scholarly journals Animal Ethics and Behavioral Science: An Overdue Discussion

BioScience ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 69 (10) ◽  
pp. 778-788 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine E Webb ◽  
Peter Woodford ◽  
Elise Huchard
Keyword(s):  
Present Article ◽  
Animal Behavior ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
Animal Ethics ◽  
Behavioral Science ◽  
Behavior Science ◽  
Moral Status Of Animals

Abstract Animal ethics—the field of philosophy concerned with the moral status of animals—is experiencing a momentum unprecedented in its history. Surprisingly, animal behavior science remains on the sidelines, despite producing critical evidence on which many arguments in animal ethics rest. In the present article, we explore the origins of the divide between animal behavior science and animal ethics before considering whether behavioral scientists should concern themselves with it. We finally envision tangible steps that could be taken to bridge the gap, encouraging scientists to be aware of, and to more actively engage with, an ethical revolution that is partly fueled by the evidence they generate.

scholarly journals The moral status of animals: Degrees of moral status and the interest-based approach

2021 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 282-295
Author(s):  
Zorana Todorovic
Keyword(s):  
Moral Status ◽  
Animal Ethics ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Moral Status Of Animals

This paper addresses the issue of the moral status of non-human animals, or the question whether sentient animals are morally considerable. The arguments for and against the moral status of animals are discussed, above all the argument from marginal cases. It is argued that sentient animals have moral status based on their having interests in their experiential well-being, but that there are degrees of moral status. Two interest-based approaches are presented and discussed: DeGrazia?s view that sentient animals have interests in continuing to live, and that their interests should be granted moral weight; and McMahan?s TRIA which similarly postulates that animals have interests and that in a given situation we should compare the human and animal interests at stake. Finally, the paper concludes that the anthropocentric approach to animal ethics should be abandoned in favour of the biocentric ethics.

The Moral Status of Animals.

1978 ◽  
Vol 28 (111) ◽  
pp. 177
Author(s):  
Mary Midgley ◽  
Stephen R. L. Clark
Keyword(s):  
Moral Status ◽  
Moral Status Of Animals

Animals in Political Theory

2015 ◽  
pp. 42-64
Author(s):  
Sue Donaldson ◽  
Will Kymlicka
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
Animal Rights ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
Animal Ethics ◽  
Moral Rights ◽  
The Public ◽  
History Of ◽  
Human Animal ◽  
Animal Question ◽  
Blind Spots

Western political theorists have largely ignored the animal question, assuming that animals have no place in our theories of democracy, citizenship, membership, sovereignty, and the public good. Conversely, animal ethicists have largely ignored political theory, assuming that we can theorize the moral status and moral rights of animals without drawing on the categories and concepts of political theory. This chapter traces the history of this separation between animals and political theory, examines the resulting intellectual blind spots for animal ethics, and reviews recent attempts to bring the two together. Situating animal rights within political theory has the potential to identify new models of justice in human-animal relations, and to open up new areas of scholarship and research.

Does consciousness matter?

2019 ◽  
pp. 165-188
Author(s):  
Peter Carruthers
Keyword(s):  
Moral Status ◽  
Cognitive Impairments ◽  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Human Infants ◽  
Age Related ◽  
Moral Status Of Animals

Chapter 7 concluded that there is no fact of the matter concerning phenomenal consciousness in animals, while also arguing that this conclusion is of no importance for science. The present chapter inquires whether it is nevertheless important in other ways, specifically for our ethical treatment of animals, arguing that it is not. But a challenge remains for those who theorize about the moral status of animals: they need to prize the foundations of their theories apart from assumptions about consciousness. The chapter also considers what should be said about the phenomenally conscious status of humans who, like animals, only partially share a full global-broadcasting architecture, such as human infants and people suffering from age-related cognitive impairments.

Gene Doping—in Animals? Ethical Issues at the Intersection of Animal Use, Gene Editing, and Sports Ethics

2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-39 ◽  
Author(s):  
CAROLYN P. NEUHAUS ◽  
BRENDAN PARENT
Keyword(s):  
Moral Status ◽  
Gene Editing ◽  
Ethical Issues ◽  
Well Being ◽  
The State ◽  
Sports Ethics ◽  
Nonhuman Animals ◽  
Animal Use ◽  
Moral Status Of Animals ◽  
Do So

Abstract:Gene editors such as CRISPR could be used to create stronger, faster, or more resilient nonhuman animals. This is of keen interest to people who breed, train, race, and profit off the millions of animals used in sport that contribute billions of dollars to legal and illegal economies across the globe. People have tried for millennia to perfect sport animals; CRISPR proposes to do in one generation what might have taken decades previously. Moreover, gene editing may facilitate enhancing animals’ capacities beyond their typical limits. This paper describes the state of animal use and engineering for sport, examines the moral status of animals, and analyzes current and future ethical issues at the intersection of animal use, gene editing, and sports. We argue that animal sport enthusiasts and animal welfarists alike should be concerned about the inevitable use of CRISPR in sport animals. Though in principle CRISPR could be used to improve sport animals’ well-being, we think it is unlikely in practice to do so.

The Moral Status of Combatants during Military Humanitarian Intervention

Utilitas ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 237-258 ◽  
Author(s):  
ALEX LEVERINGHAUS
Keyword(s):  
Present Article ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
Just War ◽  
Humanitarian Intervention ◽  
Just War Theory ◽  
Target State ◽  
The Status

Recent debates in just war theory have been concerned with the status of combatants during war. Unfortunately, however, the debate has, up to now, focused on self-defensive wars. The present article changes the focus slightly by exploring the status of combatants during military humanitarian intervention (MHI). It begins by arguing that MHI poses a number of challenges to our thinking about the status of combatants. To solve these it draws on Jeff McMahan's theory of combatant liability. On this basis, the article contends that, first, combatants engaged in atrocities lack the same set of rights and liberties held by intervening combatants. Second, and more controversially, drawing on McMahan's theory as well as the notion of complicity, it suggests that the same applies to those combatants who do not perpetrate atrocities but are merely ordered to defend the target state against the intervening state.

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