The Ideal Dimension of Law

The main theme of the article is ideal dimension of law. Author argue for a dual nature thesis – which contends that law necessarily comprises both a real or factual dimension and an ideal or critical dimension – and demonstrates how the ideal dimension (which refers primarily to moral correctness) implies the truth of non-positivism. The key provisions of the conception represented in article are substantiated in a polemic with other well-known representative of non-positivism – John Finnis. Particular attention is paid to determine relation between the real and ideal dimensions of law, which involves answering five questions. First, is there an outermost border of law? Second, is legal argumentation based exclusively on authoritative reasons or does it also include non-authoritative reasons? Third, what is the relation between human rights and legal systems? Forth, is democracy to be understood exclusively as a decision procedure or also as a form of discourse? Fifth, do legal system comprise only rules expressing a real “ought” or also principles expressing an “ideal ought”? These five questions are answered by the following five theses: the first with the Radbruch formula; he second with the special case thesis; the third with the thesis that constitutional rights are to be understood as attempts to positivize human rights; the fourth with the deliberative model of democracy; and the fifth with principles theory. All five theses turn on the same point: the claim to correctness.

THE OBLIGATION TO OBEY THE LAW IN THE LIGHT OF THE DEBATE BETWEEN FINNIS AND RAZ

The recent debate between John Finnis and Joseph Raz on the existence of a general prima facie moral obligation to obey positive laws is a major contribution to a classical topic in legal and political philosophy. In this paper, I argue that Raz’s normal justification thesis and Finnis’s doctrine of “determinatio,” inherited from Aquinas, complement each other, shedding light on how norms grounded in social facts can give rise to particular moral obligations independently of their content. However, I argue that this on its own does not explain the possibility of a general moral obligation to obey the law, that is, the notion that everyone has a prima facie moral obligation to obey every law that applies to them.

Uma leitura ética e filosófica do dano moral

Aborda a hipótese de que a responsabilidade civil, na tarefa corrigir perdas imerecidas e danos injustos envolvendo dano moral - que é a violação a um interesse extrapatrimonial protegido juridicamente - pode ser fortalecida a partir de uma leitura ética. Adota como pressuposto teórico que o Direito possui duas dimensões: a factual e a ideal, na esteira do que defende Robert Alexy em Teoria da Argumentação Jurídica (2014). Apresenta que no tocante ao dano moral, na primeira dimensão (factual) existe o arcabouço jurídico dos bens extrapatrimoniais protegidos juridicamente, ao passo que na segunda (ideal) defende-se que há os bens humanos básicos, os quais complementam e fortalecem a análise dos bens extrapatrimoniais no tocante a identificação e quantificação do dano moral. Aprofunda a interface dos bens extrapatrimoniais extraídos do Direito pátrio com os bens humanos básicos formulados por Bebhinn Donnelly – em A natural law approach to normativity (2007) -, Mark Murphy – em Natural law in jurisprudence and politics (2006) e Natural law and practical rationality (2001) - e John Finnis – em Lei natural e direitos naturais (2007) e Aquinas: moral, political and legal theory (2008).

Derecho y moral (razón práctica): conexiones en tiempos del Estado de derecho constitucional

El Estado de derecho constitucional hizo visibles conexiones entre el derecho y la moral racional, y en ese punto, el “movimiento de rehabilitación de la razón práctica” de la década de los setenta, inspirado fuertemente en autores como Kant y Aris-tóteles, aportó un marco teórico funcional a esos fines. Son ejemplos ilustrativos de dicha afirmación las teorías jurídicas de Robert Alexy (dialógica-constructivista) y John Finnis (realista-iusnaturalista), que avalan —con distintos fundamentos— hasta nueve conexio-nes entre el derecho y la moral, las que facilitan una comprensión y operatividad del de-recho al servicio de un objetivamente mejor o más valioso derecho. Si no hay razón capaz de definir lo bueno o lo malo, lo justo o lo injusto se frustra ese propósito y se mantiene la distancia entre aquellas dos disciplinas y realidades inescindiblemente humanas.

A Pretensa Neutralidade do Secularismo Público Posta à Prova

No contexto dos recentes debates no Supremo Tribunal Federal sobre a tese do abuso de poder religioso, o artigo aborda as seguintes questões: em que medida o capital social de ministros religiosos deve interferir na condu-ção do processo eleitoral? Qual o conteúdo do discurso religioso? Seria esse tipo de discurso propagado apenas por instituições confessionais e religiosas? Para resolver tais questões, o artigo parte de uma ampla revisão bibliográfica de obras dos principais expoentes de duas escolas de pensamento: a tradição neo-clássica do direito natural de John Finnis e a tradição reformacional em Herman Dooyeweerd. Verifica-se a hipótese da (in)consistência sociológica e moral da tese do abuso de poder religioso, sua pertinência em uma sociedade de múlti-plos discursos metanarrativos com fundo religioso (ainda que civil).

Radbruch’s Formula Revisited: The Lex Injusta Non Est Lex Maxim in Constitutional Democracies

According to German legal philosopher Gustav Radbruch, laws that are substantively unjust to an intolerable degree should not be regarded as legally valid, even if they were promulgated according to stipulated procedure. Radbruch’s Formula (as his position has been termed) contradicts the central tenet of legal positivism, according to which the existence of laws does not necessarily depend on their merit.1 While some legal positivists suppose that legal invalidity based on the content of particular laws is a central tenet of natural law theory,2 natural law theorists such as John Finnis opine that the lex injusta non est lex3 maxim has been no more than a subordinate theorem of classical natural law theory.4 In Finnis’s view, unjust laws give rise to legal obligation “in a legal sense.”5

The Ideal Dimension of Law

Alexy’s thesis that law has an ideal dimension is essentially based on the argument that law necessarily raises a claim to correctness that includes a claim to moral correctness. John Finnis has contested the necessity of this connection between law and a claim with moral content. One implication of the claim to correctness is the Radbruch Formula, which says that extreme injustice is no law. Finnis also criticizes this formula. In this chapter arguments against Finnis’s two critical points are presented. This is further elaborated into a system of the institutionalization of reason that comprises not only the Radbruch Formula but also the special case thesis, human rights, democracy, and principles theory.

La preservación del bien religioso y el Estado de Derecho

La especulación sobre un orden metafísico irreductible a la experiencia individual es universal a la condición humana, manifestándose principalmente en creencias religiosas. Los panoramas teórico-filosóficos estructurados por John Finnis y Amartya Sen son útiles para comprender este fenómeno y discernir su espacio apropiado en las comunidades humanas. El Estado de derecho asume un papel clave en la gestión de este bien básico y, por lo tanto, debe preservar las condiciones de su florecimiento, para lo cual una postura secular que reconozca la relevancia social de las diferentes visiones religiosas para la consecución del bien común de los seres humanos.