Coordination and the Moral Obligation to Obey the Law

Ethics ◽  
1987 ◽  
Vol 97 (3) ◽  
pp. 546-557 ◽  
Author(s):  
William S. Boardman
Keyword(s):  
2007 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-111
Author(s):  
Mark C. Murphy

The moral formulation of philosophical anarchism is that most persons, even in just political communities, do not have a moral obligation to obey the law. The epistemological formulation of philosophical anarchism is that most persons are unjustified in believing that they have a moral obligation to obey the law. But the philosophical anarchists’ argument strategies do not, and in fact cannot, show that belief in the moral obligation to obey the law is unjustified. And, further, given that most persons in just political communities do believe that they are under such an obligation, the moral requirement that one ought to act in accordance with one’s conscience implies that most persons have a moral obligation to obey the law. Thus the moral formulation of philosophical anarchism is false and the epistemological formulation unjustified.


Philosophy ◽  
2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ned Dobos

There are good, prudential reasons to obey the law. The prospect of punishment, not to mention loss of reputation and social exclusion, is enough for most any citizen possessed of a suitably far-sighted self-interest to discharge his or her legal duties. But is there a moral obligation to do what the law requires, just because the law requires it? If the answer is yes and the mere illegality of an act renders its performance prima facie morally wrong, political obligation obtains. Political obligation thus refers to the moral duty of citizens to obey the laws of their state. In cases where an action or forbearance that is required by law is morally obligatory on independent grounds, political obligation simply gives the citizen an additional reason for acting accordingly. But law tends to extend beyond morality, forbidding otherwise morally innocent behavior and compelling acts and omissions that people tend to think of as morally discretionary. In such cases, the sole source of one’s moral duty to comply with the law is one’s political obligation.


Philosophy ◽  
1971 ◽  
Vol 46 (178) ◽  
pp. 309-323 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. R. Cameron

An obligation may take either of two forms, each form being reported in a different way. For example, when we report the obligation of parents to care for their children, if it is the moral obligation we mean, we will say ‘Parents ought to look after their children’ but if we mean the legal obligation, we will say ‘Parents have to look after their children’. The law specifies that people shall do thus and so, not that they ought to do thus and so.


1990 ◽  
Vol 1990 (6) ◽  
pp. 1311 ◽  
Author(s):  
George C. Christie
Keyword(s):  

2020 ◽  
pp. 325-331
Author(s):  
Raymond Wacks

Do we have a moral duty to obey the law? Do we, in other words, have a moral obligation to comply with legal rules simply because they are legal rules? What about obviously unfair or unjust laws? Or laws that impose unreasonable demands on us? The question of whether we have a duty to follow the demands of the law raises some fundamental issues regarding the nature of law and its moral claims. This chapter examines a number of possible reasons for obeying the law. It will examine the principal justifications for obedience: fair play, consent, the common good, and gratitude.


1999 ◽  
Vol 71 (12) ◽  
pp. 451-459
Author(s):  
Kosta Čavoški

The author gives a short survey of the role of lawyers in the creation, interpretation and defense of law. Then, he marks dedication to law and justice as a fundamental quality of a lawyer. He points out examples of departure front this quality in the latest history and current practice of the Yugoslav judiciary, but also examples of its affirmation and resistance to attempted abuse of court by individual members of the law profession. The author also analyzes the problem of incongruity of the old and repressive provisions of certain laws with liberal provisions of the Constitution and advocates a direct application of the Constitution, which is, according to him, a legal and moral obligation of a judge.


2021 ◽  
Vol 48 (152) ◽  
pp. 725
Author(s):  
Andrea Luisa Bucchile Faggion

The recent debate between John Finnis and Joseph Raz on the existence of a general prima facie moral obligation to obey positive laws is a major contribution to a classical topic in legal and political philosophy. In this paper, I argue that Raz’s normal justification thesis and Finnis’s doctrine of “determinatio,” inherited from Aquinas, complement each other, shedding light on how norms grounded in social facts can give rise to particular moral obligations independently of their content. However, I argue that this on its own does not explain the possibility of a general moral obligation to obey the law, that is, the notion that everyone has a prima facie moral obligation to obey every law that applies to them.


2021 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 249-261
Author(s):  
Paweł Jabłoński

The aim of the paper is to analyse the answer that Dworkin’s philosophy of law provides to the following question: what is the threshold of wickedness of the legal order that excuses citizens from the moral obligation to obey the law? This is not a problem of civil disobedience (which only contests a particular decision of making or applying the law), but a situation in which the whole political-legal system is the object of moral contestation. The task will be carried out in three steps. In the first one, I will outline Dworkin’s theory of political obligation, situating it in the broader framework of the debate on this obligation. In the second step, I will analyse one of the main elements of this theory, namely the legitimacy of the legal order. As a third step, I will draw attention to a rather — as it seems — surprising similarity between Dworkin’s argumentation and Radbruch’s formula.


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