scholarly journals In This Issue: Dimensions of Diversity

2019 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-2
Author(s):  
P.A.K.
Keyword(s):  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
Kenneth M. Roberts

Abstract Polarization may be the most consistent effect of populism, as it is integral to the logic of constructing populist subjects. This article distinguishes between constitutive, spatial and institutional dimensions of polarization, adopting a cross-regional comparative perspective on different subtypes of populism in Europe, Latin America and the US. It explains why populism typically arises in contexts of low political polarization (the US being a major, if partial, outlier), but has the effect of sharply increasing polarization by constructing an anti-establishment political frontier, politicizing new policy or issue dimensions, and contesting democracy's institutional and procedural norms. Populism places new issues on the political agenda and realigns partisan and electoral competition along new programmatic divides or political cleavages. Its polarizing effects, however, raise the stakes of political competition and intensify conflict over the control of key institutional sites.


2016 ◽  
Vol 79 (2) ◽  
pp. 63-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lesley Collier ◽  
Jackie Pool

2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 223-238 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Hayton

Following the referendum on membership of the European Union (EU), this article assesses the ideological legacy of David Cameron on Conservative politics in Britain. It focuses on three areas of ideological tension in contemporary conservatism, namely, European integration, the divide between social liberals and traditionalists, and the future of the Union post-Brexit. Applying the concept of heresthetics to offer a theoretically informed account, it argues that while Cameron enjoyed some successes in ‘the art of political manipulation’ with electoral benefits, his desire to modernize conservatism was ultimately undone by his failure to restructure the key issue dimensions animating his party’s ideology. Ultimately, this failure undid his premiership, leading to his downfall.


2020 ◽  
pp. 135406882091265
Author(s):  
Robert Liñeira ◽  
Jordi Muñoz ◽  
Guillem Rico

In this article, we argue that voters use party positions on an issue dimension as a heuristic device to locate parties on other dimensions on which they have less information about. We confirm our argument by fielding two survey experiments in a context with two distinct issue dimensions: the left-right and national dimensions in Catalonia. We find that the position of a hypothetical (but plausible) candidate on a national dimension exerts a great deal of influence on where respondents locate him on the left-right dimension, as well as on a more narrowly-defined socioeconomic dimension, but that the left-right position does not affect the perceived placement on the national divide. This asymmetry can be partly explained by the different nature of these issue domains, and specifically by the distinct ability of the national dimension to activate social group cues that give rise to projection biases. These findings have important implications for our understanding of issue misperceptions and of the strategic choices available to parties in multidimensional policy spaces. The nature of the issue dimension could facilitate why some issue dimensions tend to function as cue givers and others as cue receivers. We discuss the implications of our findings in constraining the strategies available to parties in multidimensional contexts.


1999 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 29-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arend Lijphart ◽  
Peter J. Bowman ◽  
Reuven Y. Hazan

2011 ◽  
Vol 65 (3) ◽  
pp. 469-506 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert F. Trager

AbstractStates often negotiate with each other over more than one issue at the same time. This article presents a model of multidimensional international crisis bargaining. Unlike unidimensional bargaining, with two issue dimensions states can send costless signals about their resolve that have dramatic effects on other states' beliefs and actions. One reason is that when states claim a willingness to fight over an issue they in fact are not willing to fight over, they may lose the opportunity to get what they really want without conflict. As a result, when there is a chance that adversaries may each be willing to fight over two issues, the states can even sometimes convey with certainty when they will fight for both issues. The model also leads to some surprising comparative statics, for example, decreases in the probability that the target is willing to fight can increase the probability of war.


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