Diffusion and Decentralized Bargaining in International Organizations: Evidence from Mercosur's Dispute Settlement Mechanism

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tobias Lenz
Keyword(s):  
International Organizations ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Diffusion Processes ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Institutional Convergence ◽  
Dispute Settlement System ◽  
Decentralized Bargaining ◽  
Settlement Mechanism

Abstract How and with what effects do institutions diffuse between international organizations (IOs)? An emerging literature extends a key insight of the study of diffusion processes among states to the international level, establishing that the adoption of institutions in IOs is regularly conditioned by the choices of other IOs. Yet, this literature neglects a key contextual difference between the two settings: unlike in the hierarchically structured organizations that have dominated the literature on diffusion, institutional creation, and change in IOs are the result of decentralized bargaining among sovereign governments. This paper develops a heuristic model that shows how diffusion between IOs shapes decision-making within them through its impact on the institutional preferences of individual governments. The model establishes that, unlike in diffusion processes among states, convergence is an unlikely outcome of diffusion between IOs. By implication, studies that take institutional convergence as their starting point are likely to underestimate the pervasiveness of diffusion effects. I demonstrate these arguments with a case study of the establishment of a regional dispute settlement system in Mercosur, a regional organization in Latin America.

EUROPEAN UNION IN WTO’S DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (XX) ◽  
pp. 33-49
Author(s):  
Małgorzata Czermińska
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
World Trade Organisation ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Settlement System ◽  
Dispute Settlement System ◽  
Trade Conflicts ◽  
Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Descriptive Method

The World Trade Organisation (WTO) serves as a forum for co-operation, currently for as many as 164 countries, and in addition, it allows for the resolution, also amicably, of trade conflicts between parties, consequently, settling disputes between them. One of essential provisions of the Uruguay Round (UR) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) included the introduction of a new dispute settlement mechanism, that is to say, the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), which became effective on 1 January 1995. Member States of the European Union were not only actively involved in developing the rules of the international trade system, but they also influenced, to a large extent, the form of both such rules and of ongoing trade negotiations, as well as they assumed and still assume responsibility for the final arrangements. Hence, their role in the multilateral trade system is both active and passive. This paper aims to demonstrate the functioning of the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism and show the role which the European Union serves in this system. The Article employs an analytical and descriptive method. It draws on sources from the national and international literature and WTO’s databases.

“Constitutionalization” and Dispute Settlement in the wto: National Security as an Issue of Competence

1999 ◽  
Vol 93 (2) ◽  
pp. 424-451 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hannes L. Schloemann ◽  
Stefan Ohlhoff
Keyword(s):  
National Security ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Uruguay Round ◽  
Significant Shift ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Economic Relations ◽  
Trade Law ◽  
International Trade Law ◽  
Dispute Settlement System ◽  
Settlement Mechanism

The 1994 Uruguay Round revision of the dispute settlement mechanism under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization (GATT/WTO) has made it a forum both for traditional trade issues and for interests ranging from environmental protection to national security. The limits of GATT jurisdiction have become important issues of dispute settlement within the WTO, especially as the emergence of the WTO and its rule-based, quasi-obligatory dispute settlement system has spurred a significant shift toward legalism. Constitutional structures are developing much faster in international trade law than in any other area of international law and, in the aftermath of the Uruguay Round, are integrating ever more aspects of economic relations among states. Within the WTO regime the dispute settlement mechanism established by the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) plays a prominent role in enforcing its rules and reconciling a wide array of the members’ interests. The limits of the reach of the dispute settlement mechanism, given its obligatory character, are, to a certain degree, the limits of the constitutionalization of the organization as a whole.

Enforcing WTO Law

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonello Tancredi
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Settlement System ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Legal Nature ◽  
Dispute Settlement System ◽  
Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Wto Agreements ◽  
The Eu

This chapter provides a brief analysis of the enforcement tools foreseen in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. It focuses in particular on some of the peculiarities which differentiate them from the EU legal system. As the analysis shows, the relevance of reciprocity and post-litigation negotiations between States influences the legal nature of the WTO dispute settlement system, which today remains to a large extent a mixed or hybrid system. This contrasts one of the mantras diffused in the legal scholarship immediately after the entry into force of the Uruguay Round Agreements. It also represents a vehicle for the potential fragmentation of the multilateral legal framework governing international trade, which contributes to undermining the idea of uniformity of the obligations arising under the WTO Agreements for all Members.

scholarly journals What Drives Institutional Reforms in Regional Organisations? Diffusion, Contextual Conditions, and the Modular Design of ASEAN

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 173-196 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anja Jetschke
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
Modular Design ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Institutional Reforms ◽  
The Us ◽  
Regional Organisations ◽  
Available Information ◽  
Settlement Mechanism

AbstractWhat drives institutional reforms in regional organisations? And what explains the institutional design of ASEAN? Despite many differences, conventional approaches to the institutional design of regional organisations more generally and ASEAN in particular are united in regarding them as either determined by factors endogenous to the region − such as varying state interests or collective norms − or as exogenously driven, most importantly by hegemonic states like the US or China. This article offers a diffusion account of ASEAN's institutional design. Building on a more recent strand in the diffusion literature emphasising that diffusion rarely leads to convergence, the article makes two genuine contributions. First, it argues that members of regional organisations engage in modular adoption: they select institutional templates from a variety of regional as well as international organisations thereby taking advantage of available information on the costs and benefits of alternative institutions. Second, it argues that contextual conditions and cognitive priors influence what templates are chosen. The argument will be illustrated with a case study on ASEAN's adoption of a single market and a dispute settlement mechanism. Finally, and contrary to arguments that institutional borrowing might increase the expectations-deliverance gap within regional organisations, it argues that if conducted consistently, modular adoption can lead to substantial innovation and success.

Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages (Complainant: United States of America)

2019 ◽  
Vol 181 ◽  
pp. 436-487
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
International Agreements ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Settlement System ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Trade Relationship ◽  
Dispute Settlement System ◽  
Settlement Mechanism

Economics, trade and finance — World Trade Organization — General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade — Relationship with other international agreements — North American Free Trade Agreement — Measures allegedly taken contrary to GATT said to be countermeasures responding to violation of NAFTA — WTO dispute settlement mechanismInternational tribunals — Jurisdiction — Discretion not to exercise jurisdiction — Whether inherent power — WTO dispute settlement system — Whether Panel empowered to decline to exercise jurisdiction — Whether dispute between two States parties to NAFTA should be heard by arbitral tribunal under NAFTA rather than by panel under the WTO Dispute Settlement UnderstandingReprisals and countermeasures — Nature and scope — Relationship between countermeasures under international law and measures to secure compliance with laws and regulations within the WTO — Whether falling under GATT Article XX(d)Treaties — Interpretation — Effect — Interpretation of GATT Article XX(d) — Relationship between GATT and other international agreements

scholarly journals MEDIATION IN THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM UNDER THE EU- UKRAINE ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT 2014

2020 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Resolution ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Settlement System ◽  
Association Agreement ◽  
Arbitration Procedure ◽  
Dispute Settlement System ◽  
The Right ◽  
Settlement Mechanism ◽  
The Eu

The article examines the system of dispute settlement under the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU of 2014, which may arise from the lack of a unified approach to interpreting the provisions of the Agreement or fair use, and due to the improper performance of obligations by one of the Parties. Each individual dispute resolution mechanism is described. In particular, a general dispute settlement mechanism extending to the provisions of the Agreement on Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area between Ukraine and the EU (DCFTA), and a dispute settlement mechanism within the DCFTA, implemented through consultation, arbitration or arbitration, are explored. It is stated that the general dispute settlement mechanism is based on a "traditional" diplomatic approach, in which the Association Council, consisting of members of the Government of Ukraine and members of the European Commission, is a key dispute resolution body. The DCFTA dispute settlement mechanism is more complex. Attention is drawn to the fact that the consultation mechanism, which by its content provides for negotiation, can act as a separate dispute settlement procedure or as a stage preceding the arbitration procedure or mediation, if the parties failed to reach a mutually agreed solution. The arbitration procedure involves the consideration of the dispute by a panel of three independent arbitrators whose decisions are binding on the parties. If the respondent Party does not comply with the decision and does not offer temporary compensation, the other Party has the right to apply temporary protection measures, which stipulate the suspension of its obligations. Another mechanism for dispute resolution is mediation, which aims to facilitate a mutually agreed solution through comprehensive and expedited procedures through a mediator. The features of mediation in the dispute settlement system under this Agreement are identified. Attention is drawn to the benefits of mediation over other dispute resolution tools provided by the UA. In particular, unlike arbitration, any dispute concerning the provisions of Title IV of the AA may be the subject of mediation. In addition, the mediator does not have the right to submit a final dispute resolution to the parties compared to the arbitrators. Its purpose is to facilitate the adoption of a mutually agreed decision taken by the Parties as a result of their independent consent. Such a feature makes the mediation mechanism a more attractive and flexible way of resolving a conflict between the Parties, which is not always ready to commit itself to a legally binding solution. In addition, jointly finding a mutually beneficial solution can help solve problems in interpreting and implementing the terms of the agreement in a more effective way.

Impartiality and Independence of Arbitrators in International Arbitration: Issue Conflicts as Grounds for Disqualification with Special Regard to ICSID Arbitrations

2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 535-601
Author(s):  
Pablo Agustín Alonso
Keyword(s):  
Research Method ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Conflicts Of Interest ◽  
Case Study Research ◽  
International Investment ◽  
Legal Issues ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Settlement Mechanism

The grounds for disqualification of arbitrators provided by most arbitration rules refer to the relationships of arbitrators with the parties or the subject matter of the dispute – i.e., issue conflicts. However, some of those rules used to be vague or unclear, which resulted in incomplete arbitrators’ disclosures, unfunded challenge requests and awards that lacked homogeneity. Following a case-study research method, the paper focuses on the ICSID investor-State dispute settlement mechanism. It analyses and compares the ICSID Convention and Arbitration Rules, the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in light of challenge awards. The paper stresses the relevance of arbitrators’ disclosure duty and the importance of clearly defining the scope and content of ‘impartiality’ and ‘independence’ as a guidance for parties and deciding authorities when raising or deciding upon a challenge request. In particular, the study aims to show how international investment arbitrations deal with issue conflicts as grounds for disqualification, by analyzing their main causes: multiple appointments of arbitrators, similar legal issues to be decided and permission to serve both as counsel and arbitrator.

Cotton-4 and the Cotton Subsidies Issue: A Litmus Test for the WTO’s Benefits to Least-Developed Countries

2013 ◽  
pp. 852-888
Author(s):  
Amanda Pamela Dakouré
Keyword(s):  
Trade Liberalization ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Least Developed Countries ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Trading System ◽  
Litmus Test ◽  
Central Pillar ◽  
Settlement Mechanism

The World Trade Organization’s primary purpose is to promote trade liberalization for the benefit of all its members. Being a self-enforcing trading system, the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) is its central pillar. Despite critics praising the DSM for its efficiency, the aim of this article is to demonstrate that litigation is not always an option for the WTO’s least-developed members. Through a case study of the cotton issue this article will analyze the efficiency of the WTO for its least-developed members. Part I of the article will set out why the issue of cotton is the perfect paradigm to examine how the WTO’s agriculture trade liberalization can benefit its least-developed members. Part II will examine the Brazil-US Upland Cotton Dispute and shed light on its repercussions on a group called Cotton-4. Part III will discuss how Cotton-4 has tried to resolve the cotton issue through negotiations. Finally, part IV will provide least-developed members, such as Cotton-4, with ways around the power inequalities that limit them from fully benefiting from the WTO’s agriculture trade liberalization.

scholarly journals An Empirical Study of China's Participation in the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism: 2001-2010

2011 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 218-246 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei Zhuang
Keyword(s):  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Comprehensive Analysis ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Settlement System ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The World ◽  
Dispute Settlement System ◽  
Settlement Mechanism

On 11 December 2001, China officially became a Member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) after years of negotiations. The paper shows how a major developing country has used the WTO dispute settlement system by examining China’s participation in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism from its entry through 31 December 2010. It provides a comprehensive analysis of the WTO dispute cases in which China has participated as a complainant, a respondent, or a third party.

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