Sovereignty, Devolution and the English Constitution

This chapter argues that the UK territorial constitution rests upon a profound ambiguity about its central principles. Parliamentary sovereignty remains at the core of how the English understand their constitution. Yet in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, alternative doctrines have flourished, especially since devolution, which conceded the right of each nation to determine its own form of government (popular sovereignty) and established a non-majoritarian system of power-sharing and cross-border governance in (Northern) Ireland. These developments imply that the UK is a voluntary ‘family of nations’ not a unitary state. Yet Westminster has never formally conceded this point and devolution could in theory be reversed by a simple parliamentary majority. Constructive ambiguity has been retained. However, the historic tendency to allow constitutional theory and practice to diverge may be unsustainable in the light of the EU referendum result and the wider mood of English political disaffection that Brexit has tapped into.

England in a Changing Fiscal Union

The UK has formal arrangements for tax transfers to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, but not for transfers within England. Nor can we judge whether public expenditure per head is ‘fair’ to all regions of the UK, nor yet what relationship should exist between tax yield per head and public expenditure per head for each part of the UK. The chapter discusses the ‘Barnett’ formula to allocate expenditure to the three non-English territories and explains why it is not an appropriate tool. Some suggestions for an allocation mechanism are made. Such a mechanism must balance fairness with the preservation of incentives to grow a region’s economy and its tax base. Any new fiscal mechanism for England must also work both for those parts of England that have ‘devolution deals’ across a region or city region, such as Greater Manchester and Tees Valley, and for the rest of the country.

UKIP, Brexit and the Disruptive Political Potential of English National Identity

The defining feature of English national identity for many decades was its absence in politics. This has changed with the mobilisation of a particular strain of English national identity. It was not the only factor influencing choices in the 2016 EU referendum, but it was an important one. All of the concerns that are most intensely expressed by English identifiers—opposition to immigration, social and cultural conservatism, political disaffection and support for separate English political institutions—were associated with higher support for Brexit. Brexit, however, is not the end of the story. The referendum provoked intense political mobilisation by the English identifiers, but the election of June 2017 has sparked a similarly intense reaction from the British identifiers, denying the pro-Brexit Government their majority. The two votes just a year apart have highlighted how deep the identity divides in England have become.

Interpreting EVEL: Latest Station in the Conservative Party’s English Journey?

In October 2015, the Conservative Government introduced a reform to the procedures of the House of Commons known as ‘English votes for English laws’ (or EVEL). This chapter examines how the Conservative Party, which has historically been closely identified with unionism, became the architect of such a scheme. It documents how this topic emerged in political debate, following the implementation of devolution and, again, in the aftermath of the 2014 Scottish independence referendum. And it analyses EVEL’s operation at Westminster in 2015–17, uncovering tensions within it that point to deeper strains within Conservative Party thinking. It concludes that EVEL needs to be understood not only as a response to the ‘West Lothian Question’, but also in relation to a longer-term disjuncture in the Conservative psyche arising from two competing conceptions of the nature and purpose of union.

Introduction: English Identity and Institutions in a Changing United Kingdom

This chapter examines whether, why and with what consequences there has been a disentangling of England from Britain in terms of its governance and national identity. The assumption has been that to distinguish between England and Britain risks destabilising the Union. However, the English seem dissatisfied with how they are governed, as demonstrated by support for Brexit, and less content for their nationhood to be poured into the larger vessel of Britishness. In response, the major UK political parties appear more willing to appeal to English national sentiment. But England has yet to engage in a reflective national conversation about its changing identity and its relationship with the rest of the UK and wider world. The fragmentary character of national consciousness in England, and deep divisions in its political culture, make it impossible to draw simple conclusions. This chapter sketches the outlines of a prospective research agenda on these issues.

English Nationalism in Historical Perspective

This chapter proposes that much current talk of ‘English nationalism’ and its role in the vote for Brexit in 2016 is either empirically misinformed or conceptually misleading. Instead it proposes a historically informed perspective via an engagement with three different characterisations of the genesis of Englishness: the contention that the English are doomed to be ‘little Englanders’ until they cast off the shackles associated with the British state; the notion that it is empire above all that has moulded the character of English nationhood; and, finally, evolutionist accounts which trade upon familiar forms of national exceptionalism. Drawing selective insights from these accounts, while also questioning aspects of each, the author concludes that the ingrained habit of conflating Englishness with Enoch Powell’s anti-immigrant and anti-EU nationalism has stunted our understanding of this lineage of national sentiment and its politically contingent character.

How Do People in England Want to Be Governed?

The advent of devolution in Scotland and Wales might have been expected to stimulate increased public support for devolution for England, not least because of a heightened sense of English identity. However, the various arguments in favour of devolution in England point to different schemes of devolution. There appears to have been an increase in the late 1990s in the proportion prioritising an English rather than a British identity, but there is no consistent evidence that this trend has continued. Although there is seemingly widespread support for the principle of devolution, this is relatively lukewarm and does not necessarily translate into backing for any particular scheme. Only EVEL enjoys widespread support. Meanwhile, there is no consistent evidence that support for devolution has increased or has become increasingly rooted in English identity, raising doubts about claims that the devolution debate has stimulated a distinct English ‘political community’.

Territory and Power in England: The Political Economy of Manchester and Beyond

Bulpitt’s conception of a ‘dual polity’ is updated in this chapter to make sense of modern changes in central–local relations, notably the spate of ‘devolution’ deals, including for the Greater Manchester city region. ‘Devo Manc’ is the product of a deal between symbiotically entwined elites in Whitehall and Manchester City Council, both dominated by systems of ‘coterie politics’. But this attempt to recreate a new, settled duality is riddled with contradictions and is therefore chronically unstable. The problems arise from the different ambitions of key groups: the economic interests that have captured the process of economic change in the city; the institutional interests that divide key actors within the Manchester system; and the strategic interests of a central state that is desperate to offload the painful decisions created by austerity politics.

Labour and the Governance of England

The 1997–2010 Labour Government introduced wide-ranging constitutional reforms, creating new democratically elected bodies and rights for UK citizens. However, the governance of England was left largely unchanged. With the exception of the Greater London Authority, no new democratic bodies were created for England, nor were any significant powers granted to local government. An extensive system of regional administration was created but then swiftly swept away by the incoming Coalition Government in 2010. England became the only part of the union whose domestic policy was determined by the UK Government. This chapter argues that this outcome was rooted in Labour’s traditions of political thought: its assumption of a unitary state, its centralist instincts, its distrust of local government and its reluctance to consider England’s identity and constitutional position within the union. It finds some evidence Labour is now taking the English Question more seriously, but old attitudes retain significant weight.

An English Parliament: An Idea whose Time Has Come?

Ever since devolution to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, one proposed answer to the English Question has been to create symmetry by establishing an English Parliament. This has been widely seen as a fringe proposal—with many arguing that England is too big and is already well represented by what has long been its Parliament, that is, Westminster. But in recent years, interest in an English Parliament has grown. The idea has its own campaign group and has gained support from UK Independence Party (UKIP) and some in the Conservative and Labour Parties. This chapter explores the history of the English Parliament idea, examines two competing visions of a English Parliament—the ‘separately elected’ and ‘dual mandate’ models—and considers a range of largely unexplored questions about what an English Parliament would look like and what implications it would have for Westminster and for the territorial stability of the UK.