevitable in hindsight. For negative outcomes, they also misremembered prior expectations as more negative than they initially were. This memory hindsight bias was accompanied by disappointment, suggesting a relation to affect-regulatory malfunction. We propose that “depressive hindsight bias” indicates a negative schema of the past and that it sustains negative biases in depression.

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