6. Special duty problems: public bodies

2021 ◽  
pp. 138-187
Author(s):  
Kirsty Horsey ◽  
Erika Rackley

This chapter explains what happens when a public body owes a private law duty of care to an individual who claims against it in negligence. It remains the case that public bodies will be liable where the negligent exercise of their powers makes a situation worse than it already was. The discussions cover the general exclusionary rule; the current state of the law; the background to D v East Berkshire [2005]; rules for claims brought against the emergency services (including the police) and armed forces; other types of public body; and new types of claims: education-based claims and ‘social’ claims.

Tort Law ◽  
2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kirsty Horsey ◽  
Erika Rackley

This chapter explains what happens when a public body owes a private law duty of care to an individual who claims against it in negligence. The discussions cover the general exclusionary rule; the current state of the law; the background to D v East Berkshire; rules for claims brought against the emergency services (including the police) and armed forces; other types of public body; and new types of claims: education-based claims and ‘social’ claims.


Tort Law ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 137-185
Author(s):  
Kirsty Horsey ◽  
Erika Rackley

This chapter explains what happens when a public body owes a private law duty of care to an individual who claims against it in negligence. It remains the case that public bodies will be liable where the negligent exercise of their powers makes a situation worse than it already was. The discussions cover the general exclusionary rule; the current state of the law; the background to D v East Berkshire [2005]; rules for claims brought against the emergency services (including the police) and armed forces; other types of public body; and new types of claims: education-based claims and ‘social’ claims.


2019 ◽  
pp. 93-126
Author(s):  
Kirsty Horsey ◽  
Erika Rackley

Public bodies have extensive powers to act for the public benefit but often have limited resources. Difficult decisions have to be made, and if those decisions are wholly unreasonable they may be corrected by judicial review; that is, by public law remedies. A more difficult question is whether failure by a public body provides a private right of action to someone harmed (or not benefited) by the decision. While the general principles of duty of care apply (that is, proximity and whether it is fair and just to impose liability), there are several limitations on the liability of public bodies in negligence. This chapter first discusses the special common law principles applicable to the exercise of discretion by public bodies. It then considers specific problematic areas, including the difficulties involved in establishing duties of care by the emergency services before examining the effect of the Human Rights Act 1998 in establishing obligations owed directly by the state.


Author(s):  
Kirsty Horsey ◽  
Erika Rackley

Public bodies have extensive powers to act for the public benefit but often have limited resources. Difficult decisions have to be made, and if those decisions are wholly unreasonable they may be corrected by judicial review; that is, by public law remedies. A more difficult question is whether failure by a public body provides a private right of action to someone harmed (or not benefited) by the decision. While the general principles of duty of care apply (that is, proximity and whether it is fair and just to impose liability), there are several limitations on the liability of public bodies in negligence. This chapter first discusses the special common law principles applicable to the exercise of discretion by public bodies. It then considers specific problematic areas, including the difficulties involved in establishing duties of care by the emergency services before examining the effect of the Human Rights Act 1998 in establishing obligations owed directly by the state.


2021 ◽  
pp. 96-131
Author(s):  
Kirsty Horsey ◽  
Erika Rackley

Public bodies have extensive powers to act for the public benefit but often have limited resources. Difficult decisions have to be made, and if those decisions are wholly unreasonable they may be corrected by judicial review; that is, by public law remedies. A more difficult question is whether failure by a public body provides a private right of action to someone harmed (or not benefited) by the decision. While the general principles of duty of care apply (that is, proximity and whether it is fair and just to impose liability), there are several limitations on the liability of public bodies in negligence. This chapter first discusses the special common law principles applicable to the exercise of discretion by public bodies. It then considers specific problematic areas, including the difficulties involved in establishing duties of care by the emergency services before examining the effect of the Human Rights Act 1998 in establishing obligations owed directly by the state.


2021 ◽  
pp. 188-216
Author(s):  
Kirsty Horsey ◽  
Erika Rackley

This chapter explains when and how the courts have found that a duty of care should be owed by defendants for purely economic loss. This differs from ‘consequential’ economic loss, where financial loss is suffered as a secondary consequence of another harm, such as personal injury or property damage. The tort of negligence distinguishes between these, using duty of care as a device to control whether and when claimants will be able to recover their pure economic losses. The discussions cover the meaning of ‘pure’ economic loss; exceptions to the exclusionary rule; claims for pure economic loss in negligence before Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1990]; and extended applications of the principles established in Hedley Byrne v Heller [1963].


Legal Studies ◽  
1996 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 387-416
Author(s):  
Carl F Stychin

In 1995, the highest courts in two Commonwealth jurisdictions - Canada and Australia - squarely faced the issue of the liability of builders of defective and, in the case of the Canadian Supreme Court, dangerous premises in tort.’ The determination in both cases that the builders were liable to the remote purchasers for the cost of repair, based on a duty of care owed to them, can be contrasted to the current state of tort law in this country dealing with defective and dangerous premises. In fact, the articulation of the reasons why a duty of care was imposed in these cases - as reflecting considerations both of principle and policy - provides a more compelling analysis than has been seen to date in the British law of negligence.


Author(s):  
John Gardner

This chapter explores the sense in which the duties of the law of torts and the law of contract may be said to be ‘relational’. It takes a stand against the hyper-relationalism of many writings on private law, and the hypo-relationalism of others. It does so in two moves. First, it introduces the idea of a ‘strictly relational’ duty, which is a duty that one has for the reason that one is in a certain relationship. The second move goes further to argue that private law duties need not be and often are not strictly relational. They are only ‘loosely relational’. The distinction between these moves is explored and refined by reflecting on the duty of care in the law of negligence, and its modern history. Finally, this chapter considers the import, but also the theoretical dispensability, of rights-talk in private law.


2021 ◽  
pp. 102-137
Author(s):  
Kirsty Horsey ◽  
Erika Rackley

This chapter begins by explaining the meaning of psychiatric harm. It then discusses the general exclusionary rule; the distinction between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ victims; and other circumstances where the law recognises victims of psychiatric harms as having a claim in negligence (rescuers, involuntary participants, communicators of shocking news, self-harm by the defendant and ‘assumption of responsibility’ cases). Though initially psychiatric harm was recoverable only if accompanied by physical injury, it is now clear that the claimant can recover for pure psychiatric harm so long as it is a recognised psychiatric illness. It is not, therefore, possible to recover in the tort of negligence for mere grief, anxiety or distress.


Tort Law ◽  
2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kirsty Horsey ◽  
Erika Rackley

This chapter explains when and how the courts have found that a duty of care should be owed by defendants for purely economic loss. The discussions cover the meaning of ‘pure’ economic loss; exceptions to the exclusionary rule; claims for pure economic loss in negligence before Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1990]; and extended applications of the principles established in Hedley Byrne v Heller [1963].


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