The Common Approach to Article 1: The Scope of Each State’s Obligation to Ensure Respect for the Geneva Conventions

2020 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-115
Author(s):  
Verity Robson
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Good Faith ◽  
Public International Law ◽  
Ordinary Meaning ◽  
Geneva Conventions ◽  
Or Groups ◽  
The Common

Abstract Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 is foundational, but not exceptional: the duty to respect and ensure respect for the Conventions must be considered within the framework of public international law as a whole. The Article obliges each High Contracting Party and its organs to respect the Geneva Conventions, and to ensure respect for these Conventions by the population over which it exercises authority and any other persons or groups whose conduct is attributable to it. This scope is demonstrated by the ordinary meaning of the term, subsequent agreements, subsequent practice and other relevant rules of international law, and confirmed by reference to the travaux preparatoires. In particular, erga omnes status does not affect it. As a matter of good faith performance of the Conventions, each High Contracting Party also has a duty not to encourage violations by others. Common Article 1 does not require, as some authors have argued, the prevention or termination of breaches of the Geneva Conventions by other parties to conflict, but High Contracting Parties may choose to take steps toward doing so, as a matter of policy.

Intentional Citizenship and Historical Wrongs

2021 ◽  
pp. 185-209
Author(s):  
Avia Pasternak
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Regime Change ◽  
The State ◽  
Common View ◽  
Public International Law ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Common

Chapter 7 examines the problem of the distributive effect with regard to historical wrongdoings. It is commonly thought that present-day states have remedial obligations to the descendants of victims of their historical wrongs. But should present-day citizens pay for wrongs committed by their state in the past? The chapter examines how the intentional participation framework can address this challenge. It shows that citizens who are intentional participants in their state can be expected to accept a nonproportional share of the burdens of their state remedial responsibilities, even for historical wrongs that were committed before their lifetime. However, it also suggests that the state’s internal regime structure affects the scope of intentional citizenship in the state. As it shows, this restriction challenges the common view in public international law, according to which internal regime change does not affect the compensatory liabilities of a state for its past wrongdoings.

scholarly journals Quel droit de la guerre pour l’OTAN?

2005 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 549-569
Author(s):  
Henri Meyrowitz
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Reagan Administration ◽  
Nuclear Deterrence ◽  
Atomic Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Strategy ◽  
Geneva Conventions ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Status ◽  
The Common

The debate which has been going on for many years now among governments of the member countries of NATO on the ratification of the Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, signed in 1977, focusses mainly on the effects of such an instrument on deterrence and nuclear strategy. It is the fear of these effects that France has used to justify her refusal to become part of Protocol I. At the time of the signing of Protocol I, the US and Great Britain made the declaration that the new regulations as introduced by Protocol I "are not intended to have any effect on and do not regulate or prohibit the use of nuclear weapons". It appears that, for a reason which has nothing to do with atomic weapons, the Reagan administration intends not to ask the Senate for ratification of Protocol I. The governments of Italy and Belgium who ratified the Protocol in February and May 1986 respectively, have supplemented their ratification with a declaration similar to that of the two powers. As for the legality of the use of nuclear weapons, the answer must from now on rely on the combination of Protocol I and the "nuclear clause" from the declaration of the two powers and their allies. Hence the status of nuclear weapons in international law is comprised of three elements : a) The first use of nuclear weapons is not, in itself prohibited. - b) This use is subjected to the regulations of the common law of war, as has been "reaffirmed" by Protocol I, and which applies both to conventional and nuclear weapons. - c) The bans and restrictions, as provided for in these regulations, and which mark out the thin bounds which allow for the use of atomic weapons, pertain only to the use of these arms and not to nuclear deterrence.

scholarly journals An Analysis of Principle of Erga Omnes Partes with Special Reference to the Case of Belgium v. Senegal, 2012

2018 ◽  
pp. 193-198
Author(s):  
Prajwol Bickram Rana
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
The State ◽  
Common Interest ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
Public International Law ◽  
The Public ◽  
International Court ◽  
Convention Against Torture ◽  
The Common ◽  
Legal Consequences

In the Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal case), the International Court of Justice for the very fi rst time declared the country's standing before the court on the basis of erga omnes partes as admissible. The court found that Belgium had the standing to claim the responsibility of Senegal for the alleged breach under the Convention against Torture on the basis of being a party of the same convention. The court described erga omnes partes as the obligation that the state party has to all the other state parties of the convention, the court further stated that it arises due to the common interest of the state parties of a convention. Many sitting judges of the court rejected the reasoning of the majority decision and some gave a dissenting opinion. The present paper assesses the concept of erga omnes partes in the public international law and the legal consequences of erga omnes partes in the future development of public international law. The scope of the present paper is limited within the issue of admissibility of the case with the specifi c focus on the concept of erga omnes partes and does not deal with the merits or other issues raised before the court.

scholarly journals Doctrinal Differences in the Definition of the Principles of Public International Law

2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 70-79
Author(s):  
Svitlana ZADOROZHNA ◽  
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Legal Systems ◽  
International Treaties ◽  
Basic Principles ◽  
Public International Law ◽  
International Court ◽  
The Common ◽  
General Principles Of Law ◽  
International Legal System ◽  
Definition Of

The ambiguity of scholars' vision of the content of the principles of international law and their corresponding definition in doctrinal discussions can be reduced to two main directions. First, it is a problem of coverage of the concepts of principles of international law of generally accepted principles of law, and, secondly, the problem of limiting the category of principles of public international law to only ten basic principles of international law. These discussions confirm the relevance and urgency of its solution. The general principles of international law, as the inheritance of all mankind, are the result of the development of all legal systems of the world in its legal unity. These principles represent the unity of the general principles of international law, which are inherent only in the international legal system; general principles of law inherent in both national and international legal systems, as the ideological foundations of law; and common principles of national legal systems, which with certain comments can be applied to international legal relations. If we take as a basis Art. 38 of the Statute of the UN ICJ as a conditional list of sources of international law, where generally accepted principles of international law are not provided as such, the interpretation of this article can be imagined as conclusions that the principles of international law as special to general principles of law are norms of international law its reflection in any of the sources of international law, including those, which are unforeseen articles 38 of the Statute of the UN ICJ. The main difference between the principles of international law and general principles of law is that they contain specific rights and obligations for subjects of international law and are directly a regulator of international relations. Such unity can be deduced from the normative interpretation of Art. 38 of the UN Statute, in particular: the sources of enshrining the general principles of international law are customs and international treaties in accordance with paragraph a and paragraph b of Art. 38; the source of the general principles of law is paragraph c of Art. 38 of the Statute of the UN ICJ (general principles of law recognized by civilized nations); the source of identification or the legal basis for the application of the common principles of national law is paragraph d - ex aequo et bono, their application by an international court on the basis of the principle of justice.

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