Policy Polarization and Strategic Candidacy in Elections Under the Alternative Vote Rule

Author(s):  
Arnaud Dellis ◽  
Alexandre Gauthier-Belzile ◽  
Mandar Oak
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Arnaud Dellis ◽  
Alexandre Gauthier-Belzile ◽  
Mandar Oak
Keyword(s):  


2006 ◽  
Vol 39 (5) ◽  
pp. 663-666 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jon Fraenkel ◽  
Bernard Grofman
Keyword(s):  


2010 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. Sanders ◽  
H. D. Clarke ◽  
M. C. Stewart ◽  
P. Whiteley


Author(s):  
Stephen Quinlan

Most literature on special elections has focused on first-past-the-post contests and on the performance of governments. Turnout, candidates, and how the electoral system impacts the result have received less attention. This contribution fills these voids by exploring special elections in Ireland, elections conducted under the alternative vote system. Taking a multifaceted approach, it investigates the correlates of turnout, the impact of candidates and the decisive effect of lower preferences, while also testing multiple explanations of government performance. I find Irish special elections live up to the by-election truisms of lower turnout and government loss. Government performance is associated with national economic conditions. By-election victory is more likely among candidates with familial lineage and former members of parliament. Where they come into play, one in five candidates owe their victory to lower preferences.



2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peggy Matauschek

Is plurality or majority electoral reform a sensible option in Germany’s muddled electoral system debate? Yes, it is. Since Germany’s mixed-member proportional system fails to concentrate the party system in a sufficient way, Peggy Matauschek searches for a suitable alternative to the principle of proportional representation. She discusses the following options according to their contextual conditions: single-member plurality and majority electoral systems—like the alternative vote system—, parallel systems, proportional representation systems with a low district magnitude and majority bonus systems. In light of its balanced performance, the study advocates the introduction of a system with a majority bonus for a coalition.





2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 271-294 ◽  
Author(s):  
Imen Derouiche ◽  
Syrine Sassi ◽  
Narjess Toumi

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of the control-ownership wedge of controlling shareholders (excess control) on the survival of French initial public offerings (IPOs). Design/methodology/approach This paper studies a large sample of 434 French IPOs. The empirical analysis uses the Cox proportional hazard and accelerated-failure-time models. Data are manually gathered from IPO prospectuses. Findings The findings support a positive relation between the control-ownership wedge and IPO survival time, indicating that survival is more likely in firms with high excess control levels. This result is consistent with the view that controlling shareholders with a large control-ownership wedge have incentives to preserve their private benefits of control by increasing firm survival chances. The findings also show that older IPOs are more likely to survive, while riskier and underpriced IPOs are more likely to delist. Practical implications The results provide a better understanding of the role of excess control in IPO survival. They also enrich the debate on the efficiency of the one-share-one-vote rule. Originality/value The research provides new insights into the role of agency conflicts in IPO survivability. In particular, it explores the effect of dominant shareholders with a control-ownership wedge on survival time.



2011 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 14-17
Author(s):  
John Curtice
Keyword(s):  


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