scholarly journals Market Discipline, Information Processing and Corporate Governance*

Author(s):  
Martin F. Hellwig
2013 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-60
Author(s):  
Fahrur Ulum Fahrur Ulum

Abstract: Syarî’ah banking must be optimized earnestly to fulfill the stakeholders interest. The effective implementation of cooporate governance would realize the goal of fairness, accountability, and transparancy.  There are several prior focus of this system manager: basic concept and problems of cooperate governance in syarî’ah banking, the pillars of implementation, and the mechanism.  As a result, to create an effective  cooperate governance of syariah banking, the following aspects must be urgently required: a contract clarity, market discipline, moral dimension, socio-political atmosphere,  law enforcement, and institution. Board of directors, senior management, stockholders, and depositors have important roles to establish the  harmony of syariah banking development. The stakeholders  are directly connected to the mechanism of cooperate governance of syariah banking. Key Words: corporate governance, bank syari’ah, stakeholders, dan mudlârabah


2015 ◽  
Vol 05 (03) ◽  
pp. 1550014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jie Cai ◽  
Yixin Liu ◽  
Yiming Qian ◽  
Miaomiao Yu

We examine the impact of a firm’s asymmetric information on its choice of three mechanisms of corporate governance: The intensity of board monitoring, the exposure to market discipline, and CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity. We find that firms facing greater asymmetric information tend to use less intensive board monitoring but rely more on market discipline and CEO incentive alignment. These results are consistent with the monitoring cost hypothesis. In addition, we find that high information-asymmetry firms that have to substantially increase board monitoring intensity after the Sarbanes–Oxley Act suffer poor stock performance. Our evidence therefore suggests that regulators should use caution when imposing uniform corporate governance requirements on all firms.


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