scholarly journals Między sankcjonowaniem kryminalizacji aktów homoseksualnych a konstytucjonalizacją małżeństw osób tej samej płci — przyczynek do rozważań o roli Sądu Najwyższego w Stanach Zjednoczonych

2019 ◽  
Vol 28 ◽  
pp. 377-396
Author(s):  
Łukasz Machaj
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
Equal Treatment ◽  
Same Sex ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Political Reality ◽  
Homosexual Activity ◽  
Constitutional Right ◽  
The Right

Sąd Najwyższy Stanów Zjednoczonych odgrywa fundamentalną rolę w amerykańskim porządku ustrojowym, a formułowane przezeń rozstrzygnięcia wywierają ogromny wpływ na prawne, polityczne, społeczne i ekonomiczne oblicze USA. Jednym z najważniejszych punktów spornych w dyskursie aksjologiczno-prawnym w Stanach Zjednoczonych w ciągu ostatnich dekad była kwestia konstytucyjnego prawa/roszczenia osób o orientacji homoseksualnej do równego traktowania. Artykuł analizuje w tym kontekście trzy orzeczenia SN, to jest Bowers vs. Hardwick uprawomocnienie penalizacji konsensualnej aktywności seksualnej, Lawrence vs. Texas refutacja poprzedniego rozstrzygnięcia oraz Obergefell vs. Hodges konstytucjonalizacja prawa osób tej samej płci do zawierania związków małżeńskich. Autor formułuje zarazem — na podstawie powyższej analizy — generalne hipotezy dotyczące związku pomiędzy rzeczywistością społeczną czy też polityczną a interpretacjami ustaw zasadniczych werbalizowanymi przez sądy konstytucyjne. Between criminalization of homosexual activity and constitutionalization of same-sex marriage — some remarks on the role of the Supreme Court in the United StatesThe Supreme Court of the United States plays a fundamental role in the American political system; its decisions exert a crucial influence on the legal, political, social and economic reality in the United States. One of the most important and contentious points in the legal and axiological discourse in the United States for the past three decades has been the question of the constitutional right/claim of homosexuals to equal treatment and equal protection of laws. The article analyzes in this context three landmark cases, i.e. Bowers v. Hardwick the legitimization of the penalization of consensual sexual activity with respect to homosexuals, Lawrence v. Texas the abolition of the previous decision and Obergefell v. Hodges the constitutionalization of the right to same-sex marraiges. The article formulates — on the basis of this analysis — certain general hypotheses regarding the relations between the social and political reality and interpretations of constitutions issues by constitutional courts.

scholarly journals State Legislatures Have the Courage to Pass Antiabortion Laws and Test the Ideology of the “New” United States Supreme Court

2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 136-150
Author(s):  
Jill Oeding
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
State Legislatures ◽  
United States Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Undue Burden ◽  
Constitutional Right ◽  
Reported Data ◽  
The Right

Many state legislatures are racing to pass antiabortion laws that will give the current Supreme Court the opportunity to review its stance on the alleged constitutional right to have an abortion. While the number of abortions reported to be performed annually in the United States has declined over the last decade, according to the most recent government-reported data, the number of abortions performed on an annual basis is still over 600,000 per year. Abortion has been legal in the United States since 1973, when the Supreme Court recognized a constitutional right to have an abortion prior to viability (i.e. the time when a baby could possibly live outside the mother’s womb). States currently have the right to forbid abortions after viability.  However, prior to viability, states may not place an “undue burden” in the path of a woman seeking an abortion. The recent appointments of two new Supreme Court justices, Neil Gorsich and Brett Kavanaugh, give pro-life states the best chance in decades to overrule the current abortion precedent. The question is whether these two new justices will shift the ideology of the court enough to overrule the current abortion precedent.

The Intersection of LGBT Rights and Religious Beliefs in the United States

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emily R. Gill
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Religious Beliefs ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Other ◽  
Equal Treatment ◽  
Same Sex ◽  
Same Sex Couples ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Lgbt Individuals

Tension has long existed in the United State between the equality claims of LGBT individuals, on the one hand, and free exercise claims by those who hold that compelling equal treatment violates their convictions, on the other. This tension increased, however, after the United States Supreme Court extended marriage equality to same-sex couples nationwide. Equality advocates hold that antidiscrimination laws simply allow LGBT individuals to enjoy the same rights as others. Many religious advocates, however, believe that they are being prohibited from living out the implications of their conscientious beliefs. Neutrality between these conflicting claims cannot be achieved, as policies that appear neutral to one group appear non-neutral to the other. Private voluntary organizations are one site of conflict. Although private organizations should not typically be forced to reflect the values of the larger society, not all organizations are similarly situated within it. Groups such as the Boy Scouts should be able to exclude at will. Public authority does not itself always support the values of free and equal citizenship, and organizations may evolve over time as the Scouts itself has done. Organizations that exist within larger entities, however, fall into a different category. The Supreme Court was correct to uphold Hastings Law School in forcing the Christian Legal Society as a registered student organization to admit all comers. These groups also represent the values of a public entity and can continue to operate as independent entities if they so choose. The provision of services in connection with same-sex weddings and commitment ceremonies has been another site of conflict. In Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop (2015), the Supreme Court found narrowly that bakery owner Phillips could refuse to create cakes for same-sex wedding celebrations, as the state of Colorado had displayed animus toward Phillips’s religious beliefs. Commercial establishments, however, are public accommodations and generally should not be allowed to discriminate against customers on the basis of their identities. Discrimination against the activity or conduct of formal commitment is also discrimination against the identity or status of a same-sex couple. These kinds of cases do not admit of neutral solutions. Some suggest that those with religious reservations could advertise that they do not serve same-sex couples, but this is reminiscent of Jim Crow in the post–Civil War South. Jurisdictional pluralists suggest that the government designate a sphere of noninterference as a jurisdictional boundary that it will not cross. Thus individuals and associations with religious commitments would be free to pursue these interests with minimal interference. However, a prior authoritative structure must exist to define the nature and scope of this jurisdiction, just as the Constitution defines the relationships between the national government and the states. Applications for religious exemptions should not be treated more generously when they conflict with LGBT equality concerns than with equality claims based on race or gender. Although religious individuals and groups should be able to exercise their religious convictions within their areas of competence, in a liberal society and state they cannot define the limits of these areas.

Constitutional Law in 1942–1943: The Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1942

1944 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 266-288
Author(s):  
Robert E. Cushman
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
West Coast ◽  
The United States ◽  
Japanese American ◽  
Circuit Court ◽  
Court Of Appeals ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Set Up ◽  
The Right

On February 15, 1943, Wiley B. Rutledge, Jr., a judge of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, took the seat on the Supreme Court vacated by the resignation in October, 1942, of Mr. Justice Byrnes. There were no other changes in the Court's personnel. Disagreement among the justices abated somewhat. In only a dozen cases of importance did either four or three justices dissent, as against some thirty cases in the last term. The Court overruled two earlier decisions, both recent; and the reversal in each case was made possible by the vote of Mr. Justice Rutledge.A. QUESTIONS OF NATIONAL POWER1. WAR POWER-CIVIL VERSUS MILITARY AUTHORITYWest Coast Curfew Applied to Japanese-American Citizens. In February, 1942, the President issued Executive Order No. 9066, which authorized the creation of military areas from which any or all persons might be excluded and with respect to which the right of persons to enter, remain in, or leave should be subject to such regulations as the military authorities might prescribe. On March 2, the entire West Coast to an average depth of forty miles was set up as Military Area No. 1 by the Commanding General in that area, and the intention was announced to evacuate from it persons of suspected loyalty, alien enemies, and all persons, aliens and citizens alike, of Japanese ancestry.

scholarly journals Evoluzione della giurisprudenza costituzionale statunitense in materia d’aborto (II)

2011 ◽  
Vol 60 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabio Persano
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Single Case ◽  
The United States ◽  
Planned Parenthood ◽  
Abortion Debate ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Long Time ◽  
The Right ◽  
Roe V Wade

Negli Stati Uniti il dibattito sull’aborto è sempre un tema molto caldo. Questo saggio, diviso in due parti (la prima parte è stata pubblicata sul precedente numero della rivista) prova a ripercorrere l’evoluzione della giurisprudenza costituzionale statunitense in materia d’aborto, evidenziando i cambiamenti che ciascuna decisione ha apportato al quadro giuridico precedente. In questa seconda parte, la dissertazione sui singoli casi giurisprudenziali decisi dalla Suprema Corte prosegue con il caso Planned Parenthood v. Casey. Esso è stato una vera occasione mancata nella storia dell’aborto negli Stati Uniti, perchè venne sfiorata la overrule di Roe v. Wade. Ciononostante, venne sostanzialmente confermato l’impianto delle decisioni precedenti, in considerazione del fatto che una decisione contraria all’aborto avrebbe spiazzato un popolo che per decenni aveva organizzato la propria vita in funzione anche della possibilità di abortire. Con questa decisione si distinse la gravidanza in due periodi: quello della pre-viabilità, in cui la donna era completamente libera di abortire in accordo col medico; quello della post-viabilità, in cui gli Stati avrebbero potuto legiferare, pur dovendo consentire l’aborto nel caso di pericolo per la vita o la salute della madre. Inoltre il diritto d’aborto venne radicato nella libertà riconosciuta nel XIV Emendamento della Costituzione. Nel successivo caso Stenberg v. Carhart fu oggetto di giudizio l’aborto a nascita parziale: una legge del Nebraska aveva bandito questa pratica, ma la legge fu annullata dalla Corte Suprema, nonostante il duro dissenso di ben quattro giudici, fra cui Anthony Kennedy. Successivamente a questa decisione, il Congresso prese l’iniziativa di emanare il Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act. Questa legge fu impugnata in via d’azione davanti alla Corte Suprema e ne scaturì la sentenza Gonzalez v. Carhart. In questa decisione la Corte fece un passo indietro rispetto a Stenberg, affermò la legittimità del bando, sostenne che l’aborto a nascita parziale non è mai necessario per tutelare la vita della donna e che Stenberg era fondato su convinzioni erronee sul punto. Il saggio si conclude con delle interessanti considerazioni in merito ai possibili sviluppi futuri circa il tema dell’aborto negli Stati Uniti, auspica la “liberalizzazione del diritto alla vita” ed avanza una originale proposta, valida per tutti i Paesi in cui l’aborto è legalizzato. ---------- Abortion debate is always a hot subject in the United States. This essay, divided into two parts (the first part has been published on the previous issue of this review) tries to go along the development of U.S. constitutional caselaw about abortion, pointing out the change that each judgement caused to the previous law framework. In this second part, the dissertation about U.S. Supreme Court single case-law goes on by Planned Parenthood v. Casey. It was a real missed occasion in the abortion affair in the United States, because it was on the verge of overruling Roe v. Wade. However, the framework of the previous cases was substantially confirmed, considering that a decision against abortion would place out people who for a long time organized their own life in connection to the right of abortion. By this judgement, pregnancy was divided into two periods: pre-viability, when woman was completely free to have an abortion in agreement with her doctor; post-viability, when States could restrict abortion, except for woman life or health risks. Moreover, abortion right was founded on liberty, acknowledged by XIV Amendement. In the following case Gonzalez v. Carhart, partial-birth abortion was judged: a statute of Nebraska banned this activity, but it was stroked down by Supreme Court, despite of the dissenting opinion of four judges (Anthony Kennedy was one of them). After this judgement, the Congress wanted to issue Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act. This statute was pre-enforcement challenged to the Supreme Court, and Gonzalez v. Carhart was poured. In this judgment, the Court drew back Stenberg, it stated the ban was legitimate, partial-birth abortion never is necessary to safeguard woman health, and Stenberg was founded on wrong beliefs on this matter. This essay concludes with interesting considerations about possible developments about abortion affair in the United States, wishes “liberty of right to life” and proposes a solution for all the countries where abortion is legal.

scholarly journals RESPONSABILIDADE EM FACE DE PIQUETE NA JURISPRUDÊNCIA NORTE-AMERICANA

2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (54) ◽  
pp. 499
Author(s):  
Edilton MEIRELES
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
United States Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Deductive Method ◽  
The Face ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Right

RESUMONeste trabalho tratamos do direito de manifestação em piquetes e da responsabilidade que possa advir desses atos em face da jurisprudência da Suprema Corte dos Estados Unidos da América. A partir da análise das principais decisões da Suprema Corte se pode concluir que, de modo geral, os participantes do piquete não respondem quando agem de forma não ilegal. Está sedimentado, no entanto, o entendimento de que o organizador do piquete responde pelos atos dos participantes. A pesquisa desenvolvida se justifica enquanto estudo comparativo e diante do pouco debate existente no Brasil a respeito do tema. Na pesquisa foi utilizado o método dedutivo, limitada à ciência dogmática do direito, com estudo de casos apreciados pelo judiciário. PALAVRAS-CHAVES: Responsabilidade; Piquete; Estados Unidos; Suprema Corte; Liberdade De Expressão. ABSTRACTIn this work we deal with the right of demonstration in pickets and the responsibility that may arise from these acts in the face of the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the United States of America. From the analysis of the Supreme Court's main decisions it can be concluded that, in general, the picket participants do not respond when they act in a non-illegal way. It is settled, however, the understanding that the picket organizer responds by the acts of the participants. The research developed is justified as a comparative study and in view of the little debate that exists in Brazil regarding the subject. In the research was used the deductive method, limited to the dogmatic science of law, with study of cases appreciated by the judiciary.KEYWORDS: Responsibility; Picket; United States; Supreme Court; Freedom Of Expression.

Law, the U.S. Supreme Court, and Religion

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Derek H. Davis
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Church And State ◽  
Religion And Politics ◽  
The United States ◽  
Political Life ◽  
Equal Treatment ◽  
State Court ◽  
Depth Analysis ◽  
The Supreme Court

The United States Supreme Court’s religion jurisprudence is typically analyzed based on whether a court’s decision emerges from an Establishment Clause analysis or a Free Exercise Clause analysis. While this method is useful, a more in-depth analysis can be undertaken by identifying various philosophical themes that describe the court’s varied approaches to deciding religion cases. The cases can be analyzed under at least four separate but interrelated themes: separation of church and state, cooperation between sacred and secular activities in religion-based contexts, equal treatment among religions, and the integration of religion and politics. This article examines the High Court’s often controversial decisions affecting religion through the lenses of these four themes. The term “separation of church and state” is frequently used to describe the American relationship between law and religion, but this term is far too simplistic a description of how church and state interact in the American system; the ways in which the system sometimes embraces separation but sometimes does not, are analyzed and explained. Consistent with the misconception that the Supreme Court always seeks to “separate” church and state, court analysts will sometimes describe the court’s strategy as giving “no aid” to religion. This also is a simplistic analysis, since it can clearly be shown that the court does not seek to “wall” off religion from government aid in all cases. Rather, the court tends to sanction state support of “secular” activities that arise in religion contexts while denying state aid to the “sacred” components of religious activity. “Equality” is a hallmark of American democracy. While the Founders did not earmark equality as a goal of the religion clauses, the concept has nevertheless emerged as a byproduct of deeper goals, namely sanctioning religious pluralism and providing equal access to government office. If separation of church and state were really the centerpiece of how religion and state activity interact in the United States, the Supreme Court would not sanction the involvement of religion in public debate and discourse, nor would it permit political candidates and officeholders to freely talk about religion in their personal lives and its role in American political life. But the court carefully crafts a jurisprudence that rarely intrudes on this kind of activity. In sum, looking at Supreme Court religion cases through a number of philosophical lenses is a fruitful guide to understanding court decisions that are otherwise often highly complex and confusing.

scholarly journals THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL AND A FAST TRIAL: THE EXPERIENCE OF THE UNITED STATES

2021 ◽  
pp. 11-13
Author(s):  
V.V. Berch
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Direct Democracy ◽  
The United States ◽  
Jury Trial ◽  
Professional Activity ◽  
The People ◽  
Administration Of Justice ◽  
Constitutional Right ◽  
The Right ◽  
Speedy Trial

The article is devoted to the consideration of the constitutional right to a trial by a jury, as well as the right to a speedy trial in accordance with the provisions of the Sixth Amendment to the US Constitution. It is noted that as of today in Ukraine there is a question of ensuring the actual (real) participation of the people in the administration of justice and the creation of an appropriate mechanism for the realization of such a right of the people. It is established that the permanent evolution of the jury trial in the world as a full-fledged element of participatory democracy allows us to assert the possibility of applying the best foreign experience in this area and for Ukraine. It is noted that the jury trial, which is typical for the United States, is undoubtedly a consequence of the borrowing of English legal customs, but has its own special features. It has been established that the right to a speedy trial should be distinguished from other constitutional rights, as it concerns the interests of society and the justice system more than the interests of the accused. The circumstances that suggest whether a trial is in fact "fast" are rather vague, as each such proceeding is to some extent unique. The requirements for members of the jury are set out in the Jury Selection Act. It is noted that the release of jurors varies depending on the state. One of the grounds for such dismissal is professional activity. For example, doctors, lawyers, public figures, police or firefighters. At the same time, this practice is gradually ceasing to be natural. It is concluded that the jury trial as a form of public participation in the administration of justice is undoubtedly a democratic legal institution. Direct democracy in the exercise of judicial power, which is carried out in compliance with the principles of publicity and adversarial proceedings promotes the establishment of citizens' faith in the fairness of judicial decisions.  

Preserving Liberty While Combatting Terrorism: An American Experience

2003 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 113-131
Author(s):  
Steven R. Shapiro
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
United States Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
Pearl Harbor ◽  
United States Supreme ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
Martial Law ◽  
American Experience ◽  
The Right

In 1946, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the declaration of martial law in Hawaii following Pearl Harbor did not suspend the Bill of Rights and did not deprive civilians accused of crime of the right to trial by jury in a civilian rather than a military court. In a concurring opinion, Justice Frank Murphy wrote.

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