Nationalist sentiment and lottery markets: Evidence from Catalonia

Author(s):  
Jaume García ◽  
Levi Pérez
Author(s):  
Bogdan Grachev

This article attempts to “objectify” and conceptualize the concept of “Eurasia”, determine its ontological characteristics as the sociopolitical space of development of the Russian civilizational project, as well as delineates the contours of this space within the framework of a project-constructive methodological orientation. The author refers to the history of formation of holistic representations on Eurasia within the scientific thought, giving special attention to the contribution of geopoliticians, and emphasizing the implementation of theoretical provisions in real politics. The empirical basis relies on the two megaprojects that are implemented in practice: the Silk Road Economic Belt initiated by China and the Eurasian Economic Union (which includes Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Russia), as well as the “Greater Eurasia” as a potential way of their interlink and development of the space for cross-civilizational dialogue on the continent. The main conclusions are as follows: 1) Eurasia is determined both as the goal of the Russian project of civilizational development and as the space it can be realized within. At the same time, the space for the development of Russia-Eurasia is described as the natural environment of the Russian civilizational project, the space of the “primary circle”. Special role is played by the creation and development of the Eurasian Economic Union, which unites the countries that have faced the escalation of nationalist sentiment after the dissolution of the Soviet Union; 2) The “Greater Eurasia” is designated as the “secondary circle” of the Russian civilizational project, a space for continental cooperation, determines by new political reality.  3) Certain zones of civilizational confrontation and contradictions on the continent have been identified. The author believes that the need for conceptualization of the concept at hand lies in the significant sociopolitical formative potential.


Author(s):  
Michelle M. Nickerson

This chapter examines how women developed forms of antistatist protest in the first half of the twentieth century that posed an oppositional relationship between the family and government. By the 1950s, anticommunism and antistatism became widespread mechanisms of political protest for women on the right much as peace activism and welfare work came to seem natural for women on the left. But unlike the later generation of Cold Warrior women who exerted themselves most forcefully through local politics, conservative women of the early twentieth century made their strongest impact by attacking that national progressive state. They also demonized “internationalism” as the handmaiden to communism, discovering another foe that women's position in the family obliged them to oppose. Consequently, the earliest generation of conservative organizations adopted the habit of calling themselves “patriotic” groups to contrast their own nationalist sentiment with the internationalism of progressives, which they equated with communism. This pattern continued into the post-World War II era.


2019 ◽  
pp. 105-128
Author(s):  
Andrea F. Bohlman

Bohlman’s chapter explores the fragmented archive pertaining to Polish military involvement in the Crimean War, focusing on evocations of military power and travel in legion songs. The chapter suggests that legion songs were a political technology for preserving and promoting Polish nationhood during a time of partition. Not only did such songs stimulate nationalist sentiment (both at home and abroad) and portray the legion as the fulcrum of Poland’s aspirational sovereignty, they also posited a relationship to land rooted in mobility. The chapter argues that poems and songs served to sing a nation into being, redrawing constantly shifting imaginary borders between Poland and the imperial forces that kept it splintered.


Author(s):  
David Abulafia

From a Mediterranean perspective, the First World War was only part of a sequence of crises that marked the death throes of the Ottoman Empire: the loss of Cyprus, Egypt, Libya, the Dodecanese, then the war itself with the loss of Palestine to British control, soon followed by a French mandate in Syria. All these changes had consequences, sometimes drastic, in the port cities where different ethnic and religious groups had coexisted over the centuries, notably Salonika, Smyrna, Alexandria and Jaffa. At the end of the war, the Ottoman heartlands were carved up between the victorious powers, and even Constantinople swarmed with British soldiers. The sultan was immobilized politically, providing plenty of opportunities for the Turkish radicals, in particular Mustafa Kemal, who had acquitted himself with great distinction fighting at Gallipoli. Allied mistrust of the Turks was compounded by public feeling: the mass deportation of the Armenians in spring and summer 1915 aroused horror among American diplomats based in Constantinople and Smyrna. Marched across the Anatolian highlands in searing heat, with harsh taskmasters forcing them on, men, women and children collapsed and died, or were killed for fun, while the Ottoman government made noises about the treasonable plots that were said to be festering among the Armenians. The intention was to ‘exterminate all males under fifty’. The worry among Greeks, Jews and foreign merchants was that the ‘purification’ of Anatolia would not be confined to persecution of the Armenians. In its last days, the Ottoman government had turned its back on the old ideal of coexistence. In Turkey too, as the radical Young Turks often revealed, powerful nationalist sentiment was overwhelming the tolerance of past times. Smyrna survived the war physically intact, with most of its population protected from persecution, partly because its vali, or governor, Rahmi Bey, was sceptical about the Turkish alliance with Germany and Austria, and understood that the prosperity of his city depended on its mixed population of Greeks, Armenians, Jews, European merchants and Turks. When he was ordered to deliver the Armenians to the Ottoman authorities, he temporized, though he had to despatch about a hundred ‘disreputables’ to an uncertain fate.


Author(s):  
Roman Wapiński

This chapter views the great attention Polish society devoted to the Jewish question, as well as its hostility towards Jews, as making the stance which the Endecja (Partia Narodowa-Democracja, or National Democratic Party) adopted to some degree inevitable. Virtually from its beginnings, the antisemitic camp urged the strengthening of the Polish national element in all spheres of social life. Its primary founder, Roman Dmowski, stressed in his 1893 book Nasz patriotyzm (Our Patriotism) the need to increase nationalist sentiment daily. This nationalist approach also wanted to strengthen the Polish middle classes in the cities and towns, and correspondingly limit the Jewish hold on this sector, at least in the territories of the Russian and Austrian partitions. Despite the fact that when the Endecja called for a boycott on Jewish trade and artisanry they did not likewise call for greater support for Polish trade and crafts, their programme for the nationalization of economic life increased the gulf between Poles and Jews and added a new context to the traditional distances. In addition, within many urban centres in Russian and Austrian Poland, fierce economic competition between the established and newly emerging merchant classes accompanied the mutual cultural isolation.


1990 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 629-659 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary B. Miles

Those who view Rome from the perspective of modern empires have been struck by Rome's longevity (for example, Brunt 1965:267; Doyle 1986:81–103; Syme 1958:1). Attempts to explain this phenomenon, however, have given little if any consideration to why movements of national independence have occurred in modern times, but not in Roman antiquity. This is the more striking inasmuch as nationalist rebellions against imperial rule typically accompanied the dissolution of direct imperial control over native populations during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Certainly the decisions of modern imperialists to give up their empires have been influenced by political idealism or by calculations of economic self-interest unique to their historical situations (Liithy 1964:34). Nonetheless, the role of their subjects must also be taken into consideration, because it was the initiative of the colonial natives, not that of the imperial masters, that typically has resulted in the first calls for independence and, most often, in the nationalist rebellions that provoked imperialists into dismantling their empires. Idealistic impulses and calculations of economic self-interest alike have taken place within the context of that initiative and cannot help but to have been colored by it. It would be a mistake to identify nationalist sentiment and rebellion as the only reasons for the collapse of modern empires, but they must be included among the decisive reasons.


2017 ◽  
Vol 116 (792) ◽  
pp. 285-287
Author(s):  
Marianne Kamp

An anthropologist with long ties to a border town in Central Asia watched as nationalist sentiment turned what had been an informal boundary into a hard divide between erstwhile neighbors.


Significance The public broadcaster may appeal the ruling through the courts. Opposition parties have long bemoaned the dire state of the SABC, but recent controversial moves by Chief Operating Officer (COO) Hlaudi Motsoeneng are dividing the ANC itself. Impacts Social media will feature prominently in political parties' communication strategies ahead of municipal elections in August. Motsoeneng's ban on airing footage of demonstrations will not boost ANC support in protest-wrought Pretoria, where the DA has a clear lead. However, his requirement that 90% of music broadcast must be locally produced will stoke nationalist sentiment. Any major shift in SABC policy -- at least in the short term -- would have to be forced on the broadcaster through court orders.


1998 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 21-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Hjerm

This article sets out to compare nationalism or nationalist sentiment in the two neighboring countries of Norway and Sweden, since it has been claimed that nationalism differs both with respect to the degree of nationalism and the connotations it has in these two countries. In spite of the claimed differences between the two countries, this article shows that Norwegians and Swedes have to a similar extent nationalist sentiments and that xenophobia and protectionism follow in the footsteps of such attitudes in both the examined countries, indicating the negative sides of nationalism. Moreover, the two countries also show similar patterns regarding which groups in society that are most inclined to show nationalist sentiments.


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