How Does Information Disclosure Affect Bank Systemic Risk in the Presence of a Deposit Insurance System?

2019 ◽  
Vol 55 (11) ◽  
pp. 2497-2522 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bo Zhu ◽  
Li Li ◽  
Yao Zhou ◽  
Wenhua Yang
2015 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 163-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zongrun Wang ◽  
Jiangyan Chen ◽  
Yuanyuan Wan ◽  
Yanbo Jin ◽  
Jared Anthony Mazzanti

Risks ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aida Barkauskaite ◽  
Ausrine Lakstutiene ◽  
Justyna Witkowska

Scientific discussions have emphasized that the main problem with the current deposit insurance system is that the current system does not evaluate the risks that banks assume to calculate the deposit insurance premiums in many countries of the European Union (E.U.). Thus, the prevailing system does not safeguard a sufficient level of stability in the banking system. Scientific studies show that the deposit insurance system should consider not only the risk indicators for individual banks, but it must also consider the systemic risk of banks that affects the stability of the banking system. Hence, the question arises as to whether measurements of systemic risk in a common E.U. risk-based deposit insurance system are a formal necessity or if they are a value-adding process. Expanding the discussion of scientists, this article analyzes how contributions to insurance funds would change the banks of Lithuania following the introduction of the E.U.’s overall risk-based deposit insurance system and after taking into consideration the additional systemic risk. The research results that were obtained provide evidence that the introduction of a risk-based deposit insurance system would redistribute payments to the deposit insurance fund between banks operating in Lithuania, and, thereby, would contribute to a reduction in the negative effects of the deposit insurance system and would improve the stability in the financial system.


Author(s):  
Gokhan Karabulut ◽  
Mehmet Huseyin Bilgin

<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: x-small;">The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of the unlimited deposit insurance on non-performing loans and market discipline. Deposit insurance program play a crucial role in achieving financial stability. Governments in many advanced and developing economies established deposit insurance schemes for reducing the risk of systemic failure of banks. Deposit insurance has a beneficial effect of reducing the probability of a bank run.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>However deposit insurance systems have its own set of problems. Deposit insurance systems create moral hazard incentives that encourage banks to take excessive risk. Turkey established an explicit deposit insurance system in 1960. Until 1994, the coverage determined by a flat rate but in that date, Turkey experienced a major economic crisis. In April 1994, Turkish government started to apply an unlimited deposit insurance scheme to restore banking system stability. Unlimited deposit insurance caused a remarkable increase at non-performing loans. This paper empirically estimates the impact of unlimited deposit insurance system on non-performing bank loans (NPLs) and analyses the other potential sources of NPLs. </span></p>


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