Are You Experienced? US Ambassadors and International Crises, 1946–2014

How important are ambassadors in international politics? While a growing body of research stresses the importance of diplomacy in international politics, it remains unclear if individual ambassadors make a significant difference or what attributes make for an effective ambassador. This paper explores these questions through a systematic analysis of 2,730 US ambassadors between 1946 and 2014. The United States is distinctive in that it sends a sizable number of noncareer political appointees to serve as ambassadors. This provides a unique opportunity to examine how an ambassador's experience shapes where they are placed and how they perform. Using various techniques to address selection effects, including matching, I find that the United States is less likely to experience a militarized dispute with a host nation when it is represented by a political ambassador. Moreover, political ambassadors with professional experience in politics or the military, those who are close to the president, and those who are appointed in permissive congressional environments are less likely to experience militarized disputes during their tenure. Individual ambassadors matter, but diplomatic experience alone is not the only attribute that makes for an effective ambassador.

Meaning of International Order and Evidence on Revisionism

“Revisionism” is supposed to mean a rejection of the existing international order. Yet the meaning of international order has been underdeveloped in current research. This chapter delineates this idea, relying on the English school’s writings. It distinguishes the primary and secondary institutions of international order and introduces a collection of indicators to track and measure Chinese and US commitment to two aspects of international order: one that is norm-based and the other that is rule- or institution-based. These indicators encompass these countries’ official pronouncements, their involvement in wars and militarized disputes, their engagement in international political economy, and their participation in international organizations and multilateral treaties. The evidence shows that, contrary to customary depiction, the United States has become more revisionist over time and according to some measures, more so than China.

Leaders, Generals, Juntas: The Military in Politics and International Conflict Initiation

International conflict—war, crises, international disputes, and rivalries between states—has a clear influence on the military’s role in politics and vice versa. Given that the military is the primary instrument for defending the state from conventional military threats, international conflict has been an early focus of the civil–military relations literature. Generally, very high levels of involvement in politics—for example, coups, military rule, military officers in high-level government positions—are associated with a greater propensity to initiate international conflict on the part of states. However, there is disagreement as to the reasons for this pattern—for example, preferences for aggression on the part of a politically active military, diversionary incentives for a coup-threatened civilian leader, or institutional pathologies brought on by shared civil–military power are all proffered as possible explanations. Politically active militaries tend to do poorly in conflict. There are two reasons for this. The first is the dysfunction endemic in a military that splits its time between politics and proficiency in arms—as opposed to one that specializes in defense. The second reason is that when the politically active military poses a risk of coup to the political leadership of the state, the latter will often engage in such “coup-proofing” practices as purges, onerous command and control measures, the reshuffling of commanders, and the build-up of security organizations intended to offset the military. These measures not only make it harder for the military to stage a coup, they also make it harder for the military to defend the state. Although military involvement in politics makes “acute” conflict—war, militarized disputes, or crises—more likely, these types of international conflict tend to lead to reduced levels of political involvement by the military. War or a crisis can make a coup more difficult as the military is moved away from the centers of political power. International conflict—especially when it goes poorly—also can lead to reform and professionalization within the military, which decreases the appetite for political involvement. At the same time, indicators of a more severe “chronic” threat environment—hostile neighbors, unfavorable geography, or long-standing international rivalries—can make military intrusions into politics more likely.

Ideology, Institutions, Power, and Militarized Disputes

This chapter examines if and how intergovernmental organization (IGO) memberships shape participation in militarized interstate disputes. Theorists have argued that IGOs solve informational problems, socialize states, or constitute democratic communities that prevent a resort to violence. The distributive ideological approach suggests that IGOs institutionalize ideologically cohesive coalitions that ameliorate conflicts with insiders but can exacerbate conflict with outsiders. The effect of IGOs on militarized disputes should be present only if the distributional stakes have global ideological implications as opposed to when disputes are purely over particularistic stakes, such as territory. Regression analyses support this insight. Both ideological differences and IGO membership patterns affect dispute participation in dyads that include a major power but not among neighboring states or states involved in a territorial dispute. One implication is that IGO memberships affect the distribution of militarized disputes, but it is unclear whether IGOs in the aggregate reduce militarized conflict.

What’s So Peaceful about Asian Peace?

Previous work on an Asian peace has been imprecise on where, when, and why it occurs. This study examines different levels of state-based peace starting with the absence of war; unlike other treatments, however, we examine the incidence of civil war as well as the traditional interstate war. We then consider a more stringent threshold for peace, focusing on the absence or diminution of violent conflicts short of war, specifically incidents of militarized disputes and lesser conflicts. Finally, we look a broader conception of peace (“positive peace”) and examine all state relationships in Asia along a peace scale, which ranges from serious rivalries to negative peace to integrated security communities. Our findings indicate the strongest evidence for Asian peace with respect to avoiding interstate war. Nevertheless, there are significant conflicts involving violence and the threat of military force that persist in the region. A number of rivalries, many of them long-standing, continue to raise the specter of war. In addition, positive peace in Asia is rare for interstate relations and isolated to a few states for internal peace.

Militarized Disputes, Uncertainty, and Leader Tenure

How do new leaders impact crisis negotiations? We argue that opposing states know less about such a leader’s resolve over the issues at stake. To fully appreciate the consequences, we develop a multi-period bargaining model of negotiations. In equilibrium, as a proposer becomes close to certain of its opponent’s type, the duration and intensity of war goes to 0. We then test whether increase in leader tenure decrease the duration of militarized interstate disputes. Our estimates indicate that crises involving new leaders are 25.3 percent more likely to last one month than crises involving leaders with four years of tenure. Moreover, such conflicts are more likely to result in higher fatality levels. These results further indicate that leader tenure is a useful proxy for uncertainty.