V Omission, in Particular Command Responsibility

Author(s):  
Ambos Kai

This chapter continues the effort of this Volume to combine both comparative legal concepts with unique features of International Criminal Law. It is thus a direct result of the foundational work in Chapter II: International Criminal Law’s focus on individual criminal responsibility leads to an expressive purpose of punishments that again requires a criminalization of remote behavior by commanders and State leaders. This criminalization is based on the centuries old debate revolving around liability for omission. The chapter thus starts with a general explanation of the concept of omission vis-á-vis action. The author answers the question of whether a general omission liability exists in International Criminal Law affirmatively, recognizing a general principle of law, albeit with strict requirements. Drawing on the results from Chapter II, the author argues in favor of a criminalization of omission based on the prevention of harm and the protection of important legal goods/interests. The basis for this criminalization/liability is the respective person’s duty to act.

Author(s):  
Kai Ambos

This chapter analyses the concept of defences in international criminal law. It starts off with some general conceptual remarks defining defences, on a meta level, as exceptions to the (secondary) rule expressed by the respective offence; as such, they do not invalidate this rule—the prohibition sub poena by the offence—but entail its non-application. In the main part, the chapter proposes a systematization along the lines of a substantive/procedural distinction (substantive reasons to exclude individual criminal responsibility versus procedural obstacles/bars to criminal prosecution) and further distinguishing between full and partial defences, justifications and excuses, failure of proof defences, and alibi. On the basis of this classification, a hierarchy of defences is suggested.


Author(s):  
Karolina Wierczyńska ◽  
Andrzej Jakubowski

This chapter examines the ongoing process of consolidating international criminal law regimes for counteracting cultural heritage crimes, with particular focus on reparations for cultural harm. It begins with a wider panorama of international criminal law and jurisprudence in relation to cultural heritage crimes. This background outlines the limited provisions of the Rome Statute and offers some critical observations in relation to the evolving system of individual criminal responsibility for cultural heritage crimes. Second, it scrutinizes the approach taken by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in convicting Al Mahdi for the crime of intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion and/or historical monuments. Third, this chapter considers the issue of remedies and reparations for cultural harm suffered in light of the relevant provisions of the Rome State and the practice of international human rights bodies. Next, it analyzes the approach taken by the ICC in Al Mahdi regarding the methodology of determining reparations for the international destruction of cultural heritage. This chapter also analyzes the possible reconsideration of the crime of deliberate attacks against protected cultural sites going beyond the notion and scope of war crime.


2008 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 509-532 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caroline Fournet

AbstractDue to the heinous nature of international crimes, admissible defences in the context of international criminal justice understandably constitute an issue surrounded with controversy. Yet, while International Criminal Law precludes the use of a series of defences, it also admits that certain grounds may exclude individual criminal responsibility or mitigate punishment even in the case of the most serious international crimes. The present study thus proposes to analyse the permissibility of these defences and the availability of such grounds for excluding responsibility by drawing a comparison between Public International Law and International Criminal Law and by highlighting the differences and discrepancies between the two systems. Ultimately, this analysis aims at demonstrating that International Criminal Law, one of Public International Law's children, has now surpassed its parent to become a more sophisticated and a fairer legal and judicial system, for both the defendants and the victims.


Author(s):  
Asif Khan ◽  
Shaukat Hussain Bhatti ◽  
Abid Shah

Over the last few years, international criminal law has included an internationally recognized definition of the crime of aggression. One may sight the respective portion from part two (Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Applicable Laws) Article 8 of the respective document. The purpose of this research represents the historical background of individual criminal responsibility under international law and the concept of individual criminal accountability for the crimes falling under the ambit of international criminal law committed by persons. Whereas the idea of how an individual could be brought to justice, for one of the core crimes of ICC's statutes, i.e., crime of aggression, was recently adopted and envisaged into Rome statutes, after the Kampala conference 2010. The concept of individual criminal responsibility for the crime of aggression faced many difficulties in at-least adopting its proper definition, which was leftover for future when Rome statue was formulated. To keep pace, this concept needs further evolution. Such an evolution demands such a condition wherein while granting the characteristics of adaptability with the contextual conditions and principles of criminal law. This article explores the anatomy of the crime of aggression and highlights issues that remain to be resolved


Author(s):  
Laura Ausserladscheider Jonas ◽  
Dire Tladi

War crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and the crime of aggression could not be perpetrated without those who finance them. This article examines the basis for criminal liability in international criminal law (ICL) for persons who finance entities that perpetrate core crimes. Despite the need for clear rules, neither international courts nor scholars agree upon (i) whether liability exists for individuals who finance entities that perpetrate core crimes; and (ii) if so, the circumstances under which such liability exists. This article argues that an individual who finances an entity that perpetrates a core crime should be held criminally liable under customary international criminal law as an aider and abettor. The objective of this article is to clarify the rules that would enable international courts and tribunals to identify the extent to which individual criminal liability attaches to the financing of core crimes, as well as the legal basis for such liability. By clarifying the criminal accountability of individuals who finance entities that perpetrate core crimes, this article also seeks to clarify the mental elements of the mode of liability of aiding and abetting.


2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 629-664 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marina Aksenova

The provision in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (icc) on individual criminal responsibility can be considered sufficiently elaborated. The level of detail of Article 25(3) does not, however, prevent heated debates on its practical application. The Court initially leaned towards the expanded notion of “commission”, interpreted to cover instances where persons do not physically perpetrate the crime but enjoy certain degree of control over it. Underlying this trend was the premise that “commission” denotes a higher degree of blameworthiness, and is therefore more appropriate to describe involvement in mass atrocities. In contrast, the Katanga trial judgement, issued in March last year, undermined the conception of perpetration as a superior form of responsibility in international criminal law. Which position will prevail in a long run? The article explores the two convictions rendered by the Court to date and argues that the answer to this question is still unclear.


Author(s):  
Werle Gerhard ◽  
Jeßberger Florian

This chapter focuses on the general principles of international criminal law. It first develops a general theory of crimes under international law by considering the concept of crimes under international law as well as the context of organised violence. The structure of crimes under international law is also explored. Next, the chapter studies the material and mental elements of crimes under international law. Individual criminal responsibility and superior responsibility are also discussed, as are the grounds for excluding criminal responsibility. Next, the chapter covers inchoate crimes, omissions within the context of the ICC Statute, immunity, the multiplicity of offences, and finally, the requirements for prosecution.


2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 65
Author(s):  
Hilda Rezaee ◽  
Sadegh Salimi

<p>This study examines the overlap ofinternational responsibility of individual and state for genocide. To describe this overlap, the material and psychological elements of genocide are discussed. International criminal law with the distinction between "ordinary state responsibility" and "aggravated state responsibility " drawing the latter offences beyond the State's international responsibility that is mainly focused on the principle of compensation and in which punitive sanctions are not relevant. The result of this change is the establishment of individual criminal responsibility, and aggravated state responsibility.</p>The goal ofthe research is to Explain The Overlap of international responsibility of individual and state for genocide to argue that the two items are not two separate categories and rather, they complete each other. so that responsibility of individual and state for the same action following primarily, individual criminal responsibility and exclusively, Bring theaggravated state responsibility.


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