Town and Village Greens

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ashley Bowes
Keyword(s):  
Green Is ◽  
Public Nuisance ◽  
The Commons ◽  
Commercial Value ◽  
Recreational Use

Land which has been registered as a village green under the Commons Registration Act 1965 or Commons Act 2006, is protected from any development or use, which would interfere with the recreational use of the land by the local inhabitants. Section 12 of the Inclosure Act 1857 provides that it is a public nuisance to do a number of things to a green, including ‘interrupting the use or enjoyment of a green as a place of exercise or recreation’. Further, s 29 of the Commons Act 1876 provides that any ‘encroachment or inclosure’ of a village green is a public nuisance as well as a civil tort. As such, to have land registered as a village green represents a tremendous blight on the commercial value of the land.

scholarly journals The commons and emergent land in Kvarken Archipelago, Finland: governing an expanding recreational resource

2018 ◽  
Vol 196 (2) ◽  
pp. 154-167 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristina Svels ◽  
Ulrika Åkerlund
Keyword(s):  
Home Ownership ◽  
Small Scale ◽  
Power Relationships ◽  
Second Homes ◽  
Second Home ◽  
Land Survey ◽  
The Commons ◽  
Recreational Use ◽  
Privately Owned ◽  
Resource System

In this article, we explore governance structures of the recreational landscape of Kvarken Archipelago in Western Finland, an area where shore displacement occurs due to land rise and emergent (pristine) land is continuously created. Traditionally a production landscape, of fishing and small-scale agriculture, the recreational value of the archipelago has been acknowledged. The area is a popular second home destination and was designated UNESCO World Heritage in 2006. There are roughly 10,000 second homes within the study area, of which 14% are leaseholds located on emergent land. The emergent land thus makes up a common-pool resource system where private and collective use rights overlap. This article aims to understand the implications for recreational use (second home ownership) through interviews with different local stakeholders such as municipality planners, representatives of commons, local communities, and with environmental and land survey authorities. Especially, it sets out to ask, what kinds of value are created within the recreational resource system, what power relationships within the commons steer the management of the recreational resource system, and what are the implications for recreational use of the landscape. The results show different logics of recreational resource management locally in the studied commons. Access to second homes located within the collectively owned emergent land is limited to part-owners of the commons and tend to be less commercialized and also less modernized than privately owned second home plots.

When green is mean

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Judith Stills
Keyword(s):  
Green Is

"Once? No. Twenty times? Sure!" Repeated decisions and uncertainty in the tragedy of the commons

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
David J. Hardisty ◽  
Howard Kunreuther ◽  
David H. Krantz ◽  
Poonam Arora
Keyword(s):  
Tragedy Of The Commons ◽  
The Commons

Caring for the Commons

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua Fisher ◽  
Jennifer Wies ◽  
Stacie King
Keyword(s):  
The Commons

The Commercial Value of Acetylene Gas as an Illuminant

1896 ◽  
Vol 41 (1063supp) ◽  
pp. 16991-16992
Author(s):  
Louis A. Ferguson
Keyword(s):  
Commercial Value

How green is your IT?

2006 ◽  
Vol 3 (6) ◽  
pp. 34-37
Author(s):  
D. Bradbury
Keyword(s):  
Green Is

Corruption as “one‑stop‑shop”: theory and empirical analysis

2018 ◽  
pp. 32-51
Author(s):  
R. Yu. Kochnev ◽  
L. I. Polishchuk ◽  
A. Yu. Rubin
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
Business Environment ◽  
Enterprise Performance ◽  
Double Jeopardy ◽  
One Stop ◽  
The Commons ◽  
Public Production ◽  
Performance Project ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Sector Theory

We present the comparative analysis of the impact of centralized and decentralized corruption for private sector. Theory and empirical evidence point out to a “double jeopardy” of decentralized corruption which increases the burden of corruption upon private firms and weakens the incentives of bureaucracy to provide public production inputs, such as infrastructure. These outcomes are produced by simultaneous free-riding and the tragedy of the commons effects. The empirical part of the paper utilizes data of the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance project.

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