16. Trespass to land and nuisance

This chapter considers two ‘land torts’: trespass to land and private nuisance. Trespass to land protects a person in possession of land against direct invasion of his property. The right to sue includes not only those with a proprietorial interest in the land, such as owners and tenants, but also those who have exclusive occupation such as squatters. The fact that any invasion of land, however minute and whether it causes damage or not, is a trespass, indicates that the primary function of this tort is to protect rights in property, rather than simply to provide compensation. The chapter continues by distinguishing between public and private nuisance. It then discusses the interests protected in private nuisance; the standard of reasonable user; the person(s) liable for nuisance; remoteness of damage; statutory authority and planning permission; and the effect of the Human Rights Act 1998 on nuisance claims.

15. Defamation

This chapter focuses on defamation which enables an individual (or, more controversially, a company) to prevent the publication of, or recover damages for, public statements which make, or are likely to make, people think less of them. At its heart is a balance between freedom of speech (protected under the European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights Act 1998) and the interests of an individual in the protection of their reputation. The chapter examines the Defamation Act 2013 and explains who can sue for, and be liable in, defamation, when a statement is ‘defamatory’ and innuendo. It also considers the defences of truth, honest opinion, publication in a matter of public interest and privilege. It concludes with a discussion of damages for defamation.

14. Invasion of privacy

This chapter discusses different aspects of privacy. It shows that there is no general common law right to protection from invasion of privacy (the so-called ‘right to be let alone’), but that limitation has been largely subverted by the new law in the second section on the protection of personal information and the reasonable expectation of privacy that has developed significantly in recent years. This shows the potential power of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the European Convention on Human Rights, and is the subject of considerable controversy, especially in relation to the protection of celebrity privacy. The final section considers remedies in privacy cases.

13. Intentional interferences with the person

This chapter considers intentional interferences with the person, including the so-called trespass to the person torts, the tort in Wilkinson v Downton and the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. Trespass is an ancient set of wrongs which mainly deals with the direct, and usually intentional, invasion of a claimant’s interest in his person, his land or his goods. It is the right itself which is protected, and not just the freedom from resulting damage, and much of the law of trespass is the basis of civil liberties today. This chapter considers the torts of assault, battery and false imprisonment, together with various defences. The principal use today of these torts relates not so much to recovery of compensation but to the establishment of a right, or a recognition that the defendant acted unlawfully. The chapter then considers the tort in Wilkinson v Downton which provides a remedy in cases of indirect intentional infliction of distress and the statutory tort of harassment (Protection from Harassment Act 1997).

12. Breach of statutory duty

This chapter discusses liability for breach of statutory duty. There may be cases where a statute renders a certain activity a crime, and the law imposes an additional civil liability towards a person harmed by the act. While some statutes state this directly, most statutes make no mention of potential civil liability, but nevertheless liability may be imposed if the court believes that Parliament impliedly intended there to be a remedy. Not only are there difficulties about when a civil duty will be spelt out of a criminal or regulatory statute, but there are also problems about the role and function of the tort of statutory duty.

3. Special duty problems: omissions and acts of third parties

This chapter discusses the problem of when a duty of care arises in respect of negligent omissions, or for the actions of a third party. The common law takes the view that it would be too great a burden to impose liability upon a person for a mere omission, or for the actions of others. Despite this, duties can in fact be imposed in various ways, all of which focus on the reliance of the claimant upon the defendant. This can come about either by the previous conduct of the defendant, which induces reliance by the claimant that the defendant will continue to act in that way, or by reliance which comes out of a relationship of dependence between the parties. As regards third parties, a duty may arise where the defendant has control over or responsibility for the third party’s actions.

11. Product liability

This chapter deals with damage caused by defective products. It considers two separate legal regimes. The first is the ordinary law of negligence, and the second is the system of strict liability introduced by the Consumer Protection Act 1987, as required by a European Directive (85/374/EEC). The latter is limited to personal injuries and to damage to private property, so there are still many cases where a claimant has to rely on negligence. Also, the Act applies only to certain kinds of defendants (‘producers’), and a claimant will need to use negligence if, for example, he is injured by a defectively repaired product. One important point is that both systems apply only to damage to goods other than the defective product and not to damage which the defective product causes to itself: that is a matter solely for the law of contract.

9. Defences to negligence

This chapter considers three defences. It begins with a discussion of the principle of contributory negligence. It presents cases showing that the rules for establishing contributory negligence on the part of the claimant are not the same as the rules for establishing liability for negligence on the part of the defendant. It then turns to voluntary assumption of the risk or consent (sometimes referred to as volenti non fit injuria) which provides a complete defence to an action. The defence is based on the view that a person cannot sue if he consents to the risk of damage. Finally, the chapter considers the defence of illegality, which arises when the tortious action is in the context of the claimant’s and/or defendant’s participation in an unlawful act.

8. Causation and remoteness of damage

This chapter discusses the concepts of causation and remoteness of damage. Once it has been shown that a defendant owed the claimant a duty to take care and was in breach of that duty, liability can still be avoided if it can be shown that the breach did not cause the damage, or that the damage was too remote a consequence of the breach. Causation is initially determined on the balance of probabilities—a ‘but for’ test. A causation problem usually occurs when we look at the damage and see that it was actually caused by a number of different factors either combining together to bring about the damage, or each being sufficient in and of itself to have done so but where it cannot be determined which factor actually caused the harm. A remoteness problem can arise in two different situations: where the claimant is a foreseeable claimant and the damage has in fact been caused by the defendant’s act, but where the damage is either unpredictable in extent or unpredictable in nature.

10. Occupiers’ liability

This chapter focuses on the liability of an occupier to persons who are injured on their premises and the Occupiers’ Liability Acts of 1957 and 1984. The discussion considers the relationship between occupiers’ liability and negligence, what makes someone an ‘occupier’ or ‘visitor’, the duty owed to visitors and to trespassers and other non-visitors, and the exclusion of liability. The basis of liability is fault, and, to visitors at least, the duty differs little from the requirements of negligence, but there are sufficient differences to make it subject to a special chapter. These differences arise partly for historical reasons, but also because of the need to balance the rights of the occupier to deal with their property as they wish and the need to protect entrants from injury.