Autonomy and power-sharing in Northern Ireland: A model for global export?

This chapter argues that the UK territorial constitution rests upon a profound ambiguity about its central principles. Parliamentary sovereignty remains at the core of how the English understand their constitution. Yet in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, alternative doctrines have flourished, especially since devolution, which conceded the right of each nation to determine its own form of government (popular sovereignty) and established a non-majoritarian system of power-sharing and cross-border governance in (Northern) Ireland. These developments imply that the UK is a voluntary ‘family of nations’ not a unitary state. Yet Westminster has never formally conceded this point and devolution could in theory be reversed by a simple parliamentary majority. Constructive ambiguity has been retained. However, the historic tendency to allow constitutional theory and practice to diverge may be unsustainable in the light of the EU referendum result and the wider mood of English political disaffection that Brexit has tapped into.

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Power sharing and the Irish dimension: the conundrum for the SDLP in Northern Ireland

Sunningdale, the Ulster Workers' Council Strike and the Struggle for Democracy in Northern Ireland ◽

10.7228/manchester/9780719099519.003.0009 ◽

2017 ◽

Author(s):

Sarah Campbell

Keyword(s):

Northern Ireland ◽

Chief Executive ◽

Power Sharing ◽

The Troubles ◽

Popular Narrative ◽

Irish Government ◽

History Of ◽

Set Up ◽

Real Challenge ◽

Lost Opportunity

This chapter traces the ideas that shaped the concept of power-sharing within the SDLP, and subsequently Northern nationalism, highlighting the significance attached to the Irish dimension as a core feature of power-sharing, which caused divisive debates within the party post-Sunningdale. It will also trace how the concept evolved within British and Irish government circles, where much of the talk focussed on ‘government by consent’ as opposed to power-sharing during the rest of the 1970s. The fall of Sunningdale in 1974 has been attributed to many things, and the popular narrative emphasises that it was an agreement too soon, or a lost opportunity. This explanation does not account for the level of intra-party conflict that existed before the executive was even set up or during the negotiations. Further, it overlooks the very real challenge that power-sharing posed (and continues to pose) to democracy and legitimacy. Brian Faulkner, Chief Executive in the 1974 power-sharing Executive, retrospectively questioned the legitimacy of the SDLP sharing power in Northern Ireland: ‘Given the history of the SDLP over the previous years, and particularly their attitude that Northern Ireland had no right to exist, it was natural that unionists should feel strongly against SDLP participation in government’. The mandatory coalition between parties who were at ideologically opposite ends of the spectrum, including a party that had the demise of the state as one of its core aims, further highlighted the undemocratic nature of the agreement that inevitability would have caused problems, had the experiment not failed in 1974. The emphasis the SDLP attached to the Irish dimension as an integral part of power-sharing additionally eroded the democratic complexion of power-sharing. This has very real repercussions for the Northern Ireland Assembly today. While the 1998 Agreement ended the violence (or at least the level of violence) associated with the prior three decades of the ‘troubles’, there is no real commitment to democratic pluralist institutions at Stormont and instead there has been a reinforcing of the historical choices offered to the electorate of selecting candidates or voting on the basis of their shade of orange or green.

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Stan Orme and the road to ‘Industrial Democracy’: British attempts at the politicisation of working-class Protestants in Northern Ireland, 1973–75

Sunningdale, the Ulster Workers' Council Strike and the Struggle for Democracy in Northern Ireland ◽

10.7228/manchester/9780719099519.003.0008 ◽

2017 ◽

Author(s):

Tony Craig

Keyword(s):

Northern Ireland ◽

Working Class ◽

Power Sharing ◽

Political Activity ◽

Industrial Democracy ◽

Industrial Workers ◽

Working Classes ◽

The Road ◽

General Elections ◽

The Uk

As Minister of State in Northern Ireland 1974-1976, Stanley Orme MP (1923-2005) worked at the heart of British government policies that attempted to ameliorate and politicise the membership of those loyalist groups that had successfully brought down the power sharing executive in 1974. Orme followed and extended a government policy of often secret engagement of those outside the mainstream of Northern Ireland politics; a policy that successfully brought about the Provisional IRA’s 1975 ceasefire, but which failed to bring the UVF into electoral politics with the dismal performance of the Volunteer Political Party in the 1974 general elections. Orme’s approach, outlined in the 1975 pamphlet ‘Industrial Democracy’ encouraged workers’ participation in the newly nationalised Harland and Wolff shipyard and was a direct attempt to politicise the Protestant working classes of Belfast. Orme attempted to redirect their support away from both existing militant and right-wing groups that at this time included the UDA, UVF and Ulster Vanguard. Orme’s view was that skilled industrial workers belonged within the fold of progressive social democracy and that the extension of government-backed syndicalist activity in the ship yard would empower the workers and help shift Northern Ireland as a whole from sectarian models of political activity to a class based system similar to the rest of the UK. For Orme, ‘Industrial Democracy’ was the ‘Last Chance for Northern Ireland’ and a potential solution to the province’s ills, ‘If the working-class people of Northern Ireland can be convinced that, whatever their religious denominations, they have economic interests in common, they will be able to approach the constitutional problem… with open minds.’ (‘Last Chance for Northern Ireland?’, [undated] c. 1975 LSE Orme 1/3). Using a combination of Orme’s official and private papers, this chapter seeks to explore and critique Orme’s motivation, his policy, and its effect.

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Wales and Northern Ireland

Macdonald on the Law of Freedom of Information ◽

10.1093/oso/9780198724452.003.0033 ◽

2016 ◽

Keyword(s):

Northern Ireland ◽

Power Sharing ◽

Freedom Of Information ◽

Freedom Of Information Act ◽

National Assembly ◽

Legislative Power ◽

Belfast Agreement ◽

The Government ◽

The Way

Chapter 24 explains how the Freedom of Information Act 2000 applies to Wales and Northern Ireland. It describes the scheme of devolution for Wales with the National Assembly for Wales and the Welsh Government and the way legislative power has been increased by the Government of Wales Act 2006 and how a reserved powers model of devolution has been agreed in a Command Paper Powers for a purpose: Towards a lasting devolution settlement for Wales. Next, the way freedom of information works in Wales is considered. The chapter then describes the scheme of devolution for Northern Ireland established following the Belfast Agreement on Friday 10 April 1998, including the Northern Ireland Assembly and the National Ireland Executive structured to ensure power-sharing and inclusivity. Section 88(2) of the 2000 Act states that the Act extends to Northern Ireland. Finally, the specific references to Northern Ireland in the 2000 Act are considered.

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The Sunningdale Agreement, 1973

Negotiating a Settlement in Northern Ireland, 1969-2019 ◽

10.1093/oso/9780198841388.003.0002 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 48-105

Author(s):

John Coakley ◽

Jennifer Todd

Keyword(s):

Northern Ireland ◽

Political Institutions ◽

Majority Rule ◽

Power Sharing ◽

Republic Of Ireland ◽

Northern Ireland Conflict ◽

The Face ◽

The Republic ◽

New Institutions

In an early ambitious attempt to resolve the Northern Ireland conflict in 1973–4, there emerged two key proposals that would radically change the form of Northern Ireland political institutions: power-sharing (rather than majority rule), and institutionalized links with the Republic of Ireland (rather than a ‘hard’ border). This chapter, centred on a witness seminar where several of those involved recorded their memories and interpretations, explores the thinking of officials—especially on the Irish side—as it evolved in the early 1970s. It also documents their changing views as they attempted to reach new new modes of accommodation with their British counterparts. It examines the process by which an innovative package was agreed in Sunningdale, England, in December 1973, and follows the challenging process of implementation of this package. This initiative was ultimately unsuccessful, as the new institutions collapsed in the face of determined unionist opposition in May 1974.

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