Euroscepticism and the Future of European Integration

Author(s):  
Catherine E. De Vries

The European Union (EU) is facing one of the rockiest periods in its existence. At no time in its history has it looked so economically fragile, so insecure about how to protect its borders, so divided over how to tackle the crisis of legitimacy facing its institutions, and so under assault by Eurosceptic parties. The unprecedented levels of integration in recent decades have led to increased public contestation, yet at the same the EU is more reliant on public support for its continued legitimacy than ever before. This book examines the role of public opinion in the European integration process. It develops a novel theory of public opinion that stresses the deep interconnectedness between people’s views about European and national politics. It suggests that public opinion cannot simply be characterized as either Eurosceptic or not, but rather that it consists of different types. This is important because these types coincide with fundamentally different views about the way the EU should be reformed and which policy priorities should be pursued. These types also have very different consequences for behaviour in elections and referendums. Euroscepticism is such a diverse phenomenon because the Eurozone crisis has exacerbated the structural imbalances within the EU. As the economic and political fates of member states have diverged, people’s experiences with and evaluations of the EU and national political systems have also grown further apart. The heterogeneity in public preferences that this book has uncovered makes a one-size-fits-all approach to addressing Euroscepticism unlikely to be successful.

2021 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-107
Author(s):  
Jan Kovář

The European Union (EU) is facing one of the rockiest periods in its existence. At no time in its history has it looked so economically fragile, so insecure about how to protect its borders, so divided over how to tackle the crisis of legitimacy facing its institutions, and so under assault by Eurosceptic parties. The unprecedented levels of integration in recent decades have led to increased public contestation, yet at the same the EU is more reliant on public support for its continued legitimacy than ever before. This book examines the role of public opinion in the European integration process. It develops a novel theory of public opinion that stresses the deep interconnectedness between people’s views about European and national politics. It suggests that public opinion cannot simply be characterized as either Eurosceptic or not, but rather that it consists of different types. This is important because these types coincide with fundamentally different views about the way the EU should be reformed and which policy priorities should be pursued. These types also have very different consequences for behaviour in elections and referendums. Euroscepticism is such a diverse phenomenon because the Eurozone crisis has exacerbated the structural imbalances within the EU. As the economic and political fates of member states have diverged, people’s experiences with and evaluations of the EU and national political systems have also grown further apart. The heterogeneity in public preferences that this book has uncovered makes a one-size-fits-all approach to addressing Euroscepticism unlikely to be successful.


Author(s):  
Zuzana Ringlerova

The European Union (EU) is a supranational political system that unites more than twenty-five European countries. European integration began to facilitate economic cooperation. Over time, it evolved into both an economic and political union. The progress in European integration accelerated in the 1980s and the 1990s. As a result, the European Union was established in 1993 and assumed more political power. The process of establishing the European Union was slowed by the results of a referendum in Denmark, which at first did not approve the treaty establishing the EU. This referendum made it clear that public support for European integration could no longer be taken for granted and that public attitudes toward the EU are crucial for the European Union’s future development. In other words, the era of permissive consensus ended and it became clear that public opinion has become a powerful force in the development of European integration. Since then, public opinion has had a clear influence on the direction of European integration in a number of ways. Examples of this influence include the rejection of the single European currency in Sweden, the failure of the Constitution for Europe, and, most notably, the United Kingdom’s decision to exit the EU. Public opinion has influenced European politics in other ways as well. For example, national political elites, acting at the European level, are constrained in their decisions by public opinion at home. The importance of understanding public opinion toward the EU has given rise to a lively research program. In their quest to understand citizens’ attitudes toward the EU, researchers first had to conceptualize the key concepts in this field, in particular the meaning of public support for the EU. Following this, scholars began to investigate why people support or oppose the European Union, which became the most widely studied topic in this field. In addition, studies have examined public support for specific European policies, determinants of voting in EU-related referendums, public support for EU membership in countries outside the EU, and the extent to which public opinion matters for policymaking in the EU. All these topics are included in this annotated bibliography. The section devoted to General Introductions and Review Articles lists review articles and textbook chapters that provide a quick overview of the topic as a whole. The next section, What Is Public Support for the EU and How Do We Explain It?, digs deeper into the concept of public support for the EU, asking how the concept is defined and what explains support for the EU. The following three sections deal with public opinion toward specific EU policies (Public Opinion toward Specific EU Policies), public support for the EU in nonmember states (Public Support for the EU in Candidate Countries and Other Nonmember States), and the question of public opinion’s influence on policymaking in the EU (Does Public Opinion Matter for Policymaking in the EU?). The second-to-last section is devoted to referendums on European matters (Referendums: Explaining the People’s Vote, Explaining Brexit). The last section (Data Sources) looks at data sources that can be used in the study of public attitudes toward the EU.


Author(s):  
Catherine E. De Vries

Public contestation regarding European integration is becoming increasingly important for the future of the European project. While traditionally European Union (EU) scholars deemed public opinion of minor importance for the process of European integration, public support and scepticism is now seen as crucial for the survival of the European project. One important reason for this change in perspective is the increasing politicization of the EU in domestic politics. In recent years, a burgeoning literature on public contestation concerning European integration has developed. Students of public opinion in the EU have primarily focused their attention on the explanations of fluctuations in support and scepticism. This work stresses both interest- and identity-based explanations showing that support for European integration increases with skill levels and more inclusive identities. Less attention has been given to the conceptualization of the precise nature of public opinion and its role in EU politics. When it comes to the politicization of European integration and its effects on public opinion, many scholarly contributions have aimed to explore the conditions under which EU attitudes affect voting behavior in elections and referendums. Yet, the way in which public opinion affects policy making and responsiveness at the EU level has received much less scholarly attention. This suggests that more work needs to be undertaken to understand the conditions under which public contestation of the EU constrains the room to maneuver of domestic and European elites at the EU level, and the extent to which it poses a challenge to, or opportunity for, further integrative steps in Europe. Only by gaining a better understanding about the ways public opinion limits the actions of domestic and European elites or not at the EU level, will scholars be able to make predictions about how public opinion might affect the future of the European project.


2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raluca Buturoiu

<p>The European Union is dominated by permanent change and diversity so that public opinion regarding different EU-related issues follows a similar trend. Within this continually changing context, there are two important interconnected things to be considered: first, public opinion towards the EU represents the core of political and academic debates over the present and future of the European integration. Second, the favorable attitudes and opinions towards the EU have increasingly changed into disapproving or sceptic attitudes in the last years. Although there are studies on Eurosceptic attitudes and their causes in almost all EU member states, only a few of them offer a clear overview of this issue. The present paper addresses four questions: What is actually Euroscepticism?; What are the faces of Euroscepticism in the EU as a whole?; How prominent are Eurosceptic attitudes in Romania?; Where do we go from here? The aim of this paper is to examine the theoretical foundations of Euroscepticism and to provide insightful information to be used in future studies.</p>


2021 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 429-451
Author(s):  
Marianna Dudášová

Recent developments in the European Union revealed significant differences between the Visegrad countries and the remaining members of the EU. The enlargement euphoria of the first decade of the 21st century was replaced by certain enlargement fatigue, manifesting itself not only in concrete governmental policies but also in the public opinion towards the EU. As European integration and globalisation are parallel processes, declining support for European integration must not necessarily be the result of disagreement with specific policies and should be examined in the broader context of globalisation fears and anxieties. The article describes variations in globalisation scepticism between the group of Visegrad countries and the remaining countries of the EU as well as variations within the Visegrad group itself, focusing on the main drivers of economic globalisation – international trade, foreign direct investment, and immigration. The development of public opinion since the financial and economic crisis in 2009 indicates that Visegrad countries should not be treated as a uniform bloc of globalisation sceptics as there are significant differences in opinion between the more pessimistic Czechs and Slovaks and the more optimistic Poles and Hungarians. Their globalisation scepticism also varies across different dimensions of globalisation and is fuelled by different motivations.


Author(s):  
Emanuele Massetti ◽  
Arjan H. Schakel

Regionalist parties are political actors that emphasize distinct ethno-territorial identities and interests vis-à-vis those of the entire state, advocating some forms of territorially based self-government in a view to protect, give voice to, and enhance those identities and interests. The tense relationships that these political actors often have with the central institutions leads them, in the European Union (EU) context, to identify the EU as a potential ally in their struggle against the state. Indeed, the EU system of multilevel governance, in which regional governments have obtained a considerable role, is also the result of a combined effect of regionalist parties’ pressure on member states from below and the process of European integration creating a favorable political framework from above. This putative alliance was celebrated, during the 1980s and 1990s, with the Maastricht Treaty representing a pivotal moment for the launch of the vision of a “Europe of the Regions.” However, the EU constitutional reforms of the 2000s (from the Treaty of Nice to the Treaty of Lisbon) fell rather short vis-à-vis regionalist claims, revealing the “illusionary character” of the “Europe of the Regions” idea. Since then, attempts to achieve “Independence in Europe” (through “internal enlargement”) have intensified in regions governed by strong and radical regionalist parties, such as in Catalonia and Scotland. These secessionist attempts have added further strain to an already under-stress EU political system. Indeed, far from acting as an ally of regionalist forces, the EU appears to have straddled between the role of a neutral observer and a supporter of member states’ territorial integrity.


Author(s):  
Lenka Anna Rovná ◽  
Jan Rovny

The collapse of communism in late 1989 released the Czechs to freely consider and shape the social and economic structures of their country. The diverse formulations of the contours that a democratic and market competitive Czech Republic should take were closely intertwined with the visions of Europe and the European Union. Two prominent postcommunist politicians, Václav Havel and Václav Klaus, offered two perspectives. While Václav Havel stressed the cultural, socially liberal anchoring represented by European democracy, Václav Klaus initially focused on Europe as a market-liberal economic model. By the time Václav Klaus replaced Václav Havel in the presidential office, Klaus shifted his European rhetoric from economic to sociocultural matters, opposing Europe as a limitation on Czech sovereignty. The discrete visions proposed by these statesmen are reflected in Czech public opinion, shaped between economic and sociocultural considerations. While Czech public opinion initially viewed the EU in economic terms, this changed around the time of the Czech Republic’s accession to the Union in 2004. By the early 2000s, Czechs started to view the EU rather as a sociocultural project. It was also around this time that public support for the Union started to significantly decline. The European Union, as a multifaceted organization with an encompassing legal framework, has been both an inspiration and a scarecrow in Czech politics. While for Havel, it has provided an imperfect but stable sociocultural expression of liberty and openness, for Klaus it was initially a symbol of free market economics, only to later become a much-opposed damper on Czech national independence. Klaus’s economic view dominated public understanding of the EU in the 1990s; however, the 2000s have seen a shift as the EU has come to be understood as a value-based, socially liberalizing project. While this development coincides with Havel’s vision of the EU, it has led, paradoxically, to increased public opposition to European integration.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alessandro Borin ◽  
Elisa Macchi ◽  
Michele Mancini

Abstract The future of an institution, such as the European Union, ultimately depends on people’s support. This paper investigates whether EU redistributive policies have improved public attitudes towards European integration, both in terms of public opinion and political preferences. We focus on Cohesion Policy funds, whose allocation allows us to single out these effects by means of a regression discontinuity approach. The results show that EU transfers have mitigated the rise of Eurosceptical attitudes and reduced political consensus for anti-EU parties. The effects are homogeneous across different socio-economic groups, including the most disadvantaged ones. The improvement in public support for the EU does not appear to be exclusively a spillover of the positive economic effect of funding; we show evidence suggesting the existence of a ‘reciprocity-effect’ channel, i.e. citizens in recipient regions recognize the beneficial role of the EU as the source of funding.


1998 ◽  
Vol 31 (5) ◽  
pp. 569-601 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRISTOPHER J. ANDERSON

This article argues that citizens employ proxies rooted in attitudes about domestic politics when responding to survey questions about the European integration process. It develops a model of public opinion toward European integration based on attitudes toward the political system, the incumbent government, and establishment parties. With the help of data from Eurobarometer 34.0, the study tests political and economic models of public support for membership in the European Union in Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, and Portugal. The analyses show that system and establishment party support are the most powerful determinants of support for membership in the European Union. The results also suggest that the relationship between economic factors and support previously reported in research on public opinion toward European integration is likely to be mediated by domestic political attitudes.


Res Publica ◽  
1997 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 215-227
Author(s):  
Robin B. Hodess

The pbenomenon of European integration has received a great deal ofattention from political scientists in the wake of the mid-1980s 'relaunch' ofthe European Union (EU). However, political science's theoretical consideration of West European integration has from the outset failed to include news media as a factor in EU politics. This oversight is linked to the general dismissal of the public and public debate as irrelevant to the integration project. Yet because media have several critical functions in politics - as an information-source, agendasetter, and legitimator - political science treatment of the EU now needs to account for the role of news media. Turning to concepts in normative media theory, the article proposes a framework within which to consider media and suggests empirical analysis of media coverage of the European Union. Such analysis would complement political science study of the democratisation and legitimation of the EU, while acknowledging public discourse as an element crucial to the future course of European integration.


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