The Intersection of LGBT Rights and Religious Beliefs in the United States

Author(s):  
Emily R. Gill

Tension has long existed in the United State between the equality claims of LGBT individuals, on the one hand, and free exercise claims by those who hold that compelling equal treatment violates their convictions, on the other. This tension increased, however, after the United States Supreme Court extended marriage equality to same-sex couples nationwide. Equality advocates hold that antidiscrimination laws simply allow LGBT individuals to enjoy the same rights as others. Many religious advocates, however, believe that they are being prohibited from living out the implications of their conscientious beliefs. Neutrality between these conflicting claims cannot be achieved, as policies that appear neutral to one group appear non-neutral to the other. Private voluntary organizations are one site of conflict. Although private organizations should not typically be forced to reflect the values of the larger society, not all organizations are similarly situated within it. Groups such as the Boy Scouts should be able to exclude at will. Public authority does not itself always support the values of free and equal citizenship, and organizations may evolve over time as the Scouts itself has done. Organizations that exist within larger entities, however, fall into a different category. The Supreme Court was correct to uphold Hastings Law School in forcing the Christian Legal Society as a registered student organization to admit all comers. These groups also represent the values of a public entity and can continue to operate as independent entities if they so choose. The provision of services in connection with same-sex weddings and commitment ceremonies has been another site of conflict. In Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop (2015), the Supreme Court found narrowly that bakery owner Phillips could refuse to create cakes for same-sex wedding celebrations, as the state of Colorado had displayed animus toward Phillips’s religious beliefs. Commercial establishments, however, are public accommodations and generally should not be allowed to discriminate against customers on the basis of their identities. Discrimination against the activity or conduct of formal commitment is also discrimination against the identity or status of a same-sex couple. These kinds of cases do not admit of neutral solutions. Some suggest that those with religious reservations could advertise that they do not serve same-sex couples, but this is reminiscent of Jim Crow in the post–Civil War South. Jurisdictional pluralists suggest that the government designate a sphere of noninterference as a jurisdictional boundary that it will not cross. Thus individuals and associations with religious commitments would be free to pursue these interests with minimal interference. However, a prior authoritative structure must exist to define the nature and scope of this jurisdiction, just as the Constitution defines the relationships between the national government and the states. Applications for religious exemptions should not be treated more generously when they conflict with LGBT equality concerns than with equality claims based on race or gender. Although religious individuals and groups should be able to exercise their religious convictions within their areas of competence, in a liberal society and state they cannot define the limits of these areas.

Author(s):  
Derek H. Davis

The United States Supreme Court’s religion jurisprudence is typically analyzed based on whether a court’s decision emerges from an Establishment Clause analysis or a Free Exercise Clause analysis. While this method is useful, a more in-depth analysis can be undertaken by identifying various philosophical themes that describe the court’s varied approaches to deciding religion cases. The cases can be analyzed under at least four separate but interrelated themes: separation of church and state, cooperation between sacred and secular activities in religion-based contexts, equal treatment among religions, and the integration of religion and politics. This article examines the High Court’s often controversial decisions affecting religion through the lenses of these four themes. The term “separation of church and state” is frequently used to describe the American relationship between law and religion, but this term is far too simplistic a description of how church and state interact in the American system; the ways in which the system sometimes embraces separation but sometimes does not, are analyzed and explained. Consistent with the misconception that the Supreme Court always seeks to “separate” church and state, court analysts will sometimes describe the court’s strategy as giving “no aid” to religion. This also is a simplistic analysis, since it can clearly be shown that the court does not seek to “wall” off religion from government aid in all cases. Rather, the court tends to sanction state support of “secular” activities that arise in religion contexts while denying state aid to the “sacred” components of religious activity. “Equality” is a hallmark of American democracy. While the Founders did not earmark equality as a goal of the religion clauses, the concept has nevertheless emerged as a byproduct of deeper goals, namely sanctioning religious pluralism and providing equal access to government office. If separation of church and state were really the centerpiece of how religion and state activity interact in the United States, the Supreme Court would not sanction the involvement of religion in public debate and discourse, nor would it permit political candidates and officeholders to freely talk about religion in their personal lives and its role in American political life. But the court carefully crafts a jurisprudence that rarely intrudes on this kind of activity. In sum, looking at Supreme Court religion cases through a number of philosophical lenses is a fruitful guide to understanding court decisions that are otherwise often highly complex and confusing.


2018 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Corvino ◽  

In June 2018 the Supreme Court of the United States decided the case of Masterpiece Cakeshop, in which baker Jack Phillips refused to provide a cake for a same-sex wedding. The Court decided the case on fairly narrow grounds; in particular, it set aside the question of whether Phillips illegally discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation by refusing to sell the same cake to a gay couple that he would sell to a heterosexual couple. Concurring opinions by Justices Kagan and Gorsuch do address that question, however, and in this paper I explore the debate between them. By distinguishing between design-based and use-based refusals of service and then arguing that some use-based refusals are tantamount to discrimination on the basis of protected traits, I argue that Jack Phillips did indeed discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. I also argue that another baker, who refused to create a “Leviticus 18:22 ‘Homosexuality is a detestable sin’ ” cake, did not discriminate on the basis of religion. I thus side with Justice Kagan against Justice Gorsuch on the question of whether the Colorado commission treated the two bakers inconsistently.


Author(s):  
Łukasz Machaj

Sąd Najwyższy Stanów Zjednoczonych odgrywa fundamentalną rolę w amerykańskim porządku ustrojowym, a formułowane przezeń rozstrzygnięcia wywierają ogromny wpływ na prawne, polityczne, społeczne i ekonomiczne oblicze USA. Jednym z najważniejszych punktów spornych w dyskursie aksjologiczno-prawnym w Stanach Zjednoczonych w ciągu ostatnich dekad była kwestia konstytucyjnego prawa/roszczenia osób o orientacji homoseksualnej do równego traktowania. Artykuł analizuje w tym kontekście trzy orzeczenia SN, to jest Bowers vs. Hardwick uprawomocnienie penalizacji konsensualnej aktywności seksualnej, Lawrence vs. Texas refutacja poprzedniego rozstrzygnięcia oraz Obergefell vs. Hodges konstytucjonalizacja prawa osób tej samej płci do zawierania związków małżeńskich. Autor formułuje zarazem — na podstawie powyższej analizy — generalne hipotezy dotyczące związku pomiędzy rzeczywistością społeczną czy też polityczną a interpretacjami ustaw zasadniczych werbalizowanymi przez sądy konstytucyjne. Between criminalization of homosexual activity and constitutionalization of same-sex marriage — some remarks on the role of the Supreme Court in the United StatesThe Supreme Court of the United States plays a fundamental role in the American political system; its decisions exert a crucial influence on the legal, political, social and economic reality in the United States. One of the most important and contentious points in the legal and axiological discourse in the United States for the past three decades has been the question of the constitutional right/claim of homosexuals to equal treatment and equal protection of laws. The article analyzes in this context three landmark cases, i.e. Bowers v. Hardwick the legitimization of the penalization of consensual sexual activity with respect to homosexuals, Lawrence v. Texas the abolition of the previous decision and Obergefell v. Hodges the constitutionalization of the right to same-sex marraiges. The article formulates — on the basis of this analysis — certain general hypotheses regarding the relations between the social and political reality and interpretations of constitutions issues by constitutional courts.


1938 ◽  
Vol 32 (5) ◽  
pp. 907-921
Author(s):  
James Simsarian

Two cases which are concerned with the diversion of the waters of interstate streams were before the United States Supreme Court in the October term of 1937. One of them, Texas v. New Mexico, will be withdrawn from the Court docket when the Rio Grande compact signed by representatives of Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas and a representative of the United States on March 18,1938, enters into effect. The other case, Nebraska v. Wyoming and Colorado, was first argued before the Supreme Court in 1935. In May, 1938, the Court granted the petition of the United States for permission to intervene. Further written briefs and oral arguments were to be considered by the Court when the fall term of 1938 opened.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document