Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Exemption under the Marriage Act: Where Does Section 29 Leave Religious Objectors?

<p>This paper analyses the implications of section 29(1) of the Marriage Act 1955 for marriage celebrants wishing to refuse to solemnise same-sex marriages on religious grounds. Section 29(2) of the Marriage Act (as amended in 2013) allows a limited religious exemption for some celebrants, but not all are covered by this provision. Those not included (namely independent celebrants) can only refuse to solemnise a marriage if section 29(1) allows such a refusal. This paper asserts that when solemnising marriages, celebrants perform a ‘public function’ and are therefore subject to human rights obligations arising from the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA). These obligations are not overridden by section 29(1), so a celebrant can only refuse to solemnise a marriage if NZBORA allows this. A refusal to solemnise a same-sex marriage on religious grounds limits the right to freedom from discrimination in a way that is demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society, and thus permitted by NZBORA. Section 29(1) therefore provides a broader protection for celebrants than section 29(2), allowing all celebrants to refuse to solemnise same-sex marriages on religious grounds.</p>

Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Exemption under the Marriage Act: Where Does Section 29 Leave Religious Objectors?

<p>This paper analyses the implications of section 29(1) of the Marriage Act 1955 for marriage celebrants wishing to refuse to solemnise same-sex marriages on religious grounds. Section 29(2) of the Marriage Act (as amended in 2013) allows a limited religious exemption for some celebrants, but not all are covered by this provision. Those not included (namely independent celebrants) can only refuse to solemnise a marriage if section 29(1) allows such a refusal. This paper asserts that when solemnising marriages, celebrants perform a ‘public function’ and are therefore subject to human rights obligations arising from the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA). These obligations are not overridden by section 29(1), so a celebrant can only refuse to solemnise a marriage if NZBORA allows this. A refusal to solemnise a same-sex marriage on religious grounds limits the right to freedom from discrimination in a way that is demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society, and thus permitted by NZBORA. Section 29(1) therefore provides a broader protection for celebrants than section 29(2), allowing all celebrants to refuse to solemnise same-sex marriages on religious grounds.</p>

Autonomy vs. beneficence. A bioethical inquiry for Covid-19 mandatory vaccination

Lately, the public discussion around mandatory vaccination has been an intensely enliven one. On the one hand, there are those who argue for the effectiveness of vaccination and demand that all procure it in order that all be immunize and that the threat of COVID-19 be minimize. On the other hand, there are those who are troubled about getting the vaccine and claim that mandatory vaccination is an infringement on their individual Autonomy. Furthermore, there are those who refuse vaccination for faith-based reasons and thus invoke religious exemption. The paper offers a moral analysis about the conflict between Mandatory Vaccination, supposed to be for the good of the community, and individual Autonomy. It clarifies why there are no moral basis for mandatory vaccination nor for religious exemption.

Vaccines Mandates and Religion: Where are We Headed with the Current Supreme Court?

This article argues that the Supreme Court should not require a religious exemption from vaccine mandates. For children, who cannot yet make autonomous religious decision, religious exemptions would allow parents to make a choice that puts the child at risk and makes the shared environment of the school unsafe — risking other people’s children. For adults, there are still good reasons not to require a religious exemption, since vaccines mandates are adopted for public health reasons, not to target religion, are an area where free riding is a real risk, no religion actually prohibits vaccinating under a mandate, and policing religious exemptions is very difficult.

The legal status of infant male circumcision

We present an argument in support of the legal prohibition of infant male circumcision (IMC) in developed Western countries. We submit that all IMC, irrespective of whether the motivation behind it be secular or religious, violates children’s rights to self-determination (autonomy) and bodily integrity and is therefore morally illegitimate. And while IMC’s being morally wrong does not entail that it ought to be criminalised, we contend that it should be legally proscribed so as to protect children against harm and to uphold their rights. We consider and reject an argument that an exemption from the legal ban should be granted to religious parents who perceive themselves to be under a moral obligation to subject their male infants to IMC. We argue that since IMC sets back children’s basic interests and violates their rights, there is no room, and no case, for the conferring of a religious exemption.