Part IV Separation of Powers, Ch.24 Review of Administrative Action

Author(s):  
Jalan Prateek ◽  
Rai Ritin

This chapter examines the concept of administrative review in the context of the Indian Constitution, with particular emphasis on how administrative actions are reviewed under Article 14. It first considers whether administrative review is different from legislative review, and especially whether the grounds of judicial review under Article 14 apply to the same extent when it comes to the validity of legislation compared with administrative action. It then discusses the scope of the power of administrative review under the concept of ‘reasonableness’ and whether this concept has been applied on a consistent basis. It also comments on the inherently abstract and imprecise nature of the concept of ‘reasonableness’ and how this has contributed to the lack of a judicially manageable test or standard for analysing the various cases adjudicated by the Indian Supreme Court. Finally, the chapter discusses the nature of executive power and how it may influence an adjudication of reasonableness.

Author(s):  
Vakil Raeesa

This chapter explores how the jurisdiction of the Indian Supreme Court has evolved as an appellate court, a constitutional court, and a ‘final’ court. It begins by reviewing the four kinds of appeal that may be heard by the Supreme Court as specified in the Indian Constitution: civil, criminal, questions of constitutional interpretation, and appeals by special leave of the Court. It then considers the uncertainty and expansion in the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction, with particular emphasis on the imbalance in jurisdictional reforms, the absence of guidelines for the exercise of discretion, and inconsistency in implementing constitutional provisions. It also discusses the Court’s advisory jurisdiction, adjudication of federal disputes, and jurisdiction to interpret the Constitution, along with its power to enforce justice and its claim to inherent powers. The chapter concludes by outlining some of the challenges faced by the Court today.


Author(s):  
Robinson Nick

This chapter examines the structure of the Indian judiciary, which includes the different types of courts and judges as well as the hierarchies and relations between them. In particular, it considers the appeal and stare decisis, along with the system of internal administrative control through which the Indian judiciary coordinates its behaviour. The discussion begins with an overview of India’s judicial system and the relevant provisions of the Indian Constitution. The chapter then discusses the functioning of the Indian Supreme Court, the High Courts, and subordinate judiciary. It comments on the top-heaviness of the Indian judiciary and its impact on the judicial system’s performance.


Author(s):  
Srikrishna BN

This chapter focuses on the independence of the Indian judiciary and how judicial independence has been interpreted and secured in the country’s constitutional law. In particular, it considers the balance between judicial independence and judicial accountability, along with various concerns and goals that have shaped constitutional doctrine in this area. The chapter begins with and primarily focuses upon a study of the appointment of judges to the higher judiciary and its relevance to the debate over judicial independence in India. It then describes the conditions of service of officers and servants of the Indian Supreme Court and the High Courts as spelled out in the Indian Constitution. It also discusses the approach towards disciplinary action against judges, including their impeachment, and concludes by looking at issues that are integral to the question of judicial independence, especially those relating to salaries, tenure, transfers, and removal.


2015 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-90
Author(s):  
Janina Boughey

Although the High Court has never ruled on the issue, the prevailing view has been that unless parliaments enact bills of rights, the principle of proportionality does not and cannot play a role in judicial review of administrative decisions in Australia. Yet in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li, a majority of the High Court hinted that this may not be the case. This article analyses the reasons for Australia's longstanding reluctance to embrace proportionality in the administrative law context, and whether the decision in Li has altered this position. It then explores overseas developments in proportionality review which reveal that the principle may take on many forms in the administrative law context, with differing implications for the separation of powers. The article finds that it might be possible to accommodate certain methods of applying proportionality within Australia's judicial review framework, but not without significant broader changes to judicial review of administrative action in Australia.


2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Daly

This article draws attention to the post-Dunsmuir framework regarding the standard of review of administrative action and the Supreme Court of Canada’s reluctance to engage in grand theorizing about the general principles of judicial review. The article explores the uncertainty surrounding the application of the standard of reasonableness and what factors can or should be taken into consideration during its application. The article identifies four key problems — the scope of the post-Dunsmuir framework, the scope of its correctness category, the difficult relationship between the reasons given for a decision and the substantive reasonableness of the decision in question, and the emergence of difficult distinctions bedevilling the application of the reasonableness standard. Through identifying weaknesses in the current administration of reasonableness review, it is hoped that the courts, sooner rather than later, will adopt a unified approach for using the reasonableness standard of review.


Author(s):  
Baxi Upendra

This chapter examines constitutional hegemony in relation to three forms of prudence: legisprudence, jurisprudence, and demosprudence. It considers how constitutional pluralism has influenced the making and working of the Indian Constitution, especially through the dynamics of the Supreme Court of India. In particular, it explores the notion of adjudicatory leadership and the concept of demosprudence in the context of the Indian Supreme Court, along with the changing relation between demosprudence and jurisprudence. The article first looks at the demosprudence of the Supreme Court of India, before discussing the concepts of organisational adjudicatory leadership, hermeneutic adjudicatory leadership, Social Action Litigation, and socially responsible criticism. It also analyses the politics and law of constitutional amendments.


2021 ◽  
pp. 115-132
Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi

This chapter looks at the Japanese experience with judicial review. The Supreme Court of Japan does not enforce those parts of the Japanese Constitution, like Article 9, which prohibits war making; Article 21, which protects freedom of speech; or Article 89, which forbids taxpayer money from being used to hire Shinto priests. The Supreme Court of Japan thus refuses to enforce important articles in the Constitution of Japan. It does rubber stamp and thus legitimize actions taken by the political branches of the government. Why has judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation failed to take root in Japan? Japan does not need either a federal or a separation of powers umpire, since Japan is, firstly, a unitary nation-state with no need for a federalism umpire; and, secondly, a parliamentary democracy with a weak upper house of the legislature. Moreover, Japan has never atoned for the wrongs it committed during World War II nor has it truly admitted to even having done the horrible things that Japan did. A nation cannot get rights from wrongs judicial review and a Bill of Rights unless it admits it has done something wrong. Finally, the Japanese Constitution contains an inadequate system of checks and balances. As a result, the Supreme Court of Japan may not have the political space within which it can assert power.


Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi

This chapter assesses the emergence of judicial review in Canada. Canadian judicial review emerged as a direct result of federalism and separation of powers umpiring by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC), which was Canada’s highest court from the adoption of the British North America Act in 1867 until Canada ended appeals to the JCPC in 1949. There was also, as Ran Hirschl would argue, an element of elite hegemonic entrenchment by imperial British colonial elites in the retention of the JCPC as the highest court of appeals in Canada from the creation of the Supreme Court of Canada in 1875 until Canada abolished appeals to the JCPC in 1949. Some Canadian elites tried and failed to end JCPC judicial review in Canadian cases in 1875. Canadian judicial review from 1867 to 1982 was exclusively concerned with federalism and separation of powers judicial umpiring because Canada had no constitutional Bill of Rights until 1982. There are thus two founding moments in the judicial review of legislation in Canadian history: firstly, the period from 1867 to 1982 when Canadian federalism and separation of powers law took shape as a result of federalism and separation of powers umpiring; and, secondly, the period from 1982 to the present, when the Supreme Court of Canada began vigorously enforcing the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The emergence of judicial review from 1982 down to the present day is partly a rights from wrongs phenomenon, and it is partly the result of constitutional borrowing from the United States’s Warren Court.


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