scholarly journals The Problem of Evil: A Criticism of the Augustinian Point of View. Marion LeRoy Burton

1911 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 231-234
Author(s):  
Thomas C. Hall
2016 ◽  
pp. 195-204
Author(s):  
Michail  Mantzanas

The present study focuses on research about reincarnation in order to formulate some preliminary conclusions concerning various philosophical theories. The overview extends over a considerable period range, from ancient Greek and up to the patristic tradition. The relevant issues include the problem of evil, the question of human decomposition and death as well as reincarnation (metempsychosis) in the Platonic thought. The problem of evil is a problem of reason that emerges from the philosophical background of ancient Greek thought but also from the subsequent Christian patristic thought and transforms itself into diverse concepts (e.g. the significance of justice). According to the original thought of Socrates, evil is associated with ignorance and good with knowledge. This point of view is given a brief review in the philosophical thought of several important representatives of the patristic tradition (e.g., Origen and Gregory of Nyssa). On the other hand, the idea of immortality of the soul, which dates to the religious movement of the Orphic mysteries (seventh century BC) means that the persistence of the immortal soul at the moment of death needs the use of a new body. This essay will try to analyze the ancient character of the myth of reincarnation through the perspectives of philosophy and religion.


Author(s):  
Juan Pablo Martínez Martínez

A lo largo de la historia de la filosofía, el problema del mal ha sido enfocado o desde un punto de vista moralizante o desde un punto de vista metafísico, que difícilmente puede dar respuesta a la pregunta por el origen del mal radical en el hombre. Partiendo de la distinción entre mal sufrido y mal cometido o mal moral —que establece Paul Ricoeur—, se tratará de mostrar que el mal sufrido realmente no es un mal. Por su parte, la experiencia genuina del mal sufrido que se concreta en la pregunta al aire del justo sufriente nos permitirá, por un lado, deslindar las concepciones de sufrimiento y mal mediante el uso del concepto dolor, y por otro lado, una revisión antropológica del problema del mal, que cuadra perfectamente con la línea de propuesta de Paul Ricoeur, cuya teoría acerca de la experiencia del mal será comentada y ampliada desde un antropología trascendental, no desde una metafísica, ni desde la perspectiva simbólica de Ricoeur.Throughout the history of philosophy the problem of evil has been examined either from a moral or a metaphysical point of view, neither of which can answer the question of the radical origin of evil in human life. By distinguishing between suffered evil and committed or moral evil —a distinction that Paul Ricoeur established— we will try to show that suffered evil is not really an evil. On the one hand, the genuine experience of suffered evil, which takes form in the questions of the just man who suffers, will allow us to make a distinction between suffering and evil through the concept of pain. On the other hand, it will also help us to conduct an anthropologic review of the problem of evil. This approach fits perfectly with Paul Ricoeur’s line of thought, since his theory about the experience of evil will be studied and delved into through a transcendental anthropology, not from a metaphysical approach, and not from Ricoeur’s symbolic perspective.


2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ashok Nagpal ◽  
Ankur Prahlad Betageri

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 105-131
Author(s):  
Bruce Russell

I begin by distinguishing four different versions of the argument from evil that start from four different moral premises that in various ways link the existence of God to the absence of suffering. The version of the argument from evil that I defend starts from the premise that if God exists, he would not allow excessive, unnecessary suffering. The argument continues by denying the consequent of this conditional to conclude that God does not exist. I defend the argument against Skeptical Theists who say we are in no position to judge that there is excessive, unnecessary suffering by arguing that this defense has absurd consequences. It allows Young Earthers to construct a parallel argument that concludes that we are in no position to judge that God did not create the earth recently. In the last section I consider whether theists can turn the argument from evil on its head by arguing that God exists. I first criticize Alvin Plantinga’s theory of warrant that one might try to use to argue for God’s existence. I then criticize Richard Swinburne’s Bayesian argument to the same conclusion. I conclude that my version of the argument from evil is a strong argument against the existence of God and that several important responses to it do not defeat it.


Author(s):  
Mark C. Murphy

This Introduction raises the problem of divine ethics and how it bears on the problem of evil (or ‘argument from evil’). It notes the importance of distinguishing among three conceptions of God: God as maximally great being (as ‘an Anselmian being’), God as that being who is supremely worthy of worship, and God as that being who is fully worthy of allegiance. This book treats the first conception to be the most explanatorily basic, and thus it is the sole focus of inquiry for most of the book (Chapters 1 through 6); the second and third conceptions are considered in the second part of the book (Chapters 7 through 9).


Author(s):  
Michael C. Rea

This chapter provides a detailed characterization of the various meanings of the term “divine hiddenness,” carefully and rigorously articulates the version of the problem of divine hiddenness that has dominated contemporary philosophical discussion for the past twenty-five years, and then explains the relationship between that problem and the problem of evil.


Author(s):  
N. N. Trakakis

First, the nature of ‘anti-theodicy’ is outlined, and some indication is provided as to how this position differs from both theodicy and skeptical theism, and how the anti-theodicy view can be supported on the basis of moral and methodological considerations. Secondly, a possible metaphysical basis for anti-theodicy is sought, and this is achieved by abandoning anthropomorphic conceptions of God in favour of alternative models of divinity that might make possible new and more fruitful perspectives on the problem of evil. The alternative model advanced here for special attention is the Absolute Idealism of F. H. Bradley. The chapter concludes by showing how the problem of evil can be answered from a Bradleian perspective.


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