Populism and Polarization in Comparative Perspective: Constitutive, Spatial and Institutional Dimensions

Polarization may be the most consistent effect of populism, as it is integral to the logic of constructing populist subjects. This article distinguishes between constitutive, spatial and institutional dimensions of polarization, adopting a cross-regional comparative perspective on different subtypes of populism in Europe, Latin America and the US. It explains why populism typically arises in contexts of low political polarization (the US being a major, if partial, outlier), but has the effect of sharply increasing polarization by constructing an anti-establishment political frontier, politicizing new policy or issue dimensions, and contesting democracy's institutional and procedural norms. Populism places new issues on the political agenda and realigns partisan and electoral competition along new programmatic divides or political cleavages. Its polarizing effects, however, raise the stakes of political competition and intensify conflict over the control of key institutional sites.

How challenger parties can win big with frozen cleavages: Explaining the landslide victory of the Servant of the People party in the 2019 Ukrainian parliamentary elections

In the Ukrainian parliamentary elections of July 2019, Volodymyr Zelensky’s new party, Servant of the People (SN) won a majority of seats in the context of what had been a ‘frozen cleavage’ dividing party voters along a single geo-cultural dimension: pro-West/anti-Soviet versus anti-West/pro-Russian positions. Analysing a unique set of surveys of public and expert opinion, we find that its unprecedented success stems from the extreme weaknesses of the existing and often discredited parties rather than ideological shifts. Our findings also question whether challenger parties in other contexts, including consolidated democracies, must compete on new issue dimensions in order to succeed electorally.

Inferring party positions across issue dimensions

In this article, we argue that voters use party positions on an issue dimension as a heuristic device to locate parties on other dimensions on which they have less information about. We confirm our argument by fielding two survey experiments in a context with two distinct issue dimensions: the left-right and national dimensions in Catalonia. We find that the position of a hypothetical (but plausible) candidate on a national dimension exerts a great deal of influence on where respondents locate him on the left-right dimension, as well as on a more narrowly-defined socioeconomic dimension, but that the left-right position does not affect the perceived placement on the national divide. This asymmetry can be partly explained by the different nature of these issue domains, and specifically by the distinct ability of the national dimension to activate social group cues that give rise to projection biases. These findings have important implications for our understanding of issue misperceptions and of the strategic choices available to parties in multidimensional policy spaces. The nature of the issue dimension could facilitate why some issue dimensions tend to function as cue givers and others as cue receivers. We discuss the implications of our findings in constraining the strategies available to parties in multidimensional contexts.

EU Accession Immigration and the Rise of UKIP

This chapter explains how the powerful issue dimensions of the EU and immigration were combined in the 2004 decision for open immigration with EU accession countries. As immigration rose in the 2000s, the salience of immigration increased substantially. The 2004 immigration decision had two key consequences. Firstly, it greatly constrained the ability of UK governments to change the level of immigration in response to public opinion, and secondly, it closely linked the previously separate issues of immigration and Europe. The salience of immigration was related most strongly to media coverage of the issue, which in turn closely tracked the actual rates of immigration. UKIP capitalized on this combined EU/immigration dimension and substantial numbers of voters switched to UKIP from the major parties in 2015 on this basis. We show that without the high salience of immigration between 2010 and 2015, the defections to UKIP would have been relatively small.

Not so responsive after all: European parties do not respond to public opinion shifts across multiple issue dimensions

Many studies have found that European parties change their policy positions in response to changes in public opinion. This is both theoretically and normatively appealing, suggesting that European party politics operates in a way that is consistent with spatial models. Nonetheless, virtually all previous studies are based on a single, uni-dimensional measure of public opinion: left–right self-placement from the Eurobarometer surveys. This measure has a number of flaws, including the fact that political conflict in Europe now occurs across multiple issue dimensions beyond the classic divide on state involvement in the economy. We used new measures of Europeans’ ideological positions across four different issue dimensions and 26 countries from 1981–2016, together with data on parties’ policy positions from their manifestos, to re-evaluate findings on responsiveness. Across many different model specifications, samples and outcome measures, we found virtually no evidence that European political parties respond to public opinion on any issue dimension. Our findings suggest that scholars may require better measures of party positions, more nuanced theories of responsiveness (for example to sub-groups, or across longer time horizons), or may need to refocus their attention towards responsiveness via policy outcomes rather than parties’ policy commitments.

Not so Responsive after all: European Parties do not Respond to Public Opinion Shifts across Multiple Issue Dimensions

Many studies have found that European parties change their policy positions in response to changes in public opinion. This is both theoretically and normatively appealing, suggesting that European party politics operates in a way that is consistent with spatial models. Nonetheless, virtually all previous studies are based on a single, uni-dimensional measure of public opinion: left-right self-placement from the Eurobarometer surveys. This measure has a number of flaws, including the fact that political conflict in Europe now occurs across multiple issue dimensions beyond the classic divide on state involvement in the economy. We use new measures of Europeans' ideological positions across four different issue dimensions and twenty-six countries from 1981-2016, together with data on parties' policy positions from their manifestos, to re-evaluate findings on responsiveness. Across many different model specifications, samples and outcome measures, we find virtually no evidence that European political parties respond to public opinion on any issue dimension. Our findings suggest that scholars may require better measures of party positions, more nuanced theories of responsiveness (for example to sub-groups, or across longer time horizons), or may need to re-focus their attention towards responsiveness via policy outcomes rather than parties' policy commitments.

British conservatism after the vote for Brexit: The ideological legacy of David Cameron

Following the referendum on membership of the European Union (EU), this article assesses the ideological legacy of David Cameron on Conservative politics in Britain. It focuses on three areas of ideological tension in contemporary conservatism, namely, European integration, the divide between social liberals and traditionalists, and the future of the Union post-Brexit. Applying the concept of heresthetics to offer a theoretically informed account, it argues that while Cameron enjoyed some successes in ‘the art of political manipulation’ with electoral benefits, his desire to modernize conservatism was ultimately undone by his failure to restructure the key issue dimensions animating his party’s ideology. Ultimately, this failure undid his premiership, leading to his downfall.