Less Can Be More: Conflicting Ballot Proposals and the Highest Vote Rule

2009 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 383-418
Author(s):  
Michael D. Gilbert ◽  
Joshua M. Levine
Keyword(s):  
Vote Rule

Policy Polarization and Strategic Candidacy in Elections Under the Alternative Vote Rule

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arnaud Dellis ◽  
Alexandre Gauthier-Belzile ◽  
Mandar Oak
Keyword(s):  
Vote Rule ◽  
Alternative Vote

The control-ownership wedge and the survival of French IPOs

2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 271-294 ◽  
Author(s):  
Imen Derouiche ◽  
Syrine Sassi ◽  
Narjess Toumi
Keyword(s):  
Survival Time ◽  
Initial Public Offerings ◽  
Failure Time ◽  
Vote Rule ◽  
Agency Conflicts ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Public Offerings ◽  
The One

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of the control-ownership wedge of controlling shareholders (excess control) on the survival of French initial public offerings (IPOs). Design/methodology/approach This paper studies a large sample of 434 French IPOs. The empirical analysis uses the Cox proportional hazard and accelerated-failure-time models. Data are manually gathered from IPO prospectuses. Findings The findings support a positive relation between the control-ownership wedge and IPO survival time, indicating that survival is more likely in firms with high excess control levels. This result is consistent with the view that controlling shareholders with a large control-ownership wedge have incentives to preserve their private benefits of control by increasing firm survival chances. The findings also show that older IPOs are more likely to survive, while riskier and underpriced IPOs are more likely to delist. Practical implications The results provide a better understanding of the role of excess control in IPO survival. They also enrich the debate on the efficiency of the one-share-one-vote rule. Originality/value The research provides new insights into the role of agency conflicts in IPO survivability. In particular, it explores the effect of dominant shareholders with a control-ownership wedge on survival time.

US Senate Dems will push vote rule changes

2020 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Vote Rule ◽  
United States Senate ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Rule Changes ◽  
Us Senate

Headline UNITED STATES: Senate Dems will push vote rule changes

Policy Polarization and Strategic Candidacy in Elections under the Alternative-Vote Rule

2017 ◽  
Vol 173 (4) ◽  
pp. 565 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arnaud Dellis ◽  
Alexandre Gauthier-Belzile ◽  
Mandar Oak
Keyword(s):  
Vote Rule ◽  
Alternative Vote

scholarly journals Classifier Ensemble Generation for the Majority Vote Rule

2008 ◽  
pp. 340-347 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos Orrite ◽  
Mario Rodríguez ◽  
Francisco Martínez ◽  
Michael Fairhurst
Keyword(s):  
Majority Vote ◽  
Vote Rule ◽  
Classifier Ensemble ◽  
Ensemble Generation

THE UNANIMOUS VOTE RULE IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON ZOOLOGICAL NOMENCLATURE

Science ◽  
1912 ◽  
Vol 36 (930) ◽  
pp. 557-558
Author(s):  
C. W. Stiles
Keyword(s):  
Vote Rule ◽  
International Commission ◽  
Zoological Nomenclature ◽  
Unanimous Vote

Selective Weighted Voting in the UN General Assembly: Rationale and Methods

1966 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-62 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catherine Senf Manno
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Vote Rule ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
Weighted Voting ◽  
Un General Assembly ◽  
The One

This article presents some alternative proposals for moderating the most extreme effects of the one-state, one-vote rule in the UN General Assembly by the selective application of weighted voting. Included is a brief summary of some results of an empirical analysis of General Assembly decision making that pointed to the kinds of decisions for which weighting is recommended. Several proposed formulas and the weights which result from them are more fully described and illustrated because of their novelty and their sometimes unexpected effects.

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