condición tecno-ecológica. Heidegger ante los nuevos post-humanismos

Muchas de las reflexiones contemporáneas sobre ecología parten del cuestionamiento de la excepcionalidad del ser humano. Se busca de esta manera el distanciamiento de todo antropocentrismo y, en consecuencia, un marco conceptual ―post-humanista‖. El rol de Martin Heidegger en la búsqueda de alternativas al humanismo es reconocido, particularmente, por su rechazo al ―antropocentrismo‖ de Sartre. Sin embargo, mientras muchos post-humanismos ven en la tecnología un factor positivo en el descentramiento de lo humano, son conocidas las críticas heideggerianas a la técnica y su comprensión de ésta como parte del mismo movimiento metafísico (y antropocéntrico) moderno. En lugar de tomar en cuenta sus textos sobre la técnica, en este artículo se explora la relación de Heidegger con los post- humanismos contemporáneos a partir de la analítica existencial del Dasein. En primer lugar, se considera la situación tecnocientífica actual, siguiendo a autores como Wiener, Haraway y Latour. En segundo lugar, se evalúa la relación entre Dasein, cíborg y animal, a partir de las lecturas heideggerianas de Hubert Dreyfus (What Computers Can’t Do) y Steven Crowell (We Have Never Been Animals). Much of the contemporary thought about ecology begins with the questioning of the human exceptionality. By means of this, anthropocentrism is rejected and replaced by a ―post-humanist‖ framework. In this context, Martin Heidegger‘s oeuvre is credited for its search of alternatives to humanism, particularly because of its rejection of Sartre‘s ―anthropocentrism‖. However, while post- humanisms tend to behold the role of technology positively, Heidegger‘s critiques to the technique as a consequence of the same metaphysical and anthropocentric movement are widely known. Instead of considering the common Heideggerian texts about technique, in this paper I explore the relationship between Heidegger and contemporary post-humanisms from the perspective of his existential analytic. In the first place, I will briefly describe the contemporary techno-scientific context, following the insights of Wiener, Haraway and Latour. In the second place, I will consider the relationship between Dasein, cyborgs and animals, discussing the Heideggerian interpretations of Hubert Dreyfus (What Computers Can’t Do) and Steven Crowell (We Have Never Been Animals).

Heidegger’s Presentational Strategies:

Drawing upon the interpretations of Martin Heidegger’sBeing and Timeoffered by the favorable commentators such as Hubert Dreyfus, Robert Dostal, Harrison Hall, and Charles Taylor, this paper responds to Heidegger’s unsympathetic commentator Herman Philipse’s critical interpretation of Being and Time(Sections 12-18 of Division I) and shows the validity of Heidegger’s claim for the ontological priority of the practical world over the theoretical world. This has been done by showing that the practical world where readiness-to-hand is the norm, emerges from a self-correcting,transient originary situation where readiness-to-hand is primordial to us while we arrive at the theoretical aspect of presence-at-hand when we encounter the unreadiness-to-hand. This paper also shows that Heidegger’s text is coherent and consistent. Thishas been done by looking at the structure of Heidegger’s presentational strategies and by making links explicit in them. We have also looked afresh at how he defines certain pivotal elements of his practical world and their relationship with each other.

Two Refutations of the Vorhanden Reading of Heidegger’s Philosophy of Science in Being and Time

The dominant interpretation of Heidegger’s philosophy of science in Being and Time is that he defines science, or natural science, in terms of presence-at-hand (Vorhandenheit). I argue that this interpretation is false. I call this dominant view about Heidegger’s definition of science the vorhanden claim; interpreters who argue in favor of this claim I call vorhanden readers. In the essay, I reconstruct and then refute two major arguments for the vorhanden claim: respectively, I call them equipmental breakdown (Section 1) and theoretical assertion (Section 2). The equipmental breakdown argument, stemming mainly from Hubert Dreyfus, advances a vorhanden reading on the basis of three other interpretive claims: I call them, respectively, the primacy of practice claim, the decontextualization claim, and the breakdown claim. While I remain agnostic on the first claim, the argument fails because of decisive textual counterevidence to the latter two claims. Meanwhile, the theoretical assertion argument, which I reconstruct mainly from Robert Brandom, premises its vorhanden claim on the basis of some remarks in Being and Time indicating that theoretical assertions, as such, refer to present-at-hand things. Since science is taken to be a paradigmatic case of an activity that makes theoretical assertions, the vorhanden claim is supposed to follow. I refute this argument on the grounds that it equivocates on Heidegger’s concept of “theoretical assertion” and cannot account for his insistence that science does not principally consist in the production of such assertions. I conclude that, with the failure of these two arguments, the case for the vorhanden claim is severely weakened.

Tekoälyn yhteiskehittäminen julkisella sektorilla

Artificial intelligence co-creation in the public sector This article assesses the steps of AI co-creation in the public innovation ecosystem. However, in order to understand AI in the right context, two aims need to be fulfilled first. The limits and possibilities of AI in public administration are assessed by examining the contributions of AI research, phenomenology and philosopher Hubert Dreyfus. According to the article, the simpler the rules, the better for AI. Therefore, hierarchical and bureaucratic structures are best for AI application. However, bureaucratic structures are poor in innovating and exploration – AI innovations included. After this, co-creation is introduced as a way of innovating AI in the public sector. For identifying new opportunities for co-production, different forms of cross-sectoral and citizen involvement are needed.

Phenomenology and functional analysis. A functionalist reading of Husserlian phenomenology

In the article I discuss functionalist interpretations of Husserlian phenomenology. The first one was coined in the discussion between Hubert Dreyfus and Ronald McIntyre. They argue that Husserl’s phenomenology shares similarities with computational functionalism, and the key similarity is between the concept of noema and the concept of mental representation. I show the weaknesses of that reading and argue that there is another available functionalist reading of Husserlian phenomenology. I propose to shift perspective and approach the relation between phenomenology and functionalism from a methodological perspective, specifically taking into account the functionalist explanatory strategy called functional analysis. I discuss the notion of function in Husserl’s works and Husserl’s idea of functional phenomenology. The key argument I develop is that in functional phenomenology we can find an explanatory strategy which is analogous to the strategy of functional decomposition used in functional analysis. I conclude that the proposed functionalist reading of phenomenology opens a new approach to the integration of phenomenology with cognitive sciences.

Enativismo e conhecimento prático

Em Ser e Tempo (1927), Heidegger argumenta que o conhecimento primordial do Dasein se dá no manuseio de entes mundanos. Merleau-Ponty, por sua vez, descreve na Fenomenologia da Percepção (1945) que o conhecimento é, antes de tudo, uma intencionalidade corporal intraduzível em termos proposicionais. Mais tarde, em What Computers Can’t Do (1972), Hubert Dreyfus usa a obra de ambos para apontar os equívocos do paradigma cognitivista, isto é, a abordagem dominante do então nascente campo da inteligência artificial. Finalmente, em The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience (1991), a noção de enativismo - elaborada por Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson e Eleanor Rosch - surge como uma tentativa de tomar do cognitivismo e do conexionismo a hegemonia nas ciências cognitivas. Dito isso, o objetivo do artigo consiste em descrever o enativismo e apontar sua herança fenomenológica.

condición tecno-ecológica. Heidegger ante los nuevos post-humanismos

Muchas de las reflexiones contemporáneas sobre ecología parten del cuestionamiento de la excepcionalidad del ser humano. Se busca de esta manera el distanciamiento de todo antropocentrismo y, en consecuencia, un marco conceptual ―post-humanista‖. El rol de Martin Heidegger en la búsqueda de alternativas al humanismo es reconocido, particularmente, por su rechazo al ―antropocentrismo‖ de Sartre. Sin embargo, mientras muchos post-humanismos ven en la tecnología un factor positivo en el descentramiento de lo humano, son conocidas las críticas heideggerianas a la técnica y su comprensión de ésta como parte del mismo movimiento metafísico (y antropocéntrico) moderno. En lugar de tomar en cuenta sus textos sobre la técnica, en este artículo se explora la relación de Heidegger con los post- humanismos contemporáneos a partir de la analítica existencial del Dasein. En primer lugar, se considera la situación tecnocientífica actual, siguiendo a autores como Wiener, Haraway y Latour. En segundo lugar, se evalúa la relación entre Dasein, cíborg y animal, a partir de las lecturas heideggerianas de Hubert Dreyfus (What Computers Can’t Do) y Steven Crowell (We Have Never Been Animals). Much of the contemporary thought about ecology begins with the questioning of the human exceptionality. By means of this, anthropocentrism is rejected and replaced by a ―post-humanist‖ framework. In this context, Martin Heidegger‘s oeuvre is credited for its search of alternatives to humanism, particularly because of its rejection of Sartre‘s ―anthropocentrism‖. However, while post- humanisms tend to behold the role of technology positively, Heidegger‘s critiques to the technique as a consequence of the same metaphysical and anthropocentric movement are widely known. Instead of considering the common Heideggerian texts about technique, in this paper I explore the relationship between Heidegger and contemporary post-humanisms from the perspective of his existential analytic. In the first place, I will briefly describe the contemporary techno-scientific context, following the insights of Wiener, Haraway and Latour. In the second place, I will consider the relationship between Dasein, cyborgs and animals, discussing the Heideggerian interpretations of Hubert Dreyfus (What Computers Can’t Do) and Steven Crowell (We Have Never Been Animals).

Reflexões sobre a educação do trabalhador a partir do pensamento de Simone Weil1

Resumo A filósofa francesa Simone Weil (1909-1943) buscou compreender o estatuto do trabalho na vida humana, bem como as formas de opressão operária vigentes em sua época. Ela propôs uma ressignificação do trabalho, visando à liberdade e à dignidade humana. Embora o trabalho seja um tema frequentemente referido nos artigos dedicados a essa pensadora, poucos dentre eles enfatizam a viabilidade de sua proposta na atualidade. Nesse sentido, este artigo visa articular o pensamento weiliano a três teóricos do século XXI. Analisamos as propostas da psicologia do trabalho expressas por Yves Clot e Christophe Dejours. Também analisamos o modelo fenomenológico proposto por Hubert Dreyfus para compreender de que maneira se desenvolvem as habilidades e de que modo elas se expressam no corpo do expert. Estabelecemos, assim, possíveis diálogos com o pensamento weiliano a partir dos conceitos centrais presentes em sua proposta de educação do trabalhador, buscando transpor esses conceitos para nossa realidade.