scholarly journals Identifying the possible source regions of elevated concentrations of Xenon-133 detected at the Takasaki Radionuclide Monitoring Station (JPX38) on 2 October 2017: Malaysian CTBT National Data Centre (MY-NDC) findings

Author(s):  
F I A Rashid ◽  
M Z Zolkaffly
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Ole Ross ◽  
Nicolai Gestermann ◽  
Peter Gaebler ◽  
Lars Ceranna

<p>For detection of non-compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) the global International Monitoring System (IMS) is being built up and nearly complete. The IMS is designed to detect and identify nuclear explosions through their seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide signature. The IMS data are collected, processed to analysis products, and distributed to the signatory states by the International Data Centre (IDC) in Vienna. The member states themselves may operate National Data Centers (NDC) giving technical advice concerning CTBT verification to their government. NDC Preparedness Exercises (NPE) are regularly performed to practice the verification procedures for the detection of nuclear explosions in the framework of CTBT monitoring. The NPE 2019 scenario was developed in close cooperation between the Italian NDC-RN (ENEA) and the German NDC (BGR). The fictitious state RAETIA announced a reactor incident with release of unspecified radionuclides into the atmosphere. Simulated concentrations of particulate and noble gas isotopes at IMS stations were given to the participants. The task was to check the consistency with the announcement and to serach for waveform events in the potential source region of the radioisotopes. In a next step, the fictitious neighbour state EASTRIA provided further national (synthetic) measurements and requested assistance from IDC with so called Expert Technical Analysis (ETA) about the origin of those traces. The presentation shows aspects of scenario design, event selection, and forward amospheric transport modelling as well as radionuclide and seismological analyses.   </p>


2008 ◽  
Vol 79 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Pequegnat ◽  
P. Gueguen ◽  
D. Hatzfeld ◽  
M. Langlais

1994 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Tarvainen

The automatic analysing capability of the three component substation called hereafter also FIA1 (coordinates: 61.4444°N, 26.0793°E) is studied. The detections and daily bulletins of FINESA (renamed as FINESS since August 1993) are used as a basis of the study. At the three component substation FIA1 a detector bulletin producer of type Husebye Ruudwas used to detect events and after forming a single station daily bulletin the common detections with FINESA were taken into a more detailed examination. From 689 detections of FINESA (also referred to as FIAO) the three component substation could associate 258 events. The main part of events were mining and quarry explosions in Estonia, Russia, north of St. Petersburg and Finland, at distances up to 250 km. The diurnal distribution of events was studied and the connections to certain mines were attempted to be determined. It is found that certain mining areas have very specified shooting times, thus making it possible to monitor this kind of areas under predefined procedure. The median difference of azimuths obtained from the three component station compared with FINESA azimuths was 50 and the median difference of distance was as small as 6.2 km. In these comparisons the siting of the three component sensor was not taken into account, even though it is not located in the centre of the array. The main sources of location differences are found to be the errors of azimuth and veiled later phases. Sometimes the phase pickings of the two different methods did not give any coinciding results, even though the P detections occurred simultaneously. Also, the deviation of azimuths under poor SNR circumstances caused clear location biases. To investigate the detection and locating performance of the three component sub station FIA1 at local and regional distances, the results were compared with the preliminary weekly analysis and Helsinki bulletins of the Finnish National Data Centre (FNDC), which handled 480 events during the test period. Altogether 205 events located by FIA1 could easily be connected with the results of the Finnish National Data Centre. The median errors in azimuth and distance of these connected events were quite small, 8.9° and 9.1 lan, respectively.


MAUSAM ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 67 (2) ◽  
pp. 499-504
Author(s):  
N. MEENATCHI NATHAN ◽  
CHANABASANAGOUDA. S. PATIL ◽  
J. P. IMMANUEL JAYAPRAKASH

Pilot balloon observatories of India Meteorological Department (IMD) are using Hand Held Data Logger (HHDL), manufactured by SAMEER, to compute upper air data since 2007. The HHDL, which is a sleek and microcontroller based battery operated unit, accepts all information through the numeric keypad pertaining to the PB ascent for raw file generation and pilot balloon data processing. The raw file can be transferred to computer system as an input file to PC based Pibal computation software. This software generates Pibal messages similar to HHDL in addition to National Data Centre (NDC) data format and monthly climate. In case of any failure of hardware, both HHDL & PC based Pibal computation software cannot be used.  Therefore to overcome this problem, a PC based Pibal data keying software has been developed using visual C sharp. The new software, what is developed, creates an input file similar to HHDL; it was tested with PC based Pibal computation software which works successfully as an alternate in case of failure of HHDL & it’s hardware accessories  


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ole Ross ◽  
Nicolai Gesternann ◽  
Peter Gaebler ◽  
Lars Ceranna ◽  
Antonietta Rizzo ◽  
...  

<p>National Data Centre (NDC) Preparedness Exercises (NPE) base on partially simulated scenarios of CTBT relevant events distributed to all NDC. They provide an opportunity to practice the verification procedures for the detection of nuclear explosions in the framework of CTBT monitoring. The NPE 2019 scenario was developed in close cooperation between the Italian NDC-RN (ENEA) and the German NDC (BGR). The fictitious state RAETIA announced a reactor incident with release of unspecified radionuclides into the atmosphere. Simulated concentrations of particulate and noble gas isotopes at IMS stations were given to the participants. The task was to check the consistency with the announcement and to search for waveform events in the potential source region of the radioisotopes. <br>During NPE2019 an Exercise Expert Technical Analysis was requested from the IDC for the first time. A fictitious state party provided within the scenario (simulated) national measurements of radionuclides and asked for assisistance in analysing the additional samples. Especially backward ATM and the search for seismic events in the possible source region was requested. In addition the overall consistency to potential emissions of the reactor incident declared by the ficititious state RAETIA was questioned. In the third and last stage of the exercise, national regional seismic data were distributed among the particpants which contained an (synthetically manipulated) anomaly pointing on a explosive event.</p>


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