Communication Through Law?

This commentary raises four critical questions for Shiffrin’s account of democratic law. First, why does our duty to communicate recognition for others as moral equals ground a special duty to our fellow citizens to cooperate together in a democracy? Second, whose messages exactly does democratic law communicate—is it the messages of individual citizens or the messages of the state as a corporate agent? Third, why does discharging our communicative duties require us to play an equal role in our political system, especially given Shiffrin’s endorsement of the idea that common law counts as a form of democratic co-authorship? And finally, how does the state’s pursuit of discretionary interests, for example in the promotion of a national culture or the preservation of fetal life, help us to send morally valuable messages to one another?

4. Special duty problems: psychiatric harm

This chapter discusses the ‘special duty issue’ that arises when a person has suffered psychiatric harm as a result of the defendant’s negligence. This issue has an interesting history, for it was thought at first that a claimant could only succeed if he or she was within the range of physical impact. In other words, only the ‘primary’ victim could sue. Liability was later extended to secondary victims; that is, where the claimant was not at risk of physical injury, but saw or heard the accident which caused the shock with his or her own unaided senses.

3. Special duty problems: omissions and acts of third parties

This chapter discusses the problem of when a duty of care arises in respect of negligent omissions, or for the actions of a third party. The common law takes the view that it would be too great a burden to impose liability upon a person for a mere omission, or for the actions of others. Despite this, duties can in fact be imposed in various ways, all of which focus on the reliance of the claimant upon the defendant. This can come about either by the previous conduct of the defendant, which induces reliance by the claimant that the defendant will continue to act in that way, or by reliance which comes out of a relationship of dependence between the parties. As regards third parties, a duty may arise where the defendant has control over or responsibility for the third party’s actions.

5. Special duty problems: public bodies

Public bodies have extensive powers to act for the public benefit but often have limited resources. Difficult decisions have to be made, and if those decisions are wholly unreasonable they may be corrected by judicial review; that is, by public law remedies. A more difficult question is whether failure by a public body provides a private right of action to someone harmed (or not benefited) by the decision. While the general principles of duty of care apply (that is, proximity and whether it is fair and just to impose liability), there are several limitations on the liability of public bodies in negligence. This chapter first discusses the special common law principles applicable to the exercise of discretion by public bodies. It then considers specific problematic areas, including the difficulties involved in establishing duties of care by the emergency services before examining the effect of the Human Rights Act 1998 in establishing obligations owed directly by the state.

6. Special duty problems: economic loss

This chapter deals with negligence that causes only economic loss. The basic rule is that a person may sue for economic loss which is consequent on physical loss which that person has suffered, but may not if they have only suffered economic loss by itself. There may be exceptions to this rule where there is sufficient proximity between the parties, and one element in this may be reliance by the one on the other. Though there is a general rule that no liability can arise in respect of ‘pure’ economic losses, there is also a broader exception that can arise when such loss happens as a result of a statement being made (rather than an act done), developed from the famous case of Hedley Byrne v Heller.

7. Special duty problems: economic loss

This chapter explains when and how the courts have found that a duty of care should be owed by defendants for purely economic loss. This differs from ‘consequential’ economic loss, where financial loss is suffered as a secondary consequence of another harm, such as personal injury or property damage. The tort of negligence distinguishes between these, using duty of care as a device to control whether and when claimants will be able to recover their pure economic losses. The discussions cover the meaning of ‘pure’ economic loss; exceptions to the exclusionary rule; claims for pure economic loss in negligence before Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1990]; and extended applications of the principles established in Hedley Byrne v Heller [1963].

6. Special duty problems: public bodies

This chapter explains what happens when a public body owes a private law duty of care to an individual who claims against it in negligence. It remains the case that public bodies will be liable where the negligent exercise of their powers makes a situation worse than it already was. The discussions cover the general exclusionary rule; the current state of the law; the background to D v East Berkshire [2005]; rules for claims brought against the emergency services (including the police) and armed forces; other types of public body; and new types of claims: education-based claims and ‘social’ claims.

5. Special duty problems: psychiatric harm

This chapter begins by explaining the meaning of psychiatric harm. It then discusses the general exclusionary rule; the distinction between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ victims; and other circumstances where the law recognises victims of psychiatric harms as having a claim in negligence (rescuers, involuntary participants, communicators of shocking news, self-harm by the defendant and ‘assumption of responsibility’ cases). Though initially psychiatric harm was recoverable only if accompanied by physical injury, it is now clear that the claimant can recover for pure psychiatric harm so long as it is a recognised psychiatric illness. It is not, therefore, possible to recover in the tort of negligence for mere grief, anxiety or distress.

4. Special duty problems: omissions and acts of third parties

This chapter examines the two separate but closely linked concepts of liability for omissions and for the actions of third parties. The first section considers when and why the courts have established that a duty of care should be owed by defendants when the harm was the result of their omission, and the second explores the situations when a defendant may owe a duty in relation to the action(s) of a third party. Ordinarily you can be liable only for things that you do, but when someone does not do something that they ought to have done a duty might be found. Similarly, while it appears odd that someone may be liable for harms that someone else caused, the courts have nonetheless found that in limited circumstances people who have responsibility for, or control over, others may incur a duty in respect of the harms caused by these third parties.

Tort Law

Tort Law encourages the reader to understand, engage with and critically reflect upon tort law. The book contains five parts. Part I, which is about the tort of negligence, looks at the basic principles of the duty of care and at special duty problems relating to: omissions and acts of third parties, psychiatric harm, public bodies and economic loss. It also covers breach, causation and remoteness, and defences to negligence. Part II considers occupiers’, product and employers’ liability and breach of statutory duty. Part III looks at personal torts and explains trespass to the person, defamation and the invasion of privacy. Part IV concerns land torts and Part V looks at liability (including vicarious liability), damages and limitations.