scholarly journals Clinical Anesthesia—Near Misses and Lessons Learned

1992 ◽  
Vol 69 (5) ◽  
pp. 547
Author(s):  
R. Sirian ◽  
J.G. Hardman
2009 ◽  
Vol 103 (1) ◽  
pp. 143
Author(s):  
R. Sirian ◽  
J.G. Hardman

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 2-3
Author(s):  
Lesley Beique ◽  
Jason Martyn

Background:   In collaboration with emergency physicians, the physiotherapy and pharmacy teams at RGH implemented a novel multidisciplinary, evidence-based pathway, addressing a significant care gap in the management of low back pain (LBP) in urban emergency departments (EDs).   To accomplish this, the physiotherapist conducts a neuromusculoskeletal exam, prior to the physician. They provide treatment including manual therapy, mobilization, education, home-exercises and referral to community resources. The pharmacist then reviews medications, discusses pain management, prescribes analgesia and creates a plan for outpatient analgesia. This occurs while the patient awaits the physician, avoiding increases to length of stay (LOS) and reducing burden on physicians.   Implementation: At minimum, a site wishing to implement the pathway requires a team consisting of a physiotherapist (PT) and pharmacist dedicated to the ED, called the Rapid Assessment Back Team (RABT). To operationalize the RABT successfully, the selected PT and pharmacist must be confident practitioners and have a solid understanding of LBP, red-flags, and appropriate treatment. To avoid increasing LOS, patients are seen during the 2-hour average waiting time required to see a physician. The project team consisted of physiotherapists, pharmacists, nurses, physicians, managers, and QI leaders, formed to facilitate a collaborative approach to implementation. The Prosci® ADKAR model and Plan-Do-Study-Act (PDSA) cycles were used to implement the pathway and troubleshoot operational challenges.   Evaluation Methods: Front-line staff manually collected data on response time, treatments, adverse events, and resources provided. The investigators reviewed patient charts to record opioid prescriptions, DI referrals, and arrival/discharge times of the patients. We compared outcomes of patients seen by the RABT to historical site data of patients with a discharge diagnosis of LBP from the ED.   We actively sought feedback from physicians, nurses, and the leadership group to ensure that we identified unintended consequences or near-misses early on. We reviewed interim data such as LOS and average time-to-assessment, to identify areas for improvement. This data and feedback were addressed via bimonthly PDSA cycles. We also administered patient and staff satisfaction surveys before and after site implementation of the pathway to develop an understanding of patient and staff thoughts and experiences with the service model.   Results: We studied these outcomes in 44 patients exposed to our RABT implementation. Patients who saw a physiotherapist prior to the physician had shorter median ED LOS (3.2 vs. 4.0 hours), lower diagnostic imaging rates (36.4% vs. 49.4%) and less opioid prescribing (31.8% vs. 49.2%). No patients returned to the ED within 72 hours post evaluation, compared to the 7.6% historical recidivism. Not all patients were seen by a pharmacist. When performing a subgroup analysis of patients seen by both a pharmacist and physiotherapist prior to physician, opioid prescriptions were found to drop significantly from a baseline of 49.2% to 16.7%.   Advice and Lessons Learned: Valuable learnings from the pilot include: As described above, the physiotherapist and pharmacist must be experienced and confident to be successful in the ED setting. Selection of the appropriate clinicians is crucial to achieving results, and given this is a new area of practice for many physiotherapists, a proper orientation to the setting is required. The combination of a physiotherapist and pharmacist had the largest impact on study outcomes, further confirming the need for a multidisciplinary approach to ED patient care. An “ED toolkit” can greatly facilitate service implementation for future sites, and this was developed to facilitate implementation of the RABT at another ED within the city. The toolkit consisted of items such as resources, workflows, patient handouts, sample documentation and promotional materials to increase awareness. Service hours may need some realignment with patient demand and should be geared towards minimizing service disruptions. Ideally, the physiotherapist and pharmacist would work similar hours to maximize the amount of patients able to be seen. Regular PDSA cycles to review interim data and address operational issues increases the likelihood of success by ensuring the pathway evolves to fit the contextual needs of the site. Reviewing early results motivates the team to continue to utilize the pathway. Reviewing practice issues allows clinicians to improve the care provided. One significant unintended consequence was the increase in ED LOS for patients who were referred to PT/pharmacy following physician assessment. In addition, this subgroup did not show significant reductions in opioid prescriptions or DI referrals. RABT referrals were subsequently restricted to before the physician only.


Author(s):  
Joseph P. Balkey

Often, public reports of accidents only identify the last, obvious failure or immediate cause of the accident. If human error is the immediate cause or final failure, further assessment of accident contributors may stop, and an enhanced training program is often determined to be the primary solution for preventing further accidents of this type. However, in many cases, the accident is the final result of many inputs, decisions, actions and inactions. To demonstrate this characteristic of accidents, the 20 stories in a publication titled “Set Phasers on Stun” have been categorized into action errors and planning errors that involve designers, mechanics, or operators. For each story, the hazard and the number of simultaneous failures are listed. Then two of the 20 stories are assessed in detail; one story involves an action error and the other one involves a planning error. In each of these two stories, the system is first described as it should operate and then its risk is quantitatively assessed to identify findings, lessons learned, recommendations, analogies to the other 18 stories, and applications. This paper has three immediate goals. One, to recognize the difference between an action error and a planning error. Two, to recognize that most accidents involve 2 to 4 simultaneous failures. Three, to appreciate that quantifying the failure frequency serves two benefits. Because it is usually difficult to find out exactly what happened after an accident, the calculated frequency can help confirm what actually happened. When various alternatives are recommended, it can also help to select the most economic ones. This paper has two long term goals. One, consider assessing the failure rates of near misses. By reducing near misses, larger accidents will be reduced. Two, consider assessing the failure rates of personal near misses because you know what actually happened.


JAMA ◽  
1989 ◽  
Vol 261 (24) ◽  
pp. 3620
Author(s):  
E. S. Siker
Keyword(s):  

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hyam Bashour ◽  
Mayada Kharouf ◽  
Jocelyn DeJong

Background: Until the eruption of violence in 2011, Syria made good progress in improving maternal health indicators including reducing the maternal mortality ratio and increasing the level of skilled birth attendance. The war in Syria has been described as one of the worst humanitarian crises in recent times. Damascus Maternity Teaching Hospital is the largest maternity public hospital in the country that survived the war and continued to provide its services even during periods of pronounced instability. The main aim of this paper is to highlight the experience of childbirth and delivery care as described by women and doctors at times of severe violence affecting Damascus.Methods: This paper is based on secondary analysis of qualitative data collected between 2012 and 2014 for a WHO-funded implementation research project introducing clinical audits for maternal near-misses. This analysis specifically looked at the effects of violence on the childbirth experience and delivery care from the perspective of both women and physicians. A total of 13 in-depth interviews with women who had recently delivered and survived a complication and 13 in-depth interviews with consultant obstetricians were reviewed and analyzed, in addition to three focus group discussions with 31 junior care providers.Results: Three themes emerged concerning the experiences of women and doctors in these times of war. First, both women and doctors experienced difficulty reaching the hospital and accessing and providing the services, respectively; second, quality of care was challenged at that time as perceived by both women and doctors; and third, women and doctors expressed their psychological suffering in times of hardship and uncertainty and how this affected them.Conclusions: Efforts to safeguard the safety of delivery and prevent maternal mortality in Syria continued despite very violent and stressful conditions. Both women and providers developed strategies to navigate the challenges posed by conflict to the provision of delivery care. Lessons learned from the experiences of both women and doctors should be considered in any plans to improve maternal healthcare in a country like Syria that remains committed to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals in 2030 in the aftermath of nearly 10 years of war.


2019 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 791-798 ◽  
Author(s):  
Horacio Hojman ◽  
Rishi Rattan ◽  
Rob Osgood ◽  
Mengdi Yao ◽  
Nikolay Bugaev

ABSTRACTTerrorist incidents that target hospitals magnify morbidity and mortality. Before a real or perceived terrorist mass casualty incident threatens a hospital and its providers, it is essential to have protocols in place to minimize damage to the infrastructure, morbidity, and mortality. In the years following the Boston Marathon bombings, much has been written about the heroic efforts of survivors and responders. Far less has been published about near misses due to lack of experience responding to a mass casualty incident resulting from terrorism. After an extensive review of the medical literature and published media in English, Spanish, and Hebrew, we were unable to identify a similar event. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first reported experience of a bomb threat caused evacuation of an emergency department in the United States while actively responding to multiple casualty terrorist incidents. We summarized the chronology of the events that led to a bomb threat being identified and the subsequent evacuation of the emergency department. We then reviewed the problematic nature of our response and described evidence-based policy changes based on data from health care, law enforcement, and counterterrorism. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2019;13:791–798)


2013 ◽  
Vol 118 (4) ◽  
pp. 997-997
Author(s):  
Eric S. Fouliard

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