6. The House of Lords

2021 ◽  
pp. 135-167
Author(s):  
Ian Loveland

This chapter examines whether the House of Lords plays an effective anti-majoritarian legislative role. The chapter begins by discussing the changing nature of the relationship between the Commons and the Lords in the post-revolutionary era, focusing in particular on the emergence in the early nineteenth century of a political presumption that the Lords was becoming the inferior partner within Parliament and on the passage of the Parliament Act 1911 in which legal force was given to that political presumption. The chapter also addresses the various proposals put forward in the modern era to reform both the composition and the powers of the House of Lords, and suggests that most reform plans present a paradox. The more we ask a second chamber to perform functions complementary to those of the Commons, the more we demand of its members that they be (as individuals and as a body) ‘expert’, ‘experienced’, and ‘nonpartisan’, and so the more we reveal the crushing dominance of party politics in the lower house, and the incapacity and/or unwillingness of backbench MPs to exert a restraining influence on government activities. This suggests that the key division within the legislative process is now not Lords versus Commons, nor Labour versus Conservative, but party versus national interest. The final part of the chapter explores a more obviously ‘legal’ question; namely the implications of the Parliament Act 1911 for traditional understandings of the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty.

Author(s):  
Ian Loveland

This chapter examines whether the House of Lords plays an effective anti-majoritarian legislative role. The variations on the theme of reforming the powers and composition of the House of Lords qua legislative body are legion, as are the pros and cons of each scheme proposed, but most reform plans present a paradox. The more we ask a second chamber to perform functions complementary to those of the Commons, the more we demand of its members that they be (as individuals and as a body) ‘expert’, ‘experienced’, and ‘nonpartisan’, and so the more we reveal the crushing dominance of party politics in the lower house, and the incapacity and/or unwillingness of backbench MPs to exert a restraining influence on government activities. This suggests that the key division within the legislative process is now not Lords versus Commons, nor Labour versus Conservative, but party versus national interest.


2021 ◽  
pp. 105-134
Author(s):  
Ian Loveland

This chapter examines the relationship between the government and the House of Commons, in order further to develop arguments concerning the doctrines of parliamentary sovereignty and the separation of powers within the contemporary constitution. Consideration is given both to the role played by the House of Commons within the legislative process and its effectiveness as a means to provide scrutiny of and challenges to the ways in which the government exercises its statutory and prerogative powers. The chapter argues that, for most of the modern era, the House of Commons has been a body in which party politics is the dominant determinant both in the legislative process and in respect of executive accountability and asks if we should accept that the Commons is manifestly now a factional rather than national assembly for most purposes. But it is also suggested that it would be premature to conclude that the constitution permits factional concerns to determine both the content of legislation and the parliamentary accountability of government behaviour.


Author(s):  
Ian Loveland

This chapter examines the relationship between the government and the legislature, in order to develop arguments concerning the doctrines of parliamentary sovereignty and the separation of powers within the contemporary constitution. It argues that, for most of the modern era, the House of Commons has been a body in which party politics is the dominant determinant both in the legislative process and in respect of executive accountability. The house is manifestly now a factional rather than national assembly for most purposes. But it would be premature to conclude that the constitution permits factional concerns to determine both the content of legislation and the parliamentary accountability of government behaviour.


Author(s):  
Thomas E. Webb

Essential Cases: Public Law provides a bridge between course textbooks and key case judgments. This case document summarizes the facts and decision in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Simms [1999] UKHL 33, House of Lords. The case considered whether the Secretary of State, and prison governors, could restrict prisoners’ access to journalists investigating alleged miscarriages of justice. In addition to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) Article 10 issues this raises, Lord Hoffmann also in obiter dicta discussed the relationship between the Human Rights Act 1998, parliamentary sovereignty, and the concept of legality. The document also includes supporting commentary from author Thomas Webb.


Author(s):  
Thomas E. Webb

Essential Cases: Public Law provides a bridge between course textbooks and key case judgments. This case document summarizes the facts and decision in Jackson v HM Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56, House of Lords. This case concerned the interpretation of the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949 and the implications of this interpretation for the relationship between the Houses of Parliament. The case also contained important obiter from the House of Lords on the nature of parliamentary sovereignty. The document also includes supporting commentary from author Thomas Webb.


Public Law ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 443-482
Author(s):  
Andrew Le Sueur ◽  
Maurice Sunkin ◽  
Jo Eric Khushal Murkens

This chapter looks at the circumstances surrounding two events. The first is the 2005 decision of the UK Parliament to set up a committee to examine whether the constitutional conventions governing the relationship between the House of Lords and the House of Commons should be codified. The second is the decision of the Commons (and the Labour government) to press ahead and present the Hunting Bill 2004 for royal assent despite the opposition of the Lords to the policy of a total ban on hunting wild animals with dogs; the Lords preferred a policy of licensed hunting.


2019 ◽  
pp. 99-123
Author(s):  
Anne Dennett

This chapter focuses on parliamentary sovereignty. The term ‘Parliamentary sovereignty’ is normally defined as the ‘legislative supremacy of Parliament’. Since the constitutional settlement brought about by the Bill of Rights 1689, the UK Parliament has had unchallenged authority to create primary law. Parliament's legislative supremacy means, therefore, that there is no competing body with equal or greater law-making power and there are no legal limits on Parliament's legislative competence. Parliament has broad legislative power but cannot make unchangeable statutes, and a current parliament can reverse laws made by a previous parliament. Nobody but Parliament can override Acts of Parliament. The Enrolled Bill rule requires that, if a Bill has passed through the House of Commons and House of Lords and received royal assent, the courts will not enquire into what happened before or during the legislative process.


1964 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 120-142 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mary D. Condon

The Whig ministries of 1830-34 were faced with problems in regard to foreign affairs and parliamentary reform that were almost certain to reveal differences of philosophy within the Cabinets, yet it was on the Irish issues, more particularly that of the Episcopal Reformed Church of Ireland, that the ministries divided and broke. It is generally known that questions concerning the revenues of the Irish Church drove Stanley, the future Conservative Prime Minister, out of the Whig Party, enabled the House of Lords to rally after the Reform Bill and block measures passed by the Commons, and gave William IV an opportunity to dismiss a ministry which still retained the confidence of the lower house and replace it by a Government of his own choice. There is less knowledge, however, of the specific issues behind these events, and of the peculiarities of the Irish Church which hampered an easy solution of its problems. A study of both will serve to illuminate the conflict of parties and of personalities in the first five years of the reform age.From the utilitarian point of view, the temporalities of the Church were absurdly large. Containing only 852,064 members — less than there were in the see of Durham alone — it had a total of twenty-two bishops, including four archbishops. Many holders of benefices had no religious duties, nor, indeed, even a church in which to perform the one service required by their appointment; where parish duties were necessary, they were frequently discharged by a curate who received only a small fraction of the income of the incumbent.


Author(s):  
Meg Russell ◽  
Daniel Gover

This chapter explores the various means by which specialist select committees in both the House of Commons and House of Lords interact with and influence government legislation. The development of select committees is widely seen as important at Westminster, having encouraged greater expertise and specialization among members, and cross-party work. Yet the select committees have only a limited formal role in the legislative process, because the ‘committee stage’ occurs elsewhere. Nonetheless, this chapter shows extensive select committee influence on the 12 case study bills. The committees can be important to setting the policy agenda, informing members, influencing debate, encouraging amendments, and—potentially—supporting the government. This particularly applies to the constitutional committees in the House of Lords, and select committees conducting pre-legislative scrutiny of draft bills. However, other committees can also be important, as demonstrated by the Commons Health Committee’s intervention over the smoking ban in the Health Bill (2005–06).


2021 ◽  
pp. 123-145
Author(s):  
Anne Dennett

This chapter focuses on parliamentary sovereignty. The term ‘parliamentary sovereignty’ is normally defined as the ‘legislative supremacy of Parliament’. Since the constitutional settlement brought about by the Bill of Rights 1689, the UK Parliament has had unchallenged authority to create primary law. Parliament’s legislative supremacy means, therefore, that there is no competing body with equal or greater law-making power and there are no legal limits on Parliament’s legislative competence. Parliament has broad legislative power but cannot make unchangeable statutes, and a current parliament can reverse laws made by a previous parliament. Nobody but Parliament can override Acts of Parliament. The Enrolled Bill rule requires that, if a Bill has passed through the House of Commons and House of Lords and received royal assent, the courts will not enquire into what happened before or during the legislative process.


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