22. Right to receive services

2020 ◽  
pp. 529-539
Author(s):  
Marios Costa ◽  
Steve Peers

This chapter examines the European Union (EU) law concerning the right to receive services under Article 56 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The chapter considers the dividing line between those services which are provided for remuneration and publicly funded services—these include education (including scholarships and grants) and healthcare (including in the context of the Patients’ Directive). It focuses on the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice (CJ) in which it has developed a number of mechanisms to extend rights for those who have moved to receive services.

Author(s):  
Lorna Woods ◽  
Philippa Watson ◽  
Marios Costa

This chapter examines the European Union (EU) law concerning the right to receive services under Article 56 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The chapter considers the dividing line between remuneration and publicly funded services, and focuses on the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice (CJ) in which it has developed a number of mechanisms to extend rights for those who have moved to receive services.


Politeja ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (3(66)) ◽  
pp. 103-117
Author(s):  
Ewa Kamarad

The Term ‘Spouse’ in EU Law – Comments on the Judgment in the Coman Case (C‑ 673‑16) The paper concerns the judgment of 5 June 2018 issued by the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Coman case (C‑673‑16), in which the Court for the first time defined the term ‘spouse’ for the purpose of Directive 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States. It discusses the consequences of the judgement and its relation to the traditional mechanisms of private international law and the EU principle of mutual recognition.


2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 76-98
Author(s):  
Rogier Kegge ◽  
Annemarie Drahmann

This article aims to assess whether a programmatic approach could still be a useful legal instrument for the allocation of scarce environmental rights and a legitimate tool for implementing EU Directives. In response to the recent judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (cjeu) in the Dutch Programmatic Approach to Nitrogen case, 1 we will examine under what conditions a programmatic approach could be compatible with the precautionary principle and the freedom to conduct a business as protected by EU law. These principles are inextricably linked, and the Member States and the cjeu must find a balance between a high level of environmental protection and the freedom to conduct a business.


2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 163-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ger Essers ◽  
Frans Pennings

The effects of crossing borders can be advantageous or disadvantageous for the persons concerned; these are all part of the game and cannot be challenged on the basis of EU law. After all, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) does not provide powers for harmonisation, but only for coordination. However, the coordination rules themselves may make a person worse off when he or she makes use of the right to free movement. More precisely, such an effect may occur in combination with differences between national systems to which coordination rules are applied. One example is that the coordination rules provide that a person is subject to unemployment benefits in the country of residence and, as a result, if that person becomes ill, also to sickness benefit in that country. If the duration of sickness benefit in the country of residence is 52 weeks, but the waiting period for disability benefit (supposing, for instance, that this is (mainly) due from the country of employment) is 104 weeks, there is a gap of 52 weeks in protection. The relevance of such gaps is not to solve particular cases as such; after all, these are closely linked to particular national systems. The relevance lies in the more general approach that is now being developed by the Court of Justice to address such gaps. This will be useful in cases other than those discussed here and may be further developed in order to be codified in the Coordination Regulation.


2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 96-104
Author(s):  
Bernard Johann Mulder

This paper assesses the juridical aspects of the right to vote for, and be elected as, employee representative in company bodies. The assessment is made in the light of the pending case Konrad Erzberger v TUI AG, C 566/15 before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The case was referred to the CJEU by the Kammergericht Berlin (Germany) and it was lodged on 3 November 2015. In the case, two issues related to the provisions of the Treaty of Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) are addressed to the CJEU. One is if it is discrimination on grounds of nationality, another is if national legislation is incompatible with the provisions on freedom of movement for workers, when the national legislation does not permit inviting employees outside a country’s borders to vote or stand as a candidate for the employee representation in that company’s supervisory body. In this paper it is argued that national law in the case at issue is not incompatible with European Union (EU) law. Consequently, there is no discrimination on grounds of nationality, and there is no obstacle to free movement for workers. Instead, it is a matter of what law shall apply.


2010 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 462-480 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anja Wiesbrock

On 4 March 2010 the Court of Justice of the European Union issued its first judgment on the conformity with EU law of national provisions implementing Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification. In the case Chakroun v. Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken the Court had to rule on the Dutch implementing measures concerning resource requirements and the concepts of family reunification and family formation.


Author(s):  
Enrique Linde Paniagua

La constante expansión del mercado interior de la Unión Europea está desbordando las estrictas previsiones que se deducirían para el derecho a la libertad de circulación y residencia regulada en el Tratado de Funcionamiento de la Unión Europea y en el derecho derivado. Así, a la primigenia conexión del derecho a la libertad de circulación y residencia con la eliminación de las fronteras interiores han sucedido en la actualidad las múltiples conexiones de dicho derecho con el derecho fiscal, los derechos de la personalidad, la educación y la sanidad, tal y como acredita la jurisprudencia del Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea. Esas son las nuevas fronteras que deberán ser afrontadas por el Derecho de la Unión para lograr una ciudadanía plena.The steady expansion of the internal market of the European Union is overflowing the strict provisions that would be deducted for the right to freedom of movement and residence regulated in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and legislation. Thus, the primal connection of the right to freedom of movement and residence with the elimination of controls on persons at internal borders have happened today the multiple connections of this right with the tax law, rights of personality, the education and health, as proving the Court of Justice of the European Union. These are the new frontiers that must be addressed by EU law to achieve full citizenship.


Author(s):  
Koen Lenaerts ◽  
José A. Gutiérrez-Fons ◽  
Stanislas Adam

Two different dynamics govern the autonomy of the European Union (EU) legal order. On the one hand, autonomy seeks to define what EU law is not, i.e. it is not ordinary international law. Positively, on the other, autonomy seeks to define what EU law is, i.e. a legal order that has the capacity to operate as a self-referential system of norms that is both coherent and complete. Yet the concept of autonomy of the EU legal order in no way conveys the message that the EU and its law are euro-centric and that the Court of Justice of the European Union (the ‘Court of Justice’) seeks to insulate EU law from external influences by building walls that prevent the migration of legal ideas. Autonomy rather enables the Court of Justice to strike the right balance between the need to preserve the values on which the EU is founded and openness to other legal orders. The autonomy of the EU legal order is thus part of the very DNA of that legal order as it allows the EU to find its own constitutional space whilst interacting in a cooperative way with its Member States and the wider world.


2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (2-2019) ◽  
pp. 419-433
Author(s):  
Stefanie Vedder

National high courts in the European Union (EU) are constantly challenged: the European Court of Justice (ECJ) claims the authority to declare national standing interpretations invalid should it find them incompatible with its views on EU law. This principle noticeably impairs the formerly undisputed sovereignty of national high courts. In addition, preliminary references empower lower courts to question interpretations established by their national ‘superiors’. Assuming that courts want to protect their own interests, the article presumes that national high courts develop strategies to elude the breach of their standing interpretations. Building on principal-agent theory, the article proposes that national high courts can use the level of (im-) precision in the wording of the ECJ’s judgements to continue applying their own interpretations. The article develops theoretical strategies for national high courts in their struggle for authority.


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