15. Article 12: The right to marry and to found a family

Author(s):  
David Harris ◽  
Michael O’Boyle ◽  
Ed Bates ◽  
Carla Buckley

This chapter discusses Article 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which protects the right to marry and to found a family, subject to a wide power on the part of states to regulate the exercise of the right. National law may regulate the form and capacity to marry, but procedural or substantive limitations must not remove the essence of the right. The right to marry does not extend to same-sex marriage and there is no right to divorce. However, transsexuals are guaranteed the right to marry persons of their now opposite sex.

Author(s):  
Ruth Gaffney-Rhys

The Concentrate Questions and Answers series offers the best preparation for tackling exam and assignment questions. Each book includes key debates, typical questions, diagram answer plans, suggested answers, author commentary and tips to gain extra marks. This chapter considers the formation and recognition of adult relationships i.e. marriage, same-sex marriage, civil partnerships and cohabitation. The questions included in this chapter cover: the right to marry contained in article 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights; forced marriage; the difference between opposite-sex marriage, same-sex marriage and civil partnerships and the difference between marriage and cohabitation.


Author(s):  
Ruth Gaffney-Rhys

The Concentrate Questions and Answers series offers the best preparation for tackling exam and assignment questions. Each book includes key debates, typical questions, diagram answer plans, suggested answers, author commentary, and tips to gain extra marks. This chapter considers the formation and recognition of adult relationships i.e. marriage, same-sex marriage, civil partnerships, and cohabitation. The questions included in this chapter cover: the right to marry contained in article 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights; forced marriage; the difference between opposite-sex marriage, same-sex marriage, and civil partnerships, and the difference between marriage and cohabitation.


2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (10) ◽  
pp. 1746-1763 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah Lucy Cooper

The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has been considering whether same-sex couples should have the rights to marry and to be recognized as a family under the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) for over thirty years. In the 1980s the European Commission of Human Rights (the Commission) and the ECtHR respectively rejected the notion that same-sex relationships constituted a “family life” under Article 8 of the ECHR, and that post-operative transgendered persons had the right to marry under Article 12. However, throughout the 1990s and the first decade of the new millennium, the ECtHR handed down a body of judgments that incrementally liberalized these rights (albeit not always smoothly) in favor of LGBT persons. This evolution culminated in part on 24 June 2010, when the ECtHR passed judgment inSchalk and Kopf v. Austria.In that case the First Section of the ECtHR made a number of major, but seemingly contradictory rulings. For the first time in its history, the ECtHR ruled that same-sex relationships expressly constitute a “family life” under Article 8, and that the right to marry under Article 12 was not confined to opposite-sex couples in “all circumstances.” However, the ECtHR simultaneously ruled that Member States are under no obligation to protect that “family life,” by providing same-sex couples with access to marriage under Article 12, or an alternative registration system under Articles 8 and 14. The Grand Chamber denied the applicants' subsequent request for a referral.


2017 ◽  
Vol 76 (2) ◽  
pp. 243-246 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andy Hayward

OPPOSITE-SEX couples are prohibited from forming a civil partnership. Following the introduction of same-sex marriage, the Civil Partnership Act 2004 was not extended to opposite-sex couples, resulting in the unusual position that English law permits same-sex couples access to two relationship forms (marriage and civil partnership) yet limits opposite-sex couples to one (marriage). This discrimination was recently challenged in the courts by an opposite-sex couple, Rebecca Steinfeld and Charles Keidan, who wish to enter a civil partnership owing to their deeply-rooted ideological opposition to marriage. Rejecting marriage as a patriarchal institution and believing that a civil partnership would offer a more egalitarian public expression of their relationship, the couple argued that the current ban constitutes a breach of Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 153-188
Author(s):  
Nicola Barker

Abstract In 2018, the British Overseas Territory of Bermuda revoked the right to marry for same-sex couples. In a judgment that reconceives the relationship between sexual orientation and religious freedoms, the Bermuda Supreme Court and Court of Appeal found this revocation to be unconstitutional. I explore the political and legal context in which same-sex marriage was granted and then revoked in Bermuda. I also consider the Bermuda Courts’ judgments in light of the subsequent judgment of the United Kingdom’s Supreme Court in Steinfeld, among others. While there was an assumption from both the Bermuda and United Kingdom Governments that the revocation provision was compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights, I argue that this underestimates the significance of the distinction between declining to recognise a right to same-sex marriage and revoking a right that has already been exercised. While the European Court of Human Rights has not yet found the absence of same-sex marriage to be a violation of Article 12 of the Convention, I argue that the revocation of a right to marry between same-sex couples that had been recognised in accordance with national law changes the terrain on which the Convention arguments would be made.


2010 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 1313-1333 ◽  
Author(s):  
TIMOTHY HILDEBRANDT

AbstractUsing the case of same-sex marriage in China, this article explores two fundamental questions: What motivates a non-democratic state to promulgate a progressive human rights policy? More importantly, when a non-democratic state adopts such policies, what is the impact on activism? I argue that same-sex marriage legislation could be used strategically to improve China's human rights reputation. While this would extend a pinnacle right to gays and lesbians, the benefits might not outweigh the costs: I show that when imposed from above, a same-sex marriage law would incur opportunity costs on activism; the passage of this progressive policy would eliminate an important issue around which the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Trans-gender/-sexual (LGBT) community might develop. Moreover, even if such policy is promulgated, the right to marry will do little to challenge the larger social pressures that make life difficult for LGBT Chinese.


2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 60
Author(s):  
Bede Harris

Australia is currently confronting the issue of whether to legalise same-sex marriage. Thus far debate has been conducted with little reference to human rights theory. This article draws on the theories of John Rawls and John Stuart Mill and analyses whether, by confining the right to marry to heterosexual couples, the law infringes the right to privacy and, conversely, whether the legalisation of same-sex marriage would infringe religious rights of those who are unwilling to provide goods and services to same-sex couples. In so doing, the article adopts a comparative approach, drawing on case law from the United States. The article examines the way in which political debate on the issue has been conducted by the major parties in Australia, and concludes that both the Liberal-National coalition and the Labor party have been motivated by a desire to appease the religious right within their ranks, at the expense of human rights principles.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Simon Matthew Wilson

<p>This paper analyses the implications of section 29(1) of the Marriage Act 1955 for marriage celebrants wishing to refuse to solemnise same-sex marriages on religious grounds. Section 29(2) of the Marriage Act (as amended in 2013) allows a limited religious exemption for some celebrants, but not all are covered by this provision. Those not included (namely independent celebrants) can only refuse to solemnise a marriage if section 29(1) allows such a refusal. This paper asserts that when solemnising marriages, celebrants perform a ‘public function’ and are therefore subject to human rights obligations arising from the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA). These obligations are not overridden by section 29(1), so a celebrant can only refuse to solemnise a marriage if NZBORA allows this. A refusal to solemnise a same-sex marriage on religious grounds limits the right to freedom from discrimination in a way that is demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society, and thus permitted by NZBORA. Section 29(1) therefore provides a broader protection for celebrants than section 29(2), allowing all celebrants to refuse to solemnise same-sex marriages on religious grounds.</p>


2020 ◽  
Vol 71 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Conor McCormick ◽  
Thomas Stewart

The saga which led to the legalisation of same-sex marriage in Northern Ireland offers some important lessons about the processes of law-making for that jurisdiction, together with broader lessons about how the European Convention on Human Rights could be applied in strategic litigation elsewhere. This commentary analyses four episodes in that saga. It begins by evaluating several failed attempts to achieve legalisation at the Northern Ireland Assembly, before considering two legal challenges which also failed in the High Court of Northern Ireland. The developments which eventually led to legal change through the Parliament of the UK are assessed thereafter, followed by an appraisal of the most significant legal features in a set of judgments handed down by the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland shortly afterwards. It is concluded, in particular, that lessons in connection with how petitions of concern are deployed in the devolved legislature, as well as lessons about how the prohibition on discrimination contained in Article 14 of the Convention has been interpreted, are deserving of wider circulation and appreciation among LGBT rights campaigners in Northern Ireland and beyond.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document