10. Judicial review: access to review and remedies

Public Law ◽  
2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Stanton ◽  
Craig Prescott

This chapter provides an introduction to judicial review and its various features and requirements. It starts by exploring the meaning and purpose of judicial review, explaining the particular functions of the courts and the jurisdiction that justifies their scrutiny of administrative matters. It then sets out the legal basis for judicial review and the process through which applications proceed, which while rooted in statute, has developed incrementally through both case law and the 1998 Woolf Reforms. The chapter considers issues relating to access to review, exploring the legal requirements that must be fulfilled before an application for judicial review can be entertained by the Administrative Court. This includes a discussion of standing, which determines who can bring a claim, and consideration of the issues relating to the public law/private law divide, which concerns against whom a claim can be brought and the matter upon which that claim can be founded.

Public Law ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 409-444
Author(s):  
John Stanton ◽  
Craig Prescott

This chapter provides an introduction to judicial review and its various features and requirements. It starts by exploring the meaning and purpose of judicial review, explaining the particular functions of the courts and the jurisdiction that justifies their scrutiny of administrative matters. It then sets out the legal basis for judicial review and the process through which applications proceed, which while rooted in statute, has developed incrementally through both case law and the 1998 Woolf Reforms. The chapter considers issues relating to access to review, exploring the legal requirements that must be fulfilled before an application for judicial review can be entertained by the Administrative Court. This includes a discussion of standing, which determines who can bring a claim, and consideration of the issues relating to the public law/private law divide, which concerns against whom a claim can be brought and the matter upon which that claim can be founded.


Public Law ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 114-153
Author(s):  
John Stanton ◽  
Craig Prescott

This chapter provides an introduction to judicial review and its various features and requirements. It starts by exploring the meaning and purpose of judicial review, explaining the particular functions of the courts and the jurisdiction that justifies their scrutiny of administrative matters. It then sets out the legal basis for judicial review and the process through which applications proceed, which while rooted in statute, has developed incrementally through both case law and the 1998 Woolf Reforms. The chapter considers issues relating to access to review, exploring the legal requirements that must be fulfilled before an application for judicial review can be entertained by the Administrative Court. This includes a discussion of standing, which determines who can bring a claim, and consideration of the issues relating to the public law/private law divide, which concerns against whom a claim can be brought and the matter upon which that claim can be founded.


Author(s):  
Neil Parpworth

Judicial review is a procedure whereby the courts determine the lawfulness of the exercise of executive power. It is concerned with the legality of the decision-making process as opposed to the merits of the actual decision. Thus it is supervisory rather than appellate. Emphasis is also placed on the fact that the jurisdiction exists to control the exercise of power by public bodies. This chapter discusses the supervisory jurisdiction of the courts, procedural reform, the rule in O’Reilly v Mackman, the public law/private law distinction, collateral challenge, and exclusion of judicial review. The procedure for making a claim for judicial review under the Civil Procedural Rules (CPR) 54 is outlined.


Author(s):  
Neil Parpworth

Judicial review is a procedure whereby the courts determine the lawfulness of the exercise of executive power. It is concerned with the legality of the decision-making process as opposed to the merits of the actual decision. Thus it is supervisory rather than appellate. This chapter discusses the supervisory jurisdiction of the courts, procedural reform, the rule in O’Reilly v Mackman, the public law/private law distinction, collateral challenge, and exclusion of judicial review. The procedure for making a claim for judicial review under the Civil Procedural Rules (CPR) 54 is considered.


2018 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 533
Author(s):  
Eirik Bjorge

Are the "general principles of law recognised by civilized nations" capable of adjusting to the progress and needs of the international community? This article argues that they are, and that international law needs, to a larger degree than what has been the case, to draw on principles of public law. Those principles of public law are not to supplant, but to supplement, those of private law. The article analyses four principles: the principle of legality; the principle requiring positive legal basis for state action; the principle that even the highest emanation of the executive power cannot escape judicial review; and the principle of protection of legitimate expectations. If one takes account of the needs of international law, there is no reason whatever why today we should accede to the orthodoxy that the intention behind the concept of general principles is only to authorise a court to apply the general principles of municipal jurisprudence, in particular of private law, in so far as they are applicable to relations of states – if for no other reason than the fact that international law no longer governs only relations of states. 


2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (72) ◽  
pp. 31-50
Author(s):  
Gabriel Perlingeiro

This text endeavors to define the theoretical limits of the capacities of the public administrative authorities to reach consensual solutions to disputes within the framework of judicial review. It is motivated by the lack of a clear understanding in Brazilian law of the border area between the legal relations of public and private law involving the public authorities, and the expressions “inalienable right” (or “inalienable interest”) and “public interest” as shown by the inexplicable asymmetry between what the public administrative authorities can do within a judicial proceeding and outside one. Based on a comparative study of common law versus civil law legal systems and an examination of the treatment of the subject in Brazilian statutes, case law and legal studies, this article reviews the relationship between the public interest and inalienability, demonstrating, in conclusion, that the possibility of the administrative authorities to enter into settlements or follow similar practices should not be rejected a priori, even in cases of public law. According to the author, there are three possible scenarios in which public administrative authorities may resort to consensual dispute resolution in the context of the judicial review: in private-law relationships, in public-law relationships with respect to the exercise of administrative actions prescribed by law and public-law relationships with respect to the exercise of discretionary powers.


1999 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-48
Author(s):  
Nicholas Bamforth

THE remedial aspects of judicial review illustrate in particularly vivid form the divergent nature of public and private law proceedings. The prerogative orders–mandamus, certiorari and prohibition–are available only via judicial review. Leave is required for judicial review but not for private law actions. By contrast with the private law writ procedure, judicial review must be brought promptly and within three months. In judicial review, a remedy can still be denied to the applicant who establishes a substantive case. As the Law Commission made clear in its Report Administrative Law: Judicial Review and Statutory Appeals, “[j]udicial review often involves values and policy interests, which must be balanced against and may transcend the individual interests, which are normally the subject of litigation between private citizens” (Law Com. No. 226, para. 2.1).


2014 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Greg Weeks

Soft law is a pervasive phenomenon which is highly effective as a means of regulation in Australia, as it is in many other jurisdictions. This article will not focus on the regulatory aspects of soft law, but will examine the capacity of individuals to obtain remedies where public authorities fail to adhere to the terms of their published soft law. The available judicial remedies apply in very limited circumstances, both in private law actions (in tort or equity) and public law (judicial review) actions. Ultimately, the most effective ways to remedy breaches of soft law appear also to be ‘soft’, such as recommendations of the Ombudsman and discretionary schemes for ex gratia payments.


Author(s):  
Pascale Chapdelaine

This chapter proposes two principles that should inform the development of copyright law and policy and of user rights. The first calls for more cohesion between copyright law, private law, and public law, and for less exceptionalism in copyright law. The second requires that the balance in copyright law be adjusted for its future application as a mediation tool between the competing interests of copyright holders, users, intermediaries, and the public. Instituting positive obligations for copyright holders in relation to users and steering freedom of contract toward the objectives of copyright law are necessary regulatory changes to rectify ongoing imbalances. The principle of technological neutrality should guide the judiciary in its application of copyright’s objective of promoting a balance in copyright law. The proposed guiding principles lead to the creation of a taxonomy and hierarchy of copyright user rights that take into account the myriad ways users experience copyright works.


Author(s):  
Thomas W. Merrill

This chapter explores the relationship between private and public law. In civil law countries, the public-private distinction serves as an organizing principle of the entire legal system. In common law jurisdictions, the distinction is at best an implicit design principle and is used primarily as an informal device for categorizing different fields of law. Even if not explicitly recognized as an organizing principle, however, it is plausible that private and public law perform distinct functions. Private law supplies the tools that make private ordering possible—the discretionary decisions that individuals make in structuring their lives. Public law is concerned with providing public goods—broadly defined—that cannot be adequately supplied by private ordering. In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, various schools of thought derived from utilitarianism have assimilated both private and public rights to the same general criterion of aggregate welfare analysis. This has left judges with no clear conception of the distinction between private and public law. Another problematic feature of modern legal thought is a curious inversion in which scholars who focus on fields of private law have turned increasingly to law and economics, one of the derivatives of utilitarianism, whereas scholars who concern themselves with public law are increasingly drawn to new versions of natural rights thinking, in the form of universal human rights.


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