5. The House of Commons

The Government ◽

The Relationship ◽

This chapter examines the relationship between the government and the legislature, in order to develop arguments concerning the doctrines of parliamentary sovereignty and the separation of powers within the contemporary constitution. It argues that, for most of the modern era, the House of Commons has been a body in which party politics is the dominant determinant both in the legislative process and in respect of executive accountability. The house is manifestly now a factional rather than national assembly for most purposes. But it would be premature to conclude that the constitution permits factional concerns to determine both the content of legislation and the parliamentary accountability of government behaviour.

5. The House of Commons

10.1093/he/9780198860129.003.0005 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 105-134

Author(s):

Ian Loveland

Keyword(s):

Separation Of Powers ◽

Party Politics ◽

Legislative Process ◽

House Of Commons ◽

National Assembly ◽

The Commons ◽

The Government ◽

The Relationship ◽

This chapter examines the relationship between the government and the House of Commons, in order further to develop arguments concerning the doctrines of parliamentary sovereignty and the separation of powers within the contemporary constitution. Consideration is given both to the role played by the House of Commons within the legislative process and its effectiveness as a means to provide scrutiny of and challenges to the ways in which the government exercises its statutory and prerogative powers. The chapter argues that, for most of the modern era, the House of Commons has been a body in which party politics is the dominant determinant both in the legislative process and in respect of executive accountability and asks if we should accept that the Commons is manifestly now a factional rather than national assembly for most purposes. But it is also suggested that it would be premature to conclude that the constitution permits factional concerns to determine both the content of legislation and the parliamentary accountability of government behaviour.

6. The House of Lords

10.1093/he/9780198860129.003.0006 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 135-167

Author(s):

Ian Loveland

Keyword(s):

Nineteenth Century ◽

National Interest ◽

Legislative Process ◽

Revolutionary Era ◽

Lower House ◽

House Of Lords ◽

The Commons ◽

The Relationship ◽

This chapter examines whether the House of Lords plays an effective anti-majoritarian legislative role. The chapter begins by discussing the changing nature of the relationship between the Commons and the Lords in the post-revolutionary era, focusing in particular on the emergence in the early nineteenth century of a political presumption that the Lords was becoming the inferior partner within Parliament and on the passage of the Parliament Act 1911 in which legal force was given to that political presumption. The chapter also addresses the various proposals put forward in the modern era to reform both the composition and the powers of the House of Lords, and suggests that most reform plans present a paradox. The more we ask a second chamber to perform functions complementary to those of the Commons, the more we demand of its members that they be (as individuals and as a body) ‘expert’, ‘experienced’, and ‘nonpartisan’, and so the more we reveal the crushing dominance of party politics in the lower house, and the incapacity and/or unwillingness of backbench MPs to exert a restraining influence on government activities. This suggests that the key division within the legislative process is now not Lords versus Commons, nor Labour versus Conservative, but party versus national interest. The final part of the chapter explores a more obviously ‘legal’ question; namely the implications of the Parliament Act 1911 for traditional understandings of the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty.

The Politics of the Senate Reform Reference: Fidelity, Frustration, and Federal Unilateralism

McGill Law Journal ◽

10.7202/1034050ar ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 60 (4) ◽

pp. 623-672

Author(s):

Adam Dodek

Keyword(s):

Political Action ◽

Conservative Party ◽

Party Politics ◽

House Of Commons ◽

High Profile ◽

The Third ◽

Minority Government ◽

The Government ◽

The Relationship ◽

Court Of Appeal

References are the most political of cases, almost always involving high profile public policy issues. Frequently, references are brought to obtain rulings on the relationship between the federal government and the provinces. Less frequently, references involve questions of interbranch relations, that is, between two or more of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. The Senate Reform Reference was one of the rare cases that featured each of these three elements. This article analyzes the Senate Reform Reference on several political levels. First, it situates the reference in terms of megaconstitutional politics, the long-held Canadian practice of attempting to resolve constitutional issues through formal and often high-profile negotiations between the federal and provincial governments. Such interactions have been anathema to the Harper government which has preferred unilateral political action to negotiated political agreement. The article then examines interparty politics or the relationship between the Harper government and the opposition parties during the period of minority government (2006–2011). This is the period during which one would have expected the government to bring a reference because of its inability to obtain support from the other parties in the House of Commons and the Senate for its proposed legislation on the Senate. However, it did not. This leads to an examination of the third issue: intra-party politics or the politics within the governing party, the Conservative Party of Canada. Finally, the article discusses legal politics and how the government of Québec essentially forced the federal government’s hand by bringing its own reference to the Québec Court of Appeal. The overarching framework of interbranch politics—the relationship between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government—is examined throughout the article.

10. EU Legislation

Exploring Parliament ◽

10.1093/hepl/9780198788430.003.0010 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Ed Beale ◽

Libby Kurien ◽

Eve Samson

Keyword(s):

Direct Access ◽

Legislative Process ◽

House Of Commons ◽

National Parliaments ◽

Eu Legislation ◽

House Of Lords ◽

The Government ◽

The Uk ◽

The Eu

This chapter examines the ways in which the UK Parliament formally constrains the government and engages with European Union (EU) institutions. The House of Lords and the House of Commons both have processes to ensure that legislation proposed at the EU level has been properly reviewed before it takes effect in UK law. The ‘scrutiny reserve’, which stipulates that ministers should not agree to proposals under scrutiny, is used to elicit information about the government's negotiating position. Parliament also has a role in examining EU legislation and providing direct access to European institutions. The chapter first provides an overview of the EU legislative process, focusing on three principal EU institutions: member states, the European Parliament (EP), and the European Commission. It also considers the formal role of national parliaments in the EU legislative process, the UK Parliament's scrutiny of the EU legislation and its effectiveness, and parliamentary scrutiny after Brexit.

5. Parliamentary sovereignty

Public Law Directions ◽

10.1093/he/9780198807315.003.0005 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 99-123

Author(s):

Anne Dennett

Keyword(s):

Legislative Process ◽

Bill Of Rights ◽

House Of Commons ◽

Legislative Power ◽

Legal Limits ◽

House Of Lords ◽

The Uk ◽

A Current ◽

Law Making

This chapter focuses on parliamentary sovereignty. The term ‘Parliamentary sovereignty’ is normally defined as the ‘legislative supremacy of Parliament’. Since the constitutional settlement brought about by the Bill of Rights 1689, the UK Parliament has had unchallenged authority to create primary law. Parliament's legislative supremacy means, therefore, that there is no competing body with equal or greater law-making power and there are no legal limits on Parliament's legislative competence. Parliament has broad legislative power but cannot make unchangeable statutes, and a current parliament can reverse laws made by a previous parliament. Nobody but Parliament can override Acts of Parliament. The Enrolled Bill rule requires that, if a Bill has passed through the House of Commons and House of Lords and received royal assent, the courts will not enquire into what happened before or during the legislative process.

MR ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE POLITICIANS

The Historical Journal ◽

10.1017/s0018246x96007005 ◽

1997 ◽

Vol 40 (1) ◽

pp. 41-69 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

R. A. MELIKAN

Keyword(s):

Attorney General ◽

House Of Commons ◽

Professional Advancement ◽

Stepping Stone ◽

Significant Obstacle ◽

The Government ◽

Georgian England ◽

The Relationship ◽

Reliable Path ◽

Hostile Attitude

This article looks at the relationship between professional and political aspiration in Georgian England by examining the office of attorney general during the period 1714–1810. It argues that while the office offered a unique opportunity for a lawyer to combine a legal and political career, this was a formidable task and one rarely achieved. The generally hostile attitude toward lawyers in the house of commons was a significant obstacle. More important, however, were the complex and potentially conflicting expectations associated with the office of attorney. The relationship with the government was an awkward balance of loyalty and remoteness, whereby the attorney was encouraged to regard fellow ministers both as colleagues and as clients. Moreover, he owed a duty to parliament that was independent of, but inevitably linked to, his obligations to the crown. As a consequence of these various pressures attorneys tended to remain aloof from politics and interested primarily in their own professional advancement. The office of attorney general was less the stepping-stone to ministerial office than the reliable path to the bench.

Labour Party Politics and the Working Class

British Journal of Political Science ◽

10.1017/s0007123400000648 ◽

1976 ◽

Vol 6 (2) ◽

pp. 231-238 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Steven Beackon

Keyword(s):

Working Class ◽

Industrial Relations ◽

Social Democracy ◽

Labour Party ◽

Party Politics ◽

Fundamental Change ◽

House Of Commons ◽

The Relationship ◽

Opinion Polls ◽

Urban Working

By the late 1960s the shift of the Labour party away from its traditional base among the urban working class appeared to be gaining momentum. The opinion polls showed a marked swing of working-class sentiment away from the party, and the policies advanced during the period, especially with regard to prices and incomes and industrial relations, hardly seemed designed to satisfy the redistributive concerns traditionally imputed to the working class. Indeed the government's overriding concern with the problem of the economy during a period in which the Labour party had a large majority over all other parties in the House of Commons was seen by one commentator as the final act of a tragic farce entitled ‘The Decline and Fall of Social Democracy’. Clearly this conclusion was drawn somewhat prematurely: in the 1970s there is fragmented evidence to suggest that the Labour party has regained the votes of a number of its traditional supporters who had previously defected, just as there is evidence that the ‘left’ of the party is asserting itself. However, the events of the early 1970s are not sufficient to refute the proposition that some kind of fundamental change either has occurred, or is occurring, in the relationship between the Labour party and its traditional supporters. Even if the curtain has yet to fall, there is no reason to believe that the play has not begun.

Bicameralism in Lesotho: A review of the powers and composition of the second chamber

Law Democracy & Development ◽

10.17159/2077-4907/2019/ldd.v23a2 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 23 ◽

Author(s):

Hoolo 'Nyane

Keyword(s):

Prime Minister ◽

Legislative Process ◽

Parliamentary Democracy ◽

Common Cause ◽

National Assembly ◽

Parliamentary System ◽

History Of ◽

Considerable Controversy ◽

The Government ◽

Meaningful Role

ABSTRACT Lesotho has a bicameral parliamentary system based on the British model. While the National Assembly is clearly a representative House elected by the citizenry, the purpose, structure and legislative powers of the Senate as the Second Chamber have been a matter of considerable controversy throughout the history of parliamentary democracy in the country. The National Assembly generally has the upper hand not only in the legislative process but also in the broader parliamentary system - it chooses the Prime Minister, it places its confidence in the government and it can withdraw such confidence. The fact that the model generally gives the National Assembly the upper hand is a matter of common cause. What is in question, though, is the nature and extent of the limitation of the powers of the Senate in terms of the Constitution. This article investigates this question and contends that the composition of, and restrictions on, the Senate need to be reviewed in order to enable the Chamber to play a meaningful role in Lesotho's parliamentary democracy . Key words: Constitution of Lesotho, Bicameralism, Senate, National Assembly, Powers of the Second Chamber

KOALISI DAN PENGELOLAAN KOALISI, PADA PEMERINTAHAN JOKO WIDODO-JUSUF KALLA

Jurnal Sosial dan Humaniora ◽

10.47313/ppl.v3i6.470 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 3 (6) ◽

Author(s):

Efriza Efriza

Keyword(s):

Political Parties ◽

House Of Representatives ◽

Party Systems ◽

Coalition Government ◽

Political Market ◽

Institutional Competition ◽

The Government ◽

The Relationship ◽

Presidential Systems ◽

<pre>This paper discusses the relationship between the President and the House of Representatives and the coalition government based on the three years of President Joko Widodo (Jokowi), who was trapped in inter-institutional competition as a consequence of a mixture of presidential and multi-party systems.Initialy, President Jokowi has the desire to realize a coalition based on ideology and the same program (consensus coalition) between political parties, but the reality, it is difficult to make it happen in government, finally President Jokowi re-elected a coalition of “all parties”. Using some of the basics of Scott Mainwaring and David Altman about presidential and multiparty combination systems and coalitions in presidential systems, complemented by several Coalitions. Then, complete the results of Otto Kirchheimer on Catch All Party, to outline the transformation of the party in this modern era. Accompanied by discussions on political parties in Indonesia, based on Yasraf Amir Piliang's description of political nomadism. Based on the facts and outcomes, a combination of presidential and multiparty systems and the government's management of government by President Jokowi, which manages a "fat" coalition with accommodative leadership and transactional performances. Matters relating to the harmonious relationship between the President and the House of Representatives with the consequence that the President is committed to realizing an unconditional coalition and not for the power-seats. Coalition management can be done because the choice of the party that develops as a supporter of the government is also based not only on the need for political imagery in order to encourage electoral in the political market, but also in the spirit of the party.</pre><pre> </pre><pre>Keywords: Presidential System, Coalition Government, the President-Parliament Relations, Leadership Jokowi </pre>

Some Issues of the Relationship of the Judicial Systems of the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Republic of Karakalpakstan

Bulletin of Science and Practice ◽

10.33619/2414-2948/55/32 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 6 (6) ◽

pp. 244-251 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

G. Berdimuratova

Keyword(s):

Rule Of Law ◽

Separation Of Powers ◽

The Rule Of Law ◽

The Republic ◽

The Government ◽

Relationship Of ◽

Principle Of Legality ◽

The Relationship ◽

Mechanism Of Separation ◽

Judicial Systems

This work is devoted to the consideration of the constitutional directions of interaction and interdependence of the judiciary of the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Republic of Karakalpakstan. As a result of studying the issues under consideration, the author concludes that the importance and significance of the role and place of the judicial branch of the government in the mechanism of separation of powers is precisely in ensuring the rule of law, avoiding violations of the principle of legality and the rule of law based on it.