scholarly journals Testing for asymmetries in price reactions to quarterly earnings announcements on Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius Stock Exchanges during 2000–2009

2012 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-86 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laivi Laidroo ◽  
Zana Grigaliuniene
2010 ◽  
Vol 8 (7) ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Catherine Chiang ◽  
Yaw M. Mensah

In this paper, we propose a new method for assessing the usefulness of information, its inferential value. In the context of accounting and finance, we define the inferential value of information about a firm as how efficaciously the information enables investors to draw correct inferences regarding its future financial performance. On the basis of this definition, we develop a stylized model to measure the proximity of a firm’s future realized rates of return to the estimated rates of return implied by its current stock price. We then use the new measure to test the hypothesis that quarterly earnings announcements have a higher inferential value than other information arriving during interim (non-earnings announcement) periods. Our empirical findings suggest that investors are able to make more informative inferences about a firm’s future profitability based on quarterly earnings announcement than based on information available during interim periods. However, our findings also suggest that, in general, investors do not correctly anticipate future losses. Finally, we find that earnings announcements are as important in anticipating future profitability for larger firms as they are for smaller firms.


2015 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dedhy Sulistiawan ◽  
Jogiyanto Hartono ◽  
Eduardus Tandelilin ◽  
Supriyadi Supriyadi

The main purpose of this study is to provide empirical evidence of the relationship betweeninvestors’ responses to two events, which are, (1) earnings anouncements, and (2) technicalanalysis signals, as competing information. This study is motivated by Francis, et al. (2002),whose study used stock analyst’s recommendations as competing information in the U.S stockmarket. To extend that idea, this study uses technical analysis signals as competing informationin the Indonesian stock market. Using Indonesian data from 2007-2012, this study shows thatthere are price reactions on the day of a technical analysis signal’s release, which is prior toearnings announcements. It means that investors react to the emergence of competinginformation. Reactions on earnings announcements also produce a negative relationship withthe reaction to a technical analysis signal before an earnings announcement. This study givesevidence about the importance of technical analysis as competing information to earningsannouncements.Keywords: competing information, earnings announcements, technical analysis, price reaction


1992 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 395-422 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert M. Bowen ◽  
Marilyn F. Johnson ◽  
Terry Shevlin ◽  
D. Shores

Previous empirical research provides descriptive evidence on the timing pattern of earnings announcements but does not attempt to investigate potential explanations. Because some stakeholders are not likely to find it cost-effective to monitor the firm actively, managers have the opportunity to influence the perceptions of relatively uninformed stakeholders through accounting decisions such as the timing of earnings announcements. We provide evidence on this stakeholder explanation of timing decisions by identifying a setting that has the potential to discriminate between this and a confounding explanation for the normal timing pattern suggested in prior studies. Specifically, if managers rushed to report bad news following the October 1987 stock market crash in the belief that the ongoing market chaos reduced the reactions of stakeholders to the news, “normal” timing patterns would be (at least partially) reversed. Our results are generally consistent with prior research in that we document a (somewhat weak) association between earnings news and timing. However, consistent with the stakeholder explanation, we find that the earliest reporting group exhibited, on average, bad news. Thus, we infer that timing decisions for some firms are motivated by a desire to minimize the adverse reaction of stakeholders to bad news. In addition, we report evidence that suggests managers reduced the magnitude of reported earnings following the crash. This evidence corroborates our conclusion that managers are attempting to influence stakeholder perceptions of the firm's earnings performance.


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