The Semantic Conception of Theories and Scientific Realism. Frederick Suppe

RESUMENEl objetivo de este trabajo es mostrar, en la línea sugerida por Nickles (1980, 1981) y desarrollada por Sintonen (1985, 1996), no sólo que el «enfoque de resolución de problemas» y el «enfoque de teorías» no son contrapuestos, sino que este último, mediante la versión de la concepción semántica de las teorías conocida bajo el nombre de «estructuralismo metateórico», puede ser utilizado para aportar precisión al enfoque de resolución de problemas, a través de la caracterización más precisa del contexto teórico en el que se plantean los problemas y, de este modo, de su individuación e historia, pudiéndose así distinguir dos tipos de «cambio problemático»: «cambio en un problema» y «cambio de problema». Para ello, se presentará dicha propuesta y luego será aplicada al caso del «hibridismo» de Mendel.PALABRAS CLAVEPROBLEMA CIENTÍFICO, ENFOQUE DE RESOLUCIÓN DE PROBLEMAS, ESTRUCTURALISMO METATEÓRICO, HIBRIDISMOABSTRACTThe aim of this paper is to show, in the line suggested by Nickles (1980, 1981) and developed by Sintonen (1985, 1996), not just that the «problem-solving approach» and the «theory approach» are not incompatible, but also that the latter, in the version of the semantic conception of theories known as «structuralist view», can be used to give precision to the problem-solving approach, by a more precise characterization of the theoretical context in which problems arise and, in this way, to their individuation and history, distinguishing two types of «problem change»: «change in a problem» and «change of a problem». In order to do this, it will be presented a proposal that will be applied to Mendel’s «hybridism».KEYWORDSSCIENTIFIC PROBLEM, PROBLEM-SOLVING APPROACH, METATHEORETICAL STRUCTURALISM, HYBRIDISM

A Methodological Critique of the Semantic Conception of Theories

Rationality and Reality ◽

10.1007/1-4020-4207-8_13 ◽

2006 ◽

pp. 239-253

Author(s):

Noretta Koertge

Keyword(s):

Semantic Conception ◽

Semantic Conception Of Theories

Semantic realism in the semantic conception of theories

Synthese ◽

10.1007/s11229-020-02557-8 ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

Quentin Ruyant

Keyword(s):

Semantic Realism ◽

Semantic Conception ◽

Semantic Conception Of Theories

Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind

10.1017/cbo9780511625435 ◽

1979 ◽

Cited By ~ 601

Author(s):

Paul M. Churchland

Keyword(s):

Scientific Realism

THE CONCEPT OF ENTROPY AND ONTIC SCIENTIFIC REALISM

Философия науки ◽

10.15372/ps20200206 ◽

2020 ◽

Keyword(s):

Scientific Realism

Background Practices

10.1093/oso/9780198796220.001.0001 ◽

2017 ◽

Cited By ~ 7

Author(s):

Hubert L. Dreyfus

Keyword(s):

Scientific Realism ◽

Distinctive Feature ◽

Phenomenological Description ◽

Existential Philosophy ◽

Textual Exegesis ◽

European Tradition ◽

Continental Divide ◽

European Philosophy ◽

Anglophone World ◽

Hubert Dreyfus

Hubert Dreyfus is one of the foremost advocates of European philosophy in the anglophone world. His clear, jargon-free interpretations of the leading thinkers of the European tradition of philosophy have done a great deal to erase the analytic–Continental divide. But Dreyfus is not just an influential interpreter of Continental philosophers; he is a creative, iconoclastic thinker in his own right. Drawing on the work of Heidegger, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Foucault, and Kierkegaard, Dreyfus makes significant contributions to contemporary conversations about mind, authenticity, technology, nihilism, modernity and postmodernity, art, scientific realism, and religion. This volume collects thirteen of Dreyfus’s most influential essays, each of which interprets, develops, and extends the insights of his predecessors working in phenomenological and existential philosophy. The essays exemplify a distinctive feature of his approach to philosophy, namely the way his work inextricably intertwines the interpretation of texts with his own analysis and description of the phenomena at issue. In fact, these two tasks—textual exegesis and phenomenological description—are for Dreyfus necessarily dependent on each other. In approaching philosophy in this way, Dreyfus is an heir to Heidegger’s own historically oriented style of phenomenology.

Introduction

10.1093/oso/9780198802099.003.0001 ◽

2017 ◽

Author(s):

Daniel Stoljar

Keyword(s):

Scientific Realism ◽

Subject Matter ◽

Main Thesis ◽

The Subject

This chapter introduces the main thesis of the book, reasonable optimism, according to which there is progress on reasonably many of the big problems of philosophy. It also introduces two distinctions central to that thesis: between big questions in philosophy and small questions, and between the subject matter of philosophy, and the big questions that people have asked in different times and places about that subject matter. Examples of professional philosophers who endorse either pessimism or something close to it are set forth and analysed. Scientific realism, a position often associated with reasonable optimism about history or science, is also introduced.

Scientific realism, or the risks of importing research models into psychology

Theory & Psychology ◽

10.1177/09593543211006777 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 31 (3) ◽

pp. 429-432

Author(s):

David Carré

Keyword(s):

Standard Model ◽

Scientific Realism ◽

Subject Matter ◽

Human Person ◽

Behavioral Research ◽

Research Practice ◽

Philosophical Basis ◽

The Standard Model

In “Scientific Realism and the Issue of Variability in Behavior,” Arocha (2021) develops an acute critique of “the standard model of current research practice in psychology” (p. 376), sharply dissecting five unwarranted assumptions behind it. To address these issues, the author proposes adopting a nonpositivist philosophical basis for behavioral research: scientific realism. Behind this argumentation, however, it is implied that scientific realism is fit for becoming the metatheoretical framework for psychology because it addresses the shortcomings of the current positivist model. In this commentary, I argue that scientific realism is not fit for becoming that philosophical basis, because it is open to reducing the discipline’s subject matter—the human person—to make it fit with models that have been fruitful in other sciences. Three historical examples are presented to show the risks of adopting models from disciplines devoted to explaining other phenomena to tackle the complexity of psychology’s subject matter.