Investment Protection and Dispute Settlement in Preferential Trade Agreements: A Challenge to BITs?

2009 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 416-433 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Reinisch
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Trade Agreements ◽  
Preferential Trade Agreements ◽  
Preferential Trade ◽  
Investment Protection

Part I Investment Treaties and the Settlement of Investment Disputes: The Framework, 1 Bilateral Investment Treaties and Investment Provisions in Preferential Trade Agreements: Recent Developments in Investment Rule-making

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Echandi Roberto
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Trade Agreements ◽  
International Investment ◽  
Preferential Trade Agreements ◽  
Preferential Trade ◽  
Investment Protection ◽  
Investment Treaties ◽  
New Generation ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Rule Making

This chapter argues that investment disputes, particularly those that have arisen in the context of the implementation of NAFTA, have influenced the refinement of the provisions of new generation international investment agreements (IIAs) as well as the inclusion of a series of procedural and substantive innovations. It addresses the main distinction between BITs and investment chapters in preferential trade agreements (PTAs), focusing on the evolution of their respective rationales. It looks at the main features of the new generation of IIAs and explains how such features respond to challenges derived from the interpretation of substantive and procedural provisions included in previous agreements. The discussion is organized under two themes: (i) moving from the original exclusive focus on investment protection towards also promoting liberalization of investment flows; and (ii) the impact of investor-state dispute settlement on investment rule-making.

Untapping the potential of Preferential Trade Agreements to promote forest protection: A comparison on forest-related provisions and their enforcement in the US and EU PTAs

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 127-140
Author(s):  
Yilly Vanessa Pacheco
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Trade Agreements ◽  
Preferential Trade Agreements ◽  
Forest Governance ◽  
Environmental Agreements ◽  
Multilateral Environmental Agreements ◽  
Forest Protection ◽  
Preferential Trade ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Eu

The EU and the US are the actors with the highest number of environmental provisions in their Preferential Trade Agreements. Since 1999, specific rules on forest governance and Sustainable Forest Management have been incorporated in their PTAs. The implementation of such forest-related provisions in PTAs is mostly linked to cooperation among the Parties. However, in cases of noncompliance, PTAs provide for bilateral consultations, the application of the general dispute settlement mechanism, and even trade sanctions. The enforcement approaches differ in the US and the EU PTAs. This study focuses on the question of the potential of PTAs to contribute to forest governance and SFM and analyses the disputes that arose so far. It shows how forest issues may play a key role in negotiating and implementing PTAs, promoting compliance of Multilateral Environmental Agreements, and promoting public participation in environmental matters. The paper concludes that PTAs provide further options to develop and implement International Forest Law beyond the Multilateral Environmental Agreements.

The Evolution of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism in Preferential Trade Agreements [PTAs]: The Case of Indonesia

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 346-374
Author(s):  
I Gusti Ngurah Parikesit WIDIATEDJA
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
Trade Agreements ◽  
Preferential Trade Agreements ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Related Factors ◽  
Preferential Trade ◽  
High Level ◽  
Trade Partners ◽  
Settlement Mechanism

AbstractThe dispute settlement mechanism [DSM] under preferential trade agreements [PTAs] is crucial to ensure adequate implementation and enforcement of commitments among contracting parties. The DSM has evolved from political/diplomatic styles with a low level of legalism to judicial styles with a high level of legalism. Indonesia has also experienced this evolution process in its PTAs. This paper aims to show the evolution of the DSM in Indonesian PTAs, analyzing several related factors behind this trend. The paper argues that the evolution of the DSM from the GATT to WTO, Indonesia's participation in regional trade agreement, that is, ASEAN, the influence of trade partners, the existence of domestic factors, and the ongoing WTO dispute encourage the evolution of the DSM in Indonesian PTAs from political styles to more judicial styles with a high level of legalism.

scholarly journals Safeguards and the perils of preferential trade agreements:Dominican Republic–Safeguard Measures

2014 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 179-227 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHAD P. BOWN ◽  
MARK WU
Keyword(s):  
Dominican Republic ◽  
Dispute Resolution ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Policy Instruments ◽  
Trade Agreements ◽  
Preferential Trade Agreements ◽  
Preferential Trade ◽  
Economic Implications ◽  
Safeguard Measures ◽  
Wto Agreements

AbstractThe legal-economic implications of how WTO members apply an import-restricting safeguard measure become more complex in light of the increasing web of trade concessions undertaken through their preferential trade agreements (PTAs) in addition to their WTO commitments. This paper examines a number of complex issues that arose in the WTO litigation between five new PTA partners through theDominican Republic–Safeguard Measuresdisputes. First, we highlight the difficulties in assessing the extent to which safeguards imposed following a PTA are the result of PTA concessions relative to developments that pre-date or are otherwise unrelated to the PTA. Second, we examine how the WTO Panel resolved a number of previously unanswered questions in the WTO's safeguards jurisprudence that arose in these cases. We suggest that the Panel rightly foreclosed a number of potentially dubious practices that WTO members might otherwise have pursued when using safeguards to circumvent trade concessions. Third, we identify how safeguard-related provisions within a PTA may give rise to constraints that subsequently affect how a country may apply safeguards available under the WTO Agreements, and we describe some implications for PTA design and negotiation. Finally, we analyze the broader implications that arise from the interplay of PTAs, safeguards, and dispute settlement in light of the availability of both relatively substitutable policy instruments and dispute resolution forums.

Trade and Conflicts: Do Preferential Trade Agreements Matter?

2015 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 561-574 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arslan Tariq Rana
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Probit Model ◽  
Economic Sanctions ◽  
Trade Agreements ◽  
Preferential Trade Agreements ◽  
Preferential Trade ◽  
Militarized Disputes ◽  
Security Relations ◽  
Medium Level ◽  
High Level

AbstractA long debate continues whether international trade institutions (specifically preferential trade agreements [PTAs]) affect security relations between states. Contradicting theories and empirical claims are put forward by realists and liberals. The former posit that the institutions are epiphenomenal and possess no power to constrain state behavior whereas the latter claim that the institutions are likely to promote cooperation by supplying forums for consultation, arbitration and adjudication, thus reducing the risk of war between states. This study identifies an important channel through which the legal dimension of trade agreements (hence dispute settlement mechanisms [DSMs] in PTAs) may have pacifying effects on the outbreaks of war. DSMs of PTAs do have strong implications for militarized interstate disputes (MIDs), although not directly, but through low-level of foreign policy disputes, such as economic sanctions. If economic sanctions are believed to escalate to violent conflict, PTA DSMs may reduce the probability of war by mitigating the escalation of economic sanctions. However, the level of legalism differs among DSMs in PTAs. The present study first confirms empirically that sanction disputes escalate to militarized disputes and further, addresses the selection issue by using bivariate probit model. I find a sizeable impact of medium level of legalism reducing the sanctions escalation into war whereas high level of legalism, in which the state sovereignty is limited, do reduce the probability of sanctions but have no impact on war probability. Further, the interstate political cooperation proves to be a strong determinant for highly legalistic PTAs but not in the case of medium level of legalism.

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