In his very elaborate analysis, Forte takes on several issues regarding the European integration process, offering an original insight into the foundations of European economic governance. In particular, the author looks to expand current results in the relevant literature in several
directions. On the theoretical front, Forte departs from James Buchanan’s economic theory of clubs to provide a club-theoretic template to both the European Union and European Monetary Union. He arrives at the belief of ‘the incompleteness of the European institutional construct
and the misunderstandings about its basic principles’. His argument relies on the similarities that he recognises between Buchanan’s view of European federalism and the German ordoliberalism roots of the European integration process, which can be traced from the founding of the
European Community onward. On the empirical front, Forte identifies a potential polarisation among countries within the euro area during the crisis that occurred over the last ten years. According to him, this dualism within the euro club is due to a ‘violation’ of the ideals and
the operational suggestions proposed by Buchanan, Ordo, Röpke and Einaudi. In this comment, we briefly describe what became for most member states of the European Union the worst economic and social crisis since the Second World War that led to a new architecture of European economic
governance. Subsequently, we highlight significant results presented by Forte and elaborate how these results fit into the existing literature.
When European integration becomes costly: the euro crisis and public support for European economic governance