11. The Tort of Negligence

Author(s):  
Lucy Jones

This chapter discusses the difference between the Law of Torts and Contract and Criminal Law. It explores the tort of negligence, considering the necessary elements for a claim of negligence, namely the defendant owed the claimant a duty of care, the defendant breached that duty of care, and reasonably foreseeable damage was caused by the breach of duty. The chapter considers the special requirements for the recovery of pure economic loss and for loss as a result of psychiatric injuries, looking at both primary and secondary victims. The principles relating to breach of a duty of care, including the standard of care, are discussed. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the final element, considering the need for a causal link between the breach of duty by the defendant and the damage suffered by the claimant.

2019 ◽  
pp. 299-334
Author(s):  
Lucy Jones

This chapter discusses the difference between the law of torts and contract and criminal law. It explores the tort of negligence, considering the necessary elements for a claim of negligence, namely the defendant owed the claimant a duty of care, the defendant breached that duty of care, and reasonably foreseeable damage was caused by the breach of duty. The chapter considers the special requirements for the recovery of pure economic loss and for loss as a result of psychiatric injuries, looking at both primary and secondary victims. The principles relating to breach of a duty of care, including the standard of care, are discussed. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the final element, considering the need for a causal link between the breach of duty by the defendant and the damage suffered by the claimant.


Author(s):  
Carol Brennan

This chapter discusses the law on standard of care and breach of duty. To establish that the duty of care has been breached, the standard of care must first be found and then it must be decided if that standard was reached in the circumstances. The general standard of care is objective: the ‘reasonable person’ standard. Variations in the standard of care regarding children and the more skilled or professional are discussed, as are those pertaining to sport and the medical profession. Proof of breach must be established by the claimant on the balance of probabilities; occasionally with the benefit of the evidential tool of res ipsa loquitur.


1996 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Murphy

In English law, the recovery of pure economic loss falls mainly within the province of the law of contract. Only in very limited circumstances does the law of tort provide for the recovery of such losses. As Cardozo C.J. explained in Ultramares Corporation v. Touched, tort is concerned not to permit “liability in an indeterminate amount, for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class”. Notwithstanding this reticence, their Lordships' speeches, though not the final decision, in the seminal case of Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller and Partners Ltd. provided a notable inroad into the rigidity of this stance. Since Hedley Byrne, the question has become, instead, how far, not if, pure economic loss is and should be recoverable in the law of negligence.


Author(s):  
Vera Bermingham ◽  
Carol Brennan

Without assuming prior legal knowledge, books in the Directions series introduce and guide readers through key points of law and legal debate. Questions, diagrams, and exercises help readers to engage fully with each subject and check their understanding as they progress. The tort of negligence originated as a remedy for property damage and physical injury. However, recovery of compensation for psychiatric injury and pure economic loss, in cases where they were not caused by physical injury or property damage, has proved difficult. Duty of care for psychiatric injury is contingent upon whether the claimant is a primary or secondary victim. This chapter discusses the policy reasons for limiting duty of care for psychiatric injury, the mechanisms by which the law limits duty of care for psychiatric injury, the meaning of ‘pure economic loss’, and the development of the Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd (1964) principle of liability for negligent statements. The chapter also examines the ‘thin skull’ rule, which applies to psychiatric injury in the same way as to physical injury.


Legal Studies ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 415-433 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Murphy

The law of negligence has long been concerned not to countenance liability ‘in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class’. Nowhere, except perhaps in relation to pure economic loss, has this reluctance been more pronounced than in the context of negligently inflicted psychiatric harm. Without aiming to advocate a system of law that would create an increase in the workload of personal injury practitioners, this article attempts a thoroughgoing reappraisal of the bases of liability for psychiatric harm. More particularly, its primary aim is to accommodate liability for such harm within the current, tripartite framework governing the duty of care: that harm to the plaintiff be foreseeable, that there be a relationship of proximity between the plaintiff and the defendant and, that it be just and reasonable to impose a duty. Such an endeavour is both timely and necessary in view of the House of Lords’ recent insistence that in all cases-even those involving physical harm-all three limbs of the duty formula must explicitly be demonstrated.


2019 ◽  
pp. 60-72
Author(s):  
Carol Brennan

This chapter discusses the law on standard of care and breach of duty. To establish that the duty of care has been breached, the standard of care must first be found and then it must be decided if that standard was reached in the circumstances. The general standard of care is objective: the ‘reasonable person’ standard. Variations in the standard of care regarding children and the more skilled or professional are discussed, as are those pertaining to sport and the medical profession. Proof of breach must be established by the claimant on the balance of probabilities; occasionally with the benefit of the evidential tool of res ipsa loquitur.


2020 ◽  
pp. 106-145
Author(s):  
Carol Brennan ◽  
Vera Bermingham

Without assuming prior legal knowledge, books in the Directions series introduce and guide readers through key points of law and legal debate. Questions, diagrams, and exercises help readers to engage fully with each subject and check their understanding as they progress. The tort of negligence originated as a remedy for property damage and physical injury. However, recovery of compensation for psychiatric injury and pure economic loss, in cases where they were not caused by physical injury or property damage, has proved difficult. Duty of care for psychiatric injury is contingent upon whether the claimant is a primary or secondary victim. This chapter discusses the policy reasons for limiting duty of care for psychiatric injury, the mechanisms by which the law limits duty of care for psychiatric injury, the meaning of ‘pure economic loss’, and the development of the Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd (1964) principle of liability for negligent statements. The chapter also examines the ‘thin skull’ rule, which applies to psychiatric injury in the same way as to physical injury.


2021 ◽  
pp. 62-74
Author(s):  
Carol Brennan

This chapter discusses the law on standard of care and breach of duty. To establish that the duty of care has been breached, the standard of care must first be found and then it must be decided if that standard was reached in the circumstances. The general standard of care is objective: the ‘reasonable person’ standard. Variations in the standard of care regarding children and the more skilled or professional are discussed, as are those pertaining to sport and the medical profession. Proof of breach must be established by the claimant on the balance of probabilities; occasionally with the benefit of the evidential tool of res ipsa loquitur.


Legal Studies ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 558-585
Author(s):  
Mark Stiggelbout

This paper considers the relevance of a finding that, even absent the defendant's unlawfulness, the private law claimant would have suffered the losses claimed. It provides a principled framework for considering the issues raised by such a finding of ‘losses in any event’, arguing that it should be distinguished both from causation of injury and from the scope of the defendant's duty of care, and that it should be treated as raising a question of damages. It highlights the need, particularly in pure economic loss cases, for a careful comparison of the real and the hypothetical losses so as to determine whether the latter would indeed have been losses in any event. In this regard, the decision of the Court of Appeal in Calvert v William Hill Credit Ltd is subjected to close scrutiny. A more general argument advanced is that tort and contract both do and should adopt similar approaches in this field.


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